to what extent do nationalists agree on the state essay

Nationalism

Nationalism is the belief that the nation should be the central unit of political organisation, as the nation is the only community which is of significance. There are many different forms of nationalism and it is not one cohesive ideology.

Core ideas and principles

Nations: A nation is a group of people. It can be defined as a group of people who share particular characteristics, such as language, history, culture, religion, and so on. It can be difficult to define a nation, as factors such as language and history may be more or less important to different groups of people. Therefore, if people identify themselves as being part of a nation, this is the key categorisation of a nation.

Different nations have different characteristics and beliefs about what is important. The French consider language and cuisine to be important, and religion not important. Belgium, on the other hand, has more than one language, and Italy places emphasis on the Catholic religion. The USA does not have a particularly long history and is made up of many different ethnic backgrounds, so instead, commonality is seen through ideas such as the ‘American Dream’- the idea that anyone can succeed if they work hard enough.

Self-determination: This refers to the ability to decide how one is governed, or a nation ruling itself. This is based on the idea that, as the nation is the central form of political organisation, it is only right that the members of that nation are allowed to govern themselves, as they will know what is in their best interest.

Different types of nationalists have different views on self-determination. Some believe that the key to a stable world is one made up of independent nation-states, whereas others believe only their nation has the right to self-determination, at the expense of others. Conflicts throughout history have been fought on the principle of self-determination, such as the Balkans war of 1990 , where different ethnic groups fought for the right of self-rule following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Nation-state: A state is a geographical area with clear boundaries, therefore the nation-state is one in which a group of people regarding themselves as a nation rule themselves in their own sovereign territory. This is closely related to the concept of self-determination, and usually today the nation-state is the way a country is organised. This has not always been the case, for example, the nation of Germany was divided into two nation-states for much of the 20 th century.

Liberal nationalists aim to create a world composed of nation-states. Other forms of nationalism, for example, chauvinistic nationalism , suggest only some nations benefit from ‘nation-statehood’, whereas others should accept that they are better off as colonies of these ‘stronger’ nations.

Colonialism (also known as imperialism) was the accepted practice of many countries in history. It involves one country controlling another, by invasion, settlement or economic domination. Great Britain had the largest empire in history, made up of many African and Asian countries, now known as the ‘commonwealth’. Pursuing an Empire was seen as a good way of displaying power and ensuring prestige. As a consequence, there were fewer nation-states the further back in history one goes.

Culturalism: This argues that people have a deep, emotional tie to their nation. This is in contrast with civic nationalism (of which liberal nationalism is an example), which is based on a more rational or reason-based approach, suggesting there are rights and responsibilities which are agreed on and accepted by each member of the nation.

Culturalism suggests that each nation has an ‘essence’, referred to by Herder as the volksgeist (‘spirit’ of a nation). This is revealed through art, history, culture and shared stories or folktales. Herder’s ideas have been used to support expansionist nationalism , the idea that, as a nation’s spirit can be argued to be stronger than other nations’, colonial domination can be justified (Herder himself rejected this idea).

Civic nationalism suggests that one can join a nation instantaneously, whereas culturalism suggests that membership of a nation takes time to develop. Being German does not, therefore, mean living in Germany and being able to speak German, but having spent years living as a German, becoming absorbed in Germany’s culture and lifestyle. Culturalism links with patriotism- the belief of pride in one’s nation and having a strong emotional connection to it.

Culturalism does not have to necessarily lead to a desire for statehood. In Wales, for example, the Welsh language is preserved, as well as particular ways of life, but this has not translated into a popular desire for Wales to become a separate country (like many in Scotland wish).

Racialism: This is the belief that a person’s race (their biological background), is a significant aspect of their character, and that racial divisions are politically significant. Different races, therefore, have distinct qualities, and this may lead to a belief in the inherent superiority or inferiority of certain races. This leads to the idea of a racial hierarchy, and support for policies which ensure the separation of different races, in order to preserve their distinct characteristics.

Race can be distinguished from ethnicity, as ethnicity not only considers biological background but also a person’s culture, the culture of their parents or upbringing, their language, religion, and other factors.

Internationalism: This is the belief that people should look beyond traditional national boundaries, in order to make a better world and work in the interests of more people than just the citizens of one nation.

There are two main types:

• Liberal internationalism: individual nations have the right to self-determination (like individuals have the right to autonomy and freedom). These independent nation-states will naturally seek to co-operate with each other, by exchanging goods and services. This will lead to an interdependent network of states, which is inherently peaceful- as the costs of conflict would be too high. To help resolve disputes, supranational institutions (such as the EU) can play a part.
• Socialist internationalism: __ __concerned with extending principles of harmony, cooperation and community across all of humanity, believing that nations are an artificial way of dividing people. Nationalism and patriotism are ways by which false consciousness are maintained amongst workers, to prevent them from realising the fact of their exploitation. Marx suggested ‘the working man has no country’. Lenin suggested that one reason why capitalism has survived was the exploitation of workers in various countries, which allowed for improved wages and conditions in the ‘host’ country. This type of internationalism rejects nationalist thinking.

Nationalist views on:

• Human nature: there is a range of views in how nationalists view human nature. A common one is that human nature is reflected as a natural instinct and humans naturally wish to be united around common themes. Liberal nationalists see humans as rational individuals who will make choices out of free will. Conservative nationalists see humans as drawn to the familiar and known, which means nationalism unites a people with common traits.
• State: again, there is a range of views. Liberal nationalists view the state as a body which nations aspire to and the ideal preference is a world of nation-states. Conservative nationalists use the state as a device to unite a country and place it as a focal point of unity and trust, promoting the values of patriotism for the state. Expansionist nationalists use and view the state as a means of dominance, over both the indigenous inhabitants and as a means of challenging other states. In extremes, loyalty to the state is demanded from all citizens.
• Society: nationalists share a common view of society, in that it is defined in terms of ethnic or cultural traits. Society to that extent is a series of mono-cultural segments. Society is held together and identified by widely held ideas and beliefs - there is no division. Nationalists would see a multicultural society as unstable and not able to unify and work together for any common goal.
• Economy: nationalism is a cross-cutting doctrine, in that it can attach to views across the political spectrum, so there is no distinct or single economic view which emerges from nationalism. Nationalists on the extreme have willingly used economic planning to command the economy in terms of production. Conservative nationalists have been sceptical of large organisations with an international character taking ownership of a country’s economic capital.

Nationalism: Unity and Divisions Essay

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Introduction

Culture and identity in nationalism, nationalism and ethnic identification, ethnonationalism in the cultural community, the theory of primordialism and self -determination.

Nationalism is a complex concept that has been studied and debated extensively in anthropology, sociology, and political science. Nationalism is a core concept in anthropology that encompasses the desire for a collective identity and the belief in the value of one’s social, political, and cultural group. It has been described as expressing people’s sense of belonging to a nation or state and as an ideology that seeks to bind individuals into a unified nationality. In anthropological fields, it is considered a powerful force in the construction of collective identities and can be seen as a way of consolidating cultural, social, and political power within the nation-state. It has been linked to various forms of violence, oppression, and exclusion, yet it also serves to unite people in times of adversity. Additionally, nationalism has been utilized by indigenous peoples to construct identities of resistance, reclaiming and reviving traditional practices and cultures. In countries such as India, nationalism has been characterized by intolerance of differences and a belief that those who live in the region share a common culture, identity, and historical past (Girvin 2022). It is thus often used to promote feelings of patriotism, collective pride, and belonging among citizens of a particular region. In some cases, this belief can be a powerful engine for increasing civic participation and fostering a sense of belonging among members of a national community. However, when nationalism is framed as ethnonationalism, it can be a divisive force that erects boundaries between them and us, creating exclusivity and intolerance. This paper will support this statement with two arguments. The first part will argue that nationalism is important in fostering a sense of belonging and patriotism by focusing on the theory of social identity and ethnic identification. The second part of the paper will argue that although nationalism is an important approach in fostering unity and participation, it can be a divisive factor using the concepts of the cultural community, primordialism, and self-determination. The paper will use multiple case studies to affirm these arguments

One anthropological theory that supports nationalism as a powerful engine for increasing civic participation and belonging is the theory of social identity. This theory suggests that individuals are part of the self-concept and have a natural desire to belong to a group and that this desire can be fulfilled through national identity (Sanchez-Mazas and Licata 2015). When individuals identify as part of a nation, they become part of a larger community with shared values and goals, and this can increase their sense of belonging and engagement in civic activities. One recent case study demonstrating the anthropological theory of social identity is the controversy surrounding Confederate monuments in the United States.

Proponents of removing Confederate monuments argue that these statues honor individuals and ideologies that were rooted in slavery and white supremacy and that they continue to serve as symbols of racism and oppression. They further state that these statues are constant reminders of a dark chapter in American history and that their continued presence in public spaces sends a message that this history is not to be condemned (Walsh, 2020). Opponents of removing Confederate monuments argue that they are a part of American history and culture and that removing them is an attempt to erase this history. They argue that a great nation does not hide its history, and these statues represent Southern heritage and pride and serve as a reminder of the sacrifices made by those who fought in the Civil War (Nelson, 2017). They also argue that removing the statues is a form of censorship and an attack on free speech and expression. Moreover, many proponents contend that taking down statues does not solve racism; rather, it creates more division.

From an anthropological perspective, the controversy surrounding Confederate monuments is a clear example of social identity. Both sides of the debate are heavily invested in their own identities, and their arguments reflect this. Those who support the removal of Confederate monuments see themselves as fighting against racism and oppression, while those who oppose it see themselves as defenders of Southern heritage and culture. Furthermore, the debate over Confederate monuments reveals symbols’ role in shaping social identity. The statues themselves are symbols of a particular identity – that of the Confederacy and its values – and their continued presence serves as a constant reminder of this identity. For those who see the statues as symbols of racism and oppression, their continued presence reinforces their identity as victims of this oppression. Additionally, those who see the statues as symbols of Southern heritage and pride present that their removal attacks their identity.

Nationalism can be viewed as a powerful unifying force, with its core values of patriotism and loyalty to one’s nation providing an important source of social cohesion and shared identity. This is especially true in the digital world where media has been at the forefront in ensuring citizens’ a sense of togetherness and belonging (Mihelj and Jiménez‐Martínez 2020). In this regard, anthropology has long been interested in understanding how nationalism affects civic participation and belonging. Multiple anthropological concepts explain this phenomenon, and one is ethnic identification. This theory holds that individuals are more likely to become involved in activities related to the nation when they identify strongly with an ethnic group. One case study that illustrates the anthropological theory of ethnic identification is the controversy surrounding the Washington Redskins football team. In 2013, a group of Native American activists launched a campaign to pressure the team to change its name, arguing that it is a racist and offensive term that perpetuates stereotypes and undermines the dignity of Native American culture.

The Washington Redskins name has been controversial for decades, with critics arguing that it is a slur that perpetuates negative stereotypes of Native Americans and reinforces the marginalization and oppression of indigenous peoples. The team’s owner, Dan Snyder, has consistently defended the name, arguing that it is a “badge of honor” and a tribute to the team’s history and traditions (Shapira 2020). The debate over the organization’s name has sparked a heated national conversation about the meaning of ethnicity and identity and the extent to which public institutions and organizations should be held accountable for promoting cultural sensitivity and respect. Proponents of the name change argue that the term “Redskins” is a racial slur that should be eliminated from public discourse, while opponents argue that it is a harmless term representing a proud and noble heritage. The anthropological theory of ethnic identification posits that ethnicity is a social construct and that individuals and groups derive their sense of identity from shared cultural traits, such as language, religion, and customs. The opponents base their argument on ethnic absolutism, which suggests “nations as culturally homogeneous ‘communities of sentiment’ in which a sense of patriotic belonging can and should grow to become an important source of moral and political ideas” (Gilroy 1987, 59-60). This means that the team’s name is a unifying factor that represents the team’s values.

On the other hand, the proponents present that ethnicity is not a fixed or essential characteristic but rather a dynamic and fluid concept shaped by historical, political, and economic forces. This can be supported by Anderson’s concept of imagined communities that affirm that the dreams of racism originate from the ideologies of class which in this case is the team rather than a nation (Gilroy 1987). However, the team’s name has become a symbol of identity and belonging for many fans, who see it as a way to connect with the team’s history and traditions, thus abolishing their ethnic identification. For Native American activists, however, the name reminds them of the violence and oppression their ancestors endured at the hands of European colonizers.

The controversy over the Washington Redskins name highlights the different perspectives and experiences that individuals and groups have regarding ethnic identification. For some, the name is a source of pride and identity; for others, it is a painful reminder of the legacy of discrimination and violence, especially for native Americans (Bowman 2022). The debate over the name has also raised questions about the role of public institutions and organizations in promoting cultural sensitivity and respect. Many argue that the team has a responsibility to consider the impact of its name on Native American communities and to take steps to avoid perpetuating stereotypes and offensive imagery. However, others argue that the name is an important part of the team’s history and traditions and that efforts to change it attack their identity and construction.

The idea of ethnic nationalism, as proposed by Benedict Anderson in his book Imagined Communities, provides an interesting insight into how a nation can be understood as a cultural community. In particular, Anderson’s notion of nations as imagined communities speaks to the fact that nations are often constructed around shared values and commonalities such as language, religion, or culture (Eriksen 2010). However, Anderson further emphasizes that although countries may tend to imagine themselves, they are modern (Eriksen 2010)). This paper will explore this concept further by discussing one recent case study – the rise of ethnic Nationalism in Russia – highlighting how ethnonationalism can influence a nation’s politics, identity, and social dynamics. Russia provides an interesting example for analyzing the effects of ethnic nationalism because it has experienced both resurgences and declines in levels of nationalistic sentiment throughout its history. A strong sense of Russianness has been present for centuries, but this identity was strengthened greatly following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, which marked a new era for Russia as an independent state. Since then, there have been resurgences in both ethnic and civic nationalism that have had significant implications on various aspects of life within the country.

The resurgence of ethnonationalism in Russia is largely driven by Vladimir Putin’s government beginning in 2000. In particular, Putin sought to strengthen national unity and pride through a policy known as ‘Russification’ which aimed to promote cultural homogeneity throughout the nation by privileging Russian language and culture over those of other ethnicities or minorities such as Ukrainians, Tatars, and Jews. According to Benussi (2020, p. 92), “Putin’s national restoration belief brought considerable concerns about russification with the erosion of Tatar autonomy and uncertainty of Institutional Tatar-medium culture.” It can be argued that this policy reflects an underlying sentiment that ethnic Russians are superior to other groups within the nation and should be prioritized in terms of cultural representation, political power, and social status. Therefore, this aspect has led to a significant rise in xenophobia, prejudice, discrimination towards minority populations, and resentment by non-ethnic Russians who feel their culture and identity have been sidelined or overlooked.

Though it can be argued that the policies enacted by Putin’s government have had tangible effects on various aspects of Russian society, it is important to note that many elements of the country’s ethnic nationalism predate his presidency. For instance, there has long been a sense among many ethnic Russians that they constitute the backbone of Russia – particularly during times of crisis or turmoil – and have therefore been entrusted with preserving the nation’s culture, traditions, and values. Further, this notion has been presented as one of the major causes of inequalities in education and quality of life for other groups residing in the region (Gladkova et al., 2020). This notion has been perpetuated by state-sponsored media outlets as well as literature, art, and other forms of cultural expression emphasizing a strong sense of Russian identity. For example, in the painting “Defenders of the Fatherland” by Viktor Vasnetsov, ethnic Russian soldiers are depicted as heroic and brave, standing tall and proud against their enemies. Similarly, in Russia, ethnic Russians often refer to themselves as ” Russky,” which means “Russian” in English. This language reinforces the idea that ethnic Russians are the core of Russian society and culture.

Primordialism is an anthropological theory suggesting that national identity and loyalty are innate and inherited rather than being constructed or learned. According to this theory, individuals are born with a deep attachment to their national group, rooted in their genetic makeup, cultural traditions, and shared history. This implies that individuals have a natural and innate loyalty to their national group and that this loyalty cannot be changed or altered. The anthropological theory of national self-determination is based on the idea that people have a right to consider themselves different and distinct from others and thus have the freedom to dictate the state and form of government of their choice (Connor 1973). This theory is closely linked to nationalism, which is the belief in the inherent value of a particular national identity and the need to protect and promote it. Anthropologists argue that nations have a unique collective identity shaped by their history, culture, language, and social institutions. This collective identity is seen as a source of pride and dignity, and it is considered to be a fundamental human right. One recent case study that exemplifies the anthropological theory of primordialism and national self-determination at the center of ethnonationalism is the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been ongoing for decades, with both sides claiming national self-determination and sovereignty over their territories. At its core, the conflict is centered on the territorial dispute between the two sides, with Israel and Palestine claiming control over the same land. Israel has been accused of occupying the Palestinian territories, including the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Shafer 2018). They state that they have a deep connection to the land of Israel, which they consider their ancestral homeland. This attachment is rooted in their religious beliefs and traditions, which hold that God gave the land of Israel to the Jewish people. This has led to widespread resentment among the Palestinian population, who have been subject to restrictions on their movement and other human rights abuses such as limited access to land (Shakir 2021). In recent years, the conflict has also taken on a religious dimension, with both sides using religious rhetoric to justify their actions and claims to the land. Israel, as a predominantly Jewish state, sees itself as fulfilling a divine promise of the land of Israel to the Jewish people. This belief is rooted in the Bible and has been used to justify establishing and expanding Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories. For Palestinians, the conflict is a struggle for self-determination and the right to live in their ancestral homeland. Many Palestinians see themselves as the guardians of the land of Palestine and view Israeli actions as a violation of their religious and cultural rights. In addition, both sides have used religious rhetoric and symbols in their political discourse and propaganda, often invoking their respective holy texts and religious figures to support their positions and demonize the other side. This has contributed to the religious and cultural divisions between the two sides and fueled the ongoing conflict.

In this case, Israel and Palestine have claimed a primordial connection to the land using religion as a justification, leading to a zero-sum conflict over territory and national self-determination. The anthropological theory of primordialism suggests that national identity and self-determination are based on deep-seated, primordial ties to the land and culture rather than being constructed or negotiated through political processes. According to Coakley (2018), it emphasizes countries’ deep historical and cultural roots and assumes their quasi-objective behavior. However, one of the counterarguments to this approach is that national identity and self-determination are not fixed or inherent but rather are constructed and negotiated through political processes. One of the theories that support this argument is social constructivism. According to this perspective, how people understand and experience the world is not determined by objective facts or universal laws but rather by the social and cultural frameworks created and negotiated through interactions with others. This theory thus emphasizes the dynamic and fluid nature of national identity, arguing that it is not fixed or predetermined but rather is constructed and negotiated through ongoing social and political processes experienced in the case between Israel and Palestine. This perspective challenges the notion of national identity as something fixed or inherent and highlights how national identity is shaped and influenced by various social and political factors.

In conclusion, nationalism is a complex concept nationalism is a complex concept that can both foster unity and civic participation but can also lead to divisions and exclusion if not carefully managed. It is considered a powerful force in the construction of collective identities and can be seen as a way of consolidating cultural, social, and political power within the nation-state. However, it can also be a divisive force when framed as ethnonationalism, creating boundaries between “us” and “them” and fostering exclusivity and intolerance. This paper has supported this statement with two arguments: nationalism is important in fostering a sense of belonging and patriotism through the theory of social identity and ethnic identification, but it can also be a divisive factor through the concepts of the cultural community, primordialism, and self-determination. Multiple case studies have been used to support these arguments.

Benussi, Matteo. 2018. “ Ethnic Muslims and the ‘Halal Movement’ in Tatarstan .” Anthropological Journal of European Cultures 27 (1): 88–93. Web.

Bowman, Emma. 2022. “For Many Native Americans, the Washington Commanders’ New Name Offers Some Closure.” NPR. NPR. Web.

Coakley, John. 2017. “ ‘Primordialism’ in Nationalism Studies: Theory or Ideology? ” Nations and Nationalism 24 (2): 327–47. Web.

Connor, Walker. 1973. “The Politics of Ethnonationalism.” Journal of International Affairs 27 (1): 1–21. Web.

Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. 2010. “Nationalism.” Essay. In Ethnicity and Nationalism . London: Pluto Press.

Gilroy, Paul. 1987. There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation . London: Routledge.

Girvin, Brian. 2022. “From Civic Pluralism to Ethnoreligious Majoritarianism.” State and Majority Nationalism in Plurinational States , 27–45. Web.

Gladkova, Anna, Elena Vartanova, and Massimo Ragnedda. 2020. “ Digital Divide and Digital Capital in Multiethnic Russian Society .” Journal of Multicultural Discourses 15 (2): 126–47. Web.

Mihelj, Sabina, and César Jiménez‐Martínez. 2020. “ Digital Nationalism: Understanding the Role of Digital Media in the Rise of ‘New’ Nationalism .” Nations and Nationalism 27 (2): 331–46. Web.

Nelson, Sophia. 2017. “ Opinion: Don’t Take down Confederate Monuments. Here’s Why .” NBCNews.com. NBCUniversal News Group. 2017. Web.

Raviv, Omri Shafer. 2018. “ Studying an Occupied Society: Social Research, Modernization Theory and the Early Israeli Occupation, 1967–8 .” Journal of Contemporary History 55 (1): 161–81. Web.

Sanchez-Mazas, Margarita, and Laurent Licata. n.d. “ Social Identity Theory .” Social Identity Theory – an Overview | ScienceDirect Topics. Web.

Shakir, Omar. 2022. “ A Threshold Crossed .” Human Rights Watch. Web.

Shapira, Ian. 2020. “ A Brief History of the Word ‘Redskin’ and How It Became a Source of Controversy .” The Washington Post. WP Company. Web.

Walsh, Colleen. 2020. “ Historian Puts the Push to Remove Confederate Statues in Context .” Harvard Gazette. Harvard Gazette. Web.

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Nationalism Theory

Origins and develpoment

• Born during the French Revolution – revolutionary creed – reflects the idea that ‘subjects of the crown’ should become ‘citizens of France’ – Jean Jacques Rousseau.
• Nationalism is at heart the simple belief that the nation is the natural and proper unit of government.

Core values

• The nation – the nation should be the central principle of political organisation. Most basic level – nations are cultural entities, collections of people bound together by shared values and traditions (common language, religion and history), and usually occupying same geographic area. Nation can thus be defined by objective factors: people who satisfy a requisite set of cultural criteria belong to a nation; those who do not are non-nationals. However, there is neither a blueprint nor any objective criteria that can establish where and when a nation exists.
• Language often taken to be clearest symbol of nationhood – German nationalism – founded on sense of cultural unity, reflected in the purity and survival of German language. However there are shared languages in countries without any sense of common identity (America, New Zealand and England).
• Religion is another component – expresses common moral values and spiritual beliefs.
• Ethnic or racial unity – usually has a cultural rather than biological basis. Often share common history and traditions usually preserved by recalling past glories, national independence etc. Some nationalist feelings based more on future expectations than shared memories – applies in the case of immigrants who have been ‘naturalised’ – USA – ‘land of immigrants’.
• Organic community – humankind is naturally divided into a collection of nations, each possessing a distinctive character and separate identity. National ties and loyalties are found in all societies – they endure over time and operate at an instinctual, even primordial, level. ‘Primordialist’ approach – national identity is historically embedded: Anthony Smith highlighted the continuity between modern nations and pre-modern ethnic communities – implies there is little difference between ethnicity and nationality, modern nations essentially being updated versions of immemorial ethnic communities. ‘Situtationalist’ approach – national identity is forged in response to changing situations – Ernest Gellner – degree to which nationalism is linked to modernisation.
• National community is a particular kind of community – Ferdinand Tonnies – gemeinschaft – typically found in traditional societies and is characterised by natural affection and mutual respect. Emphasis on community – notion of creating unity – everyone has a role and common goal.
• Self-determination – Rousseau’s stress on popular sovereignty (‘general will’). Government should be based on the indivisible collective will of the entire community. Nationhood and statehood are intrinsically linked – maintaining political independence, usually expressed in the principle of national self-determination: the goal is the founding of a ‘nation-state’ (one nation within a single state). This can be achieved through unification and independence. Most desirable form of political organisation – when a people who share a common identity gain the right to self-government, nationality and citizenship coincide. Nationalism also legitimises the authority of the government – popular self-government. Not always associated with this concept of separatism, however – may instead by expressed through federalism.
• Identity – nationalism tells people who they are: gives people history, forges social bonds and collective spirit, creates a sense of destiny larger than individual existence. However, cultural nationalism emphasises the strengthening or defence of cultural identity over overt political demands – political nationalism is ‘rational’, cultural is ‘mystical’.
• Importance of a distinctive national consciousness – Herder – each nation possesses a volksgeist (national spirit) – role of nationalism is to develop an awareness of nation’s culture and traditions.

Liberal nationalism

• Mazzini – ‘prophet’ of Italian unification who believed that individual liberty would be improved through nationalism
• Rousseau – defence of popular sovereignty – fusion of popular self-government and liberal principles brought about by the fact that the multinational empires against which nationalists fought were autocratic and oppressive.
• Wilson – ideas on self-determination at the end of World War I, which promoted the idea of self- rule and rejected imperialism.
• Nationalists believed nations to be sovereign entities, entitled to liberty, and also possessing rights, most importantly the right to self-determination. Liberal nationalism is liberating as it opposes all forms of foreign domination and oppression and it stands for the ideal of self-government – reflected in belief in constitutionalism and representation.
• Believe that nations are equal, in the sense that they are equally entitled to the right to self-determination. Ultimate goal of liberal nationalism is the construction of a world of independent nation-states – “the boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of nationality” (J.S. Mill).
• Principle of balance or natural harmony applies to the nations of the world. For liberals, nationalism is a force that is capable of promoting unity within each nation amongst all nations on the basis of mutual respect for national rights and characteristics.
• Ignores the darker face of nationalism – the irrational bonds of tribalism and the powers of nationalism emotionally which results in people dying for their country for a just reason or not. Also misguided in its belief that nation-states provide political and international harmony – in all so-called nation-states there is a range of languages etc.

Expansionist nationalism/right-wing nationalism

• The aggressive face of nationalism became apparent in the late nineteenth century.
• Jingoism – mood of nationalist enthusiasm and public celebrations provoked by military expansion or imperial conquest.
• Distinguishes from liberal nationalism as it is chauvinistic – derived from Nicolas Chauvin, a French soldier who had been fanatically devoted to Napoleon. Nations are not thought to be equal in their right to self-determination, rather some nations are believed to possess characteristics or qualities that make them superior to others.
• National chauvinism breeds from a feeling of intense, even hysterical nationalist enthusiasm. Charles Maurras called such intense patriotism “integral nationalism”: individuals and independent groups lose their identity within an all-powerful ‘nation’, which has an existence and meaning beyond the life of any single individual. This is often accompanied by militarism.
• National chauvinism has particularly strong appeal for the isolated and powerless, for whom nationalism offers the prospect of security, self-respect and pride. Often stimulated by ‘negative integration’, the portrayal of another nation or race as a threat or an enemy. In the face of the enemy, the nation draws together and experiences an intensified sense of its own identity and importance.

Conservative nationalism

• Disraeli and Bismarck – belief nationalism maintains social order and defends traditional institutions.
• Conservative nationalism tends to develop in established nation-states. Conservatives care less about self-determination and more about the promise of social cohesion and public order embodied in the sentiment of national patriotism. Society is organic – nations emerge naturally from the desire of human beings to live with others who possess the same views, habits and appearance. Humans are imperfect who seek security within national community. Principal goal is thus to maintain national unity by fostering patriotic loyalty and ‘pride in one’s country’. By incorporating the working glass into the nation, conservatives have often seen nationalism as an antidote to social revolution (Disraeli). De Gaulle harnessed nationalism to conservative cause by pursuing an independent, even anti-American defence and foreign policy in France and attempted to restore order and authority to build a powerful state. Thatcherism is similar to Gaullism – national independence within Europe.
• Conservative character of nationalism is maintained by an appeal to tradition and history; nationalism thereby becomes a defence for traditional institutions and a traditional way of life – con. nat. Is essentially nostalgic and backward looking, reflecting on a past age of national glory or triumph.
• Particularly prominent when the sense of national identity is threatened or in danger of being lost – issues of immigration and supranationalism have helped to keep this form of nationalism alive. Conservative reservations about immigration stem from belief that cultural diversity leads to instability and conflict. Enoch Powell and his “rivers of blood” speech is a good example of the importance of immigration to many conservatives. Stable and successful societies must be based on shared values and a common culture – immigration should by firmly restricted. Conservative nationalists concerned about supranational bodies such as the EU posing threats to cultural and national bonds.

Racial nationalism

• In countries where nationalism is based on ethnic identity, racialism is a key part.
• Racial superiority and exclusivity, unifying the racial group in one state and therefore expansionist.
• Exemplified by Houston Chamberlain and Arthur de Gobineau and their belief in racial superiority, which justified the subjugation of other  inferior nations.
• This was not just in Europe but also in Africa, where many nations were considered to be inferior and therefore it was the duty of the Nordic and Germanic peoples to educate them
• This idea was taken on by the Nazis to promote the idea of an Aryan race.

Cultural nationalism

• Form of nationalism that emphasises the strengthening or defence of cultural identity over overt political demands.
• Not uncommonly, cultural nationalists view the state as a peripheral if not an alien entity. Cultural nationalism is ‘mystical’ in that it is based on a romantic belief in the nation as a unique historical and organic whole.
• Typically draws more on popular rituals, traditions and legends than on elite or ‘higher’ culture.
• Von Herder was a strong believer in the unity given to a nation by its shared culture and history.

Post-colonial nationalism

• Nationalism is a powerful tool when a country is trying to gain its independence, as it seeks to ensure that there is a direct and coherent opposition to the imperial power, based on social unity and national identity.
• Many newly independent states are actually authoritarian, as the boundaries of those states are often determined in an arbitrary way, and therefore, incorporate multicultural groups.
• This was a problem again in Africa with the division of many countries cutting across cultural and tribal lines. As a result people like Charles Nyerere used dislike of former colonial powers as a way of creating some form of national identity.

Socialist nationalism

• Socialism is used in conjunction with nationalism to underpin independence and self-determination and to distance them from the former independence and self-determination and to distance them from the formal imperial and capitalist power. Socialism is used to create solidarity, national purpose and unity through justice.
• Charles Nyerere combined his distrust of the west with his left wing beliefs, creating strong state provision for health and education.
• Lenin used this type of nationalism when Russia was being invaded by the White Army in the Russian Civil War.

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This chapter is about national ties and how they are supposed to act as a glue that holds the state together in the eyes of its citizens. A nation-state is one where all the people in the state are bound together by ties of national solidarity. Nationalists argue that solidarity derived from 'thin' concepts like 'justice' and 'utility' cannot bind people to their states. Conceptually, the sources of solidarity have either derived from the ideas of ethnicity or of civic unity. The questions provoked by the attempts to redeem civic nationalism concern the coherence and practicality of civic solidarity. Some contemporary political theorists regard nationalism as an anachronistic vestige of less enlightened times or as a distraction from the real issues of politics. The rise of ethnic nationalism and of imperialist racialism led to the sidelining in the more established nation-states of the republican traditions associated with civic nationalism.

Introduction

This chapter is about national ties and how they are supposed to act as a glue that holds the state together in the eyes of its citizens. A nation-state, so the story goes, is one where all the people in the state are bound together by ties of national solidarity. The solidarity legitimates the state – it tells the citizens why they are members and why it is right for the state to exist. In theory the power of the state is really in the hands of the nation because the state is nothing more or less than the great national project.

National stories are told all over the world. Despite its sordid history, the South African state is legitimated as the project of the ‘rainbow nation’. The Scots have a new parliament (though not quite a state) that represents the Scottish nation. The newly unified German state allows the nation to shape its destiny as one. East Timor is free from Indonesian domination, and the nation can now have its say. Of course, this is not the whole story. For example, national solidarity appears in a less benign light in the former Yugoslavia, where conflict has raged over national self-determination. When members of one nation live in another state, things often get unpleasant. Very many people have killed and died in the name of the nation, and states have disintegrated into bitterness and conflict as a result.

Nationalism can be very exclusive. Much of the thinking described in this chapter prizes a solidarity that is strong yet socially inclusive. In section 1 the issue of solidarity will be explained. Nationalists argue that solidarity derived from ‘thin’ concepts like ‘justice’ and ‘utility’ cannot bind people to their states. The only solidarity that works is one that appeals to strong affections for communities, in this case the nation. Conceptually, the sources of solidarity have either derived from ideas of ethnicity or from ideas of civic unity (section 2). The stories we tell are often either about common origins, or common social traditions. We may be members of the Volk or citizens of ‘the land of the free’.

In section 3, three attempts to give civic nationalism the upper hand are outlined. The questions provoked by attempts to redeem civic nationalism concern the coherence and practicality of civic solidarity. Is it possible to have a strong solidarity that does not descend either into chaos or into ethnic cruelty? Can we say ‘we’ without presupposing some sort of common character? Civic nationalists think we can, and they argue for a renewal of nationalist thought. However, perhaps they are swimming against currents that are just too strong.

1 On solidarity

Some contemporary political theorists regard nationalism as an anachronistic vestige of less enlightened times, or as a distraction from the real issues of politics. For example, when asked the question ‘what reasons do we have to identify with the state to which we belong?’ they may answer that we have ties because states have pragmatic and tangible benefits, both economically and socially. Alternatively, they might say that we should not have primary ties to states at all, but should have ties to justice.

For example, Robert Goodin sees the state as having two roles. First, it forces people to ‘“internalise” externalities’. 1 The state ensures that people pay the real cost of their activities, including environmental and social costs. If citizens drive cars, they pay for roads and for the costs of the pollution that they create. The state co-ordinates the payment of these costs. Second, the state may be the primary agent of welfarism where, through any one of a number of political agendas, wealth is redistributed according to certain political criteria. 2 So, when we ask why we have ties to the state, the answer is that we are tying ourselves to the usefulness of the state.

By contrast, John Rawls emphasises justice. His theory is related to Goodin’s in that he sees the state as having a redistributive and regulatory role. 3 The key to Rawls’s understanding of the state is that it is not the starting point of his thinking. Institutions will provoke allegiance if people find them acceptable, and citizens will find them acceptable if they are just. 4 The formations of states, as manifested in the drawing of their boundaries, are thought by Rawls to be arbitrary. As such, the place of states in the political run of things is just not all that significant. The significant thing, again, is justice. What matters is the development of an ‘overlapping consensus’ on the habits and institutions by which people, who might otherwise diverge, can get along with each other.

Very many people have argued that the sorts of solidarity envisaged by Goodin, Rawls and others is too ‘thin’ to be meaningful. This criticism has often come from communitarians and multicultural theorists, who argue that political understanding must take account of the fact that individuals are strongly embedded in communities. 5 These communities shape individuals in ways that are politically significant. Community membership determines the ‘thick’ political conceptions that real people, not the abstractions of liberal theory, carry around with them.

As with communitarian and multicultural theory, nationalism emphasises the importance of community membership. Nationalists argue that ties grounded in the justice of institutions, or ties grounded in pragmatic calculation, are not strong enough to bind people to the state. Solidarity that is rooted in utility or justice as advocated by Goodin and Rawls, is not solidarity in any meaningful sense.

For nationalists, such a solidarity fails to do two things. It fails to describe the reasons why people have experienced solidarity in the past, in situations when their relationships with their states were neither hugely beneficial nor just in the senses that Goodin and Rawls hold. Such a solidarity also fails to tell us why people should regard a state as theirs . Justice, almost always universalist in intention, and pragmatic calculation, always contingent on benefits, cannot explain the feelings of ownership that French people have regarding the French state, or that Spaniards feel regarding the Spanish state.

A theory of nationalism explains the affection people feel for their state. Nationalists argue that the mutual affections of co-nationals are a positive part of political life. National affections help legitimate states, creating a sense of membership and ownership. National membership is the root of legitimate authority. The state can tell us what to do because the state is our national project.

2 The nation and the nation-state

Historically, constitutional democracy is linked to the nation-state. When absolute monarchs ruled states, states were regarded as legitimate in virtue of the authority of the king, who was thought to receive his authority from God. Solidarity had nothing to do with it. When kings were overthrown across Europe and in America, the question of legitimacy arose. One answer to this question was that authority should be defined, at least in part, by solidarity. Boundaries were conceived as being dependent on something other than political decisions. Boundaries of states reflected the territorial spread of nations.

In France, the link between nationalism and state power was enshrined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Individual, adopted in August 1789. The declaration was to serve as the preamble to France’s Revolutionary constitution of 1791 and was drawn from the constitutions of some American states, and from the philosophies of Locke, Voltaire and Rousseau. Article III states that ‘The principle of all sovereignty resides in the Nation. No body or individual may exercise any power other than that expressly emanating from the Nation’. Article III was derived specifically from Rousseau’s writing. 6

There are two ways of thinking about the nation. When the thinkers of the French revolution thought of sovereignty as being vested in the nation, they meant that it was vested in the people born in France. However, the second wave of nationalism, beginning in the late nineteenth century, thought of the nation as a Volk – as a group tied by their shared nationhood, not by their being born in a certain state. In its first manifestation at the origins of the civic tradition, the nation was decidedly subordinate to the bourgeois state and attendant rights held by all the citizenry. The second wave was rooted in the romantic origins of pre-political groups. According to ethnic nationalists, the state was subordinate to the nation, because the nation was there first. 7

2(a) Civic nationalism

As I said, in the civic tradition the nation was assumed to be more or less everybody in the state. Political structures were set up in line with the classical republican ideas of citizenship and discourse. However, a state like France was too big to appeal to the sorts of strong solidarity that existed in medieval city-states, where it was likely that everyone knew each other. The looser phenomenon of national consciousness provided an appropriate story around which solidarity could be built.

Quite literally, the state was deemed to be the national project. It belonged to everyone, because everyone was involved in sustaining it. The appeal to nation would present people with the interest and reference that overrode other, more contingent concerns. Now, one could lose from the everyday rough and tumble of the political world, and yet be given a reason to stay loyal. You might not have your way in deciding the direction the ship of state was going to take, but you were always part of the crew.

The civic national ideal also enshrined a concept of equality that had been missing in the monarchical state. Not only were you part of the crew, but you had as much right to be captain as everyone else. As such, the experience of inequality was substantively different to the experience of inequality under monarchism. Now inequality was thought of as a facet of merit, not of birth. All members of the state were to be treated as equals without being equal in merit. Success was linked to effort. The supposition that every member could, through their own effort, climb to the top of the pile, was part of the basis for people’s nationalist affections. And if you were a loser, you could console yourself, so the story went, by the knowledge that you were still a member of the crew. ‘Socially humiliated and discontented people find in the membership of the nation a new sense of pride, a new dignity: “I am poor, but at least I am American (or German or Italian)”.’ 8 You were still, so the story went, an author of and participant in the great national project.

2(b) Ethnic nationalism

The second sort of nationalism chiefly developed across central and eastern Europe. This nationalism was not based on the prior presence of a state or on the need to legitimate a state. Instead it was based on groups that made claims to state-hood. These groups appealed to the potent romantic brew of perceived cultural and ethnic commonality to justify their uniqueness – the qualities that separated them from their peers in whatever state they happened to find themselves in.

According to Hannah Arendt, the second wave of nationalism was substantially different from the first wave in that civic nationalism ‘even in its most wildly fantastic manifestations, did not hold that men of French origin, born and raised in another country, without any knowledge of French language or culture, would be “born Frenchmen” thanks to some mysterious qualities of body and soul’. 9 The new form of nationalism, or ‘tribalism’ as Arendt called it, was characterised by a concentration on the nation as a set of shared characteristics. The problem with this is that it was not confined to national borders, as civic nationalism was. So, pan-Germanism was an aspiration to unite the Germanic peoples of Europe, not a celebration of national achievement. This nationalism justified, and justifies, what we now call Balkanisation – the attempted division of territory along supposedly ethnic lines. 10

The rise of ethnic nationalism and of imperialist racialism led to the sidelining in the more established nation-states of the republican traditions associated with civic nationalism. In France, where the republican tradition had been strong, the tone of statehood started to tend towards the authoritarian. Now the Dreyfusard appeal to ‘the stern Jacobin concept of the nation based upon human rights – that republican view of communal life which asserts that (in the words of Clemenceau) by infringing on the rights of one you infringe on the rights of all’ 11 fell on deaf ears. In Germany, where there was little in the way of a republican tradition, ‘antirepublicanism was even more pronounced’. 12 The automatic right of state members to citizenship disappeared, and those who were deemed to be outside the nation were regarded as being beyond the protection of the state. Now, you were not of a place because you were born there. You were of a place because it was your home, your birthright.

The Jacobin tradition was usurped by the ethnic drives of the new nations, by people who drove their self-conceptions into increasingly narrow corridors and away from the democratic embrace of republicanism. Now we associate nationalism with racism, intolerance and ethnic hatred. The nation is largely, though not solely, the cause of the Balkan wars, of intolerance towards immigrants and of innumerable breaches of human rights. If we are interested in a moral world that reflects diversity, plurality and inclusion, we tend to fear nationalism’s rise.

The problem is that, without denying the dangers of nationalism, very many people also recognise that the nation creates important social bonds. We cannot and should not ignore the nation, despite the cruelties associated with its ethnic manifestation. It is the root of solidarity in the nation-state that is still the primary focus of our political lives.

The contemporary nation-state is being squeezed, both from above and from below. The world we have inherited is made up of increasingly multi-ethnic societies, with stronger global institutions and changes in the nature of communications media, travel and education. As a matter of course, people make claims to sovereignty within state borders. People also make moral and legal appeals to institutions that exist beyond state borders. The nation-state is under pressure from all sides. Nevertheless, the weakening of the nation-state should not hide the fact that nationalism tapped, and still taps, directly into people’s deepest affections. The nation is still a political issue. It has never gone away.

3 Transcending ethnic nationalism

Can we derive a notion of nationalism that does not hark back to the ethnic nationalisms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? Is it possible to hold nationalist sentiments without betraying a liberal or pluralist outlook? Some thinkers wish to preserve the legitimacy of states by restoring nationalism to its civic roots. The legitimacy of states, they argue, is under threat both from reactionary ethnic nationalists and from the dissolution of communities, as traditionally conceived. In a globalised world, the nation can play an important stabilising role. While ethnic nationalism is not desirable, neither is a situation where states cannot relate to their citizenries. Nationalists want to develop an agenda that will help reorientate people back to a relationship with their democratic states.

3(a) Postnationalism

Postmodernist thinkers ‘hold this belief in common: that the project of modernity is now deeply problematic’. 13 As anti-dogmatists, they try to show how sets of concepts that had been accepted as similar or identical in the past are in fact separate. Their political conceptions tend to be oppositional. This is because of the inherently challenging nature of postmodern questions. Postmodernists present a challenge to perceived unity, and to accepted power. They challenge the supposed structures of the modern world.

In Postnationalist Ireland , Richard Kearney’s self-proclaimed agenda is to separate into their constituent parts and varieties a series of nationalist concepts that have been assumed to be identical, or to be related. He argues that the relationship between citizens and the state, and indeed between each other, must be taken apart. Once this is done, people might derive value from nationalist ties without supposing that they should link national membership to ownership of the state. This can only be done if people understand that the basis of their ties is not real but ‘imagined,’ as Benedict Anderson put it – something that is not natural and has no implications beyond itself. 14 People must realise that their identities are not unitary and complete, but are disparate, heterogeneous and complicated.

The idea that national freedom should be equated with state authority will inevitably lead to instability. In the face of contrary feelings, the state cannot maintain the unity of a diverse population. We should acknowledge the different sources of legitimacy and identity. Authority can be based on these different sources. The ethnic nation is not the sole source of identity and of legitimation. If we want stability, authority must be dispersed above and below the nation-state: ‘nations and states are of our own making and can be remade according to other images’. 15 If we understand the fact that our institutions are invented, then we will be willing to think about them creatively, and will reject the old dogmas.

Kearney replies to the question ‘can citizens live by law alone?’ in the negative. To try to ‘cure’ people of their communal ties would inevitably descend into totalitarian oppression. Instead, our communal expressions should find ‘more appropriate forms’. 16 We should not hijack the state and turn it into a medium for the ethnos. Instead, we should recognise the things that hold us together as well as the things that keep us apart. The transcendence of ethnic nationalism lies in the recognition of the dubious grounds of ethnicity, both morally and historically. The post-nation is the self-knowing nation.

Margaret Canovan argues that Kearney’s approach is problematic. The way we think about ourselves is not so clear. Following Arendt, she writes that ‘politics is not a matter of moulding passive material. Free politics means action engaged in by plural actors, and no one can control or predict its outcome’. 17 The aspirations of postmodern nationalists may be too optimistic. Holders of identity may be too stubborn to develop the realisations that Kearney wants.

The arguments of postmodernists are far removed from the prevailing feelings of people. When it comes to identity, appearances may deceive. Post-modernism is, at best, ahead of its time. Indeed, as Canovan says,

encouraging citizens to debate matters of common identity may generate more enlightened and cosmopolitan views, but it could just as well provide opportunities for populist mobilisation that might reinforce entrenched conceptions of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ or lead to re-imagined identities of an even less palatable kind. The increasing success, in Western Europe and elsewhere, of political parties hostile to immigration is a reminder of these possibilities. 18

3(b) Liberal nationalism

In On Nationality , David Miller argues that liberalism and nationalism do not have to conflict. He starts from the premise that nations can provide people with a context for thick ethical outlooks – for concrete feelings of loyalty, bravery and the like, as opposed to thin, ethereal notions of justice and virtue. People’s sense of value, or right and wrong, can come from the more concrete conceptions propagated by the nation. The nation also presents a rich foundation in our globalised, homogenous world. We should value the cultural depth that can be found amongst people who live their lives in rooted communities. 19 Nationalism provides us with a home. Nations exist to the extent that people believe they exist. The truth or falsity of those nationalist beliefs is not an issue.

The specific nation is ‘strangely amorphous when we come to ask about the rights and obligations that flow from it’:

Whereas in face-to-face communities, especially perhaps those with defined objectives, there is a clear understanding of what each is expected to contribute towards the welfare of other members, in the case of nationality we are in no position to grasp the demands and expectations of other members directly, nor they ours. 20

We may be able, Miller writes, to discern the national self-images of specific people. For example, Americans think of the USA as the ‘land of the free.’ Such images shape the way that people conceive of their national relationships. But Miller points out that such concepts have to do with political culture and not with national membership in the abstract. In the abstract sense, the nation has no specific moral qualities.

Nevertheless, the idea that people should

regard their nationality merely as historical accident, an identity to be sloughed off in favour of humanity at large, carries little appeal. If national identities are distasteful, or have distasteful aspects, it seems more reasonable to work from within, to get people to reassess what they have inherited, come to a new understanding of what it means to be German or Canadian, than to dismiss such identities from an external standpoint. 21

In a way, Miller sees a potential for us to gain control over our national traditions, instead of regarding ourselves as passive products of our nations.

Miller argues that people within the state should be included even if they regard themselves as different to the main current of national identity. ‘If a state houses a minority who for one reason or another do not feel themselves to be fully part of the national community, but who do not want or cannot realistically hope to form a nation-state of their own, then national identity must be transformed in such a way that they can be included.’ 22 A plural society demands a pluralist nationalism. It is important to

free the public sphere of symbols, practices and unstated assumptions that prevent the members of some groups from participating as equal citizens. I do not mean that the public sphere should become culturally neutral: it expresses the shared national identity of the citizens, and this must have some determinate content that varies from place to place. But national identities have always been in a state of flux, and the challenge now is to remake them in a way that is more hospitable to women, ethnic minorities and other groups without emptying them of content and destroying the underpinnings of democratic politics. 23

Perhaps Miller, just like Kearney, is a bit optimistic. Can his argument propagate change? Certainly when we think of, say, German identity, we think of a transformation that is linked to the traumas of self-recognition in the wake of Nazism and the Holocaust. However, other identities have not been forced into such self-recognition or have refused such self-recognition. Changes in national identity may happen, but there is no guarantee that the politics of members will end up turning in one direction rather than the other. We may wish for nations to be nicer, but we cannot make our wishes come true.

Even in states that are supposed to be nationalist in the civic sense, like the USA, incidents of exclusion and repression are not uncommon. American nationalism may focus on the rhetoric of freedom, but it can also turn towards violence against foreigners or other outsiders. If we agree that identities are here to stay as part of the political landscape, then we have to admit that nobody knows how to control them. Nobody knows how to make nationalism nicer.

3(c) Patriotism

Miller and Kearney seek to renew nationalism. Patriots, on the other hand, regard themselves as focusing on a solidarity that can be distinguished from nationalism. They argue that nationalism cannot simultaneously guarantee stability and an acceptable ethical outlook. We cannot rely on national affections to come up with a political outlook that respects citizenship and equal liberties. Instead of directing our affections towards the nation we should direct them towards the legitimate democratic structures of the state.

Maurizio Viroli writes that

the ideological victory of the language of nationalism has relegated the language of patriotism to the margins of contemporary political thought. And yet, when peoples become engaged in struggles for liberty, when they have to face the task of rebuilding their nations after experiences of war and totalitarian regimes, theorists are able to recover elements of the old language of patriotism under the predominant rhetoric of nationalism. 24

Our civic tradition may be weak, but it is not dead.

Viroli argues that the ‘patriotism of liberty’ is neither nationalist nor universalist. Just like liberal nationalists, patriots do not seek to create homogeneity in cultural, ethnic and linguistic spheres. Neither do they expect us to engage solely with abstract universal concepts. Instead, patriots argue for a ‘particularistic love’ of ‘common liberty and the institutions that sustain it’. They argue for

love of the common liberty of a particular people, sustained by institutions that have a particular history which has for that people a particular meaning, or meanings, that inspire and are in turn sustained by a particular way of life and culture. Because it is a love of the particular it is possible, but because it is a love of a particular liberty it is not exclusive: love of the common liberty of one’s people easily extends beyond national boundaries and translates into solidarity. 25

Viroli has little to say about how such a love can be created, but he does point out that the patriotic tradition has been carried through centuries of political writing. Patriotism is the inclusive love of ‘our’ liberty.

Similarly, Jürgen Habermas argues in favour of ‘constitutional patriotism’, which is based on his sophisticated sociological theory, as presented in his two-volume The Theory of Communicative Action . 26 Habermas argues that, over time, social discourses become progressively more rational through the ‘unforced force’ of the better argument. Societal action rationalises as a result of open discourse concerning the reasons for action. Constitutional patriotism is a post-traditional phenomenon. Habermas argues that, in a post-traditional society, people have moved on from developing allegiance based on nationalist or other sentimental and mystical outlooks. Instead, they place their allegiance in the just political procedures of the state, based upon universalist and discursive principles.

Constitutional patriotism is a rational outlook because of the way that it has been decided. This marks it out from nationalism. The only thing that guarantees democratic rights is an explicit statement in a constitution. But that constitutional statement is nothing unless it is accompanied by an attachment to its moral standpoint. Habermas writes that

the universalist principles of constitutional democracy need to be somehow anchored in the political culture of each country. Constitutional principles can neither take shape in social practices nor become the driving force for the dynamic project of creating an association of free and equal persons until they are situated in the historical context of a nation of citizens in such a way that they link up with those citizens’ motives and attitudes. 27

As Attracta Ingram argues, it is part of the liberal state that it is unified by certain shared values and the institutional structures that carry them over time. The idea involves willingness to view people, for purposes of politics, as generic individuals rather than as members of this or that clan, tribe or nation’. 28 Ingram’s point is that tight bonds can be created through ties to the political structures of the liberal state. The constitutional patriot’s cause is obviously different to those of Kearney and Miller. Instead of looking to adjust nationalism, or to promote a kinder, gentler nationalism, Habermas wants to move away from nationalist feelings altogether. At least, that is, when it comes to thinking about politics.

Viroli does not want us to detach ourselves from the ties that we have. He is not asking us to remove ourselves from our deep communal structures. 29 Habermas’s feelings about the benefits of such levels of commonality are somewhat open to question. It is difficult to know whether he wants us to forget national ties altogether or to associate our national ties with pride in our constitutional achievements. 30 Either way, neither thinker is suggesting that we completely rid ourselves of ties of birth. You do not become a citizen of your state by sitting an examination – you do so by being born there. The important thing is that we transcend the drive towards ethnic and cultural hegemony in our society. The patriotic drive, according to both Viroli and Habermas, is sufficient to tie us to our states. However, patriotism being sufficient for solidarity is less important than the fact that it is moral and rational in a way that nationalism is not.

That said, there is some doubt as to whether constitutional patriotism would create ties that are strong enough to bind people together in the way that a nation is supposed to. For example, we may take some pride in the institutions of the European Union, say the Convention on Human Rights, but that does not necessarily make us feel European in the same way that we feel British or Irish or French. 31 If patriotism does transcend ethnic nationalism, there is a risk that it will lead to the loss of solidarity in established states. That might mean greater instability, as people turn their political attention to levels above or below the nation-state.

In the introduction to this chapter, two questions were asked. First, is it possible to have a strong solidarity that does not descend either into chaos or into ethnic cruelty? Second, can we say ‘we’ without presupposing some sort of common character? Civic nationalists believe both questions can be answered affirmatively. However, there are problems with the various attempts to transcend ethnic nationalism, as surveyed in the first section. We might believe, somewhat optimistically, that nationalist ideas can be transformed. Kearney and Miller certainly believe this. Yet this strategy risks inadvertently legitimating old-style ethnic nationalism. If it is impossible to adjust nationalist ties in a way that rids us of the ethnic fixation, it might be safer to reject nationalism as a whole. Possibly any type of communal endeavour is exclusionary inasmuch as solidarity presupposes exclusion. The only inclusive solidarity may be a loose global solidarity. Instead of seeking a thicker solidarity, we could concentrate on the sort of concerns that Goodin and Rawls appeal to, as discussed in section 2. If this leads to the weakening and eventual dissolution of the nation-state, then so be it.

Of course, exclusion is not necessarily a problem in itself. The nation-state, whether we like it or not, is still the primary focus of political life. What civic nationalists and patriots want us to do is to realise that exclusion is an arbitrary thing. We should include all those who live inside our territories and simultaneously admit that the territory and its boundaries have no moral relevance. We may live in a nation-state, but that does not determine what our political actions will be. The problem with this view is that civic nationalism or patriotism may not be strong enough to create solidarity. Purely political solidarity may not be enough. National stories invest too much in common origin and the like to be open to adjustment in the direction of civic consciousness. Dangerous though it is, the ethnic nation may be more compatible with what people really need.

Yet, something does seem to be happening, certainly across the rich part of the world. To be sure, for some people the baby of social solidarity has been thrown out with the bath water of nationalism. Nationalism is irrelevant to them because they find all such bonds irrelevant. However, some others, without necessarily dropping national bonds altogether, express a more cosmopolitan sympathy with those who are not national members. Ideals of universal human rights are spreading globally, and within states. Very many people ignore nationalism when it comes to making decisions about the nature of sovereignty. It just does not figure in their ideas of right and wrong. They may maintain their pride in national achievements, whether cultural or political, but they do not think of the nation as the limit of their moral environment. Their moral environment is characterised by a multiplicity of considerations. While they want to get things right at home, they are also concerned that things are wrong elsewhere. And the fact that things are wrong elsewhere is seen as their business. People are not just civic nationalists – they also exist beyond nationalism.

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Power, luck and freedom

Collected essays.

The book collects thirteen previously published essays by Keith Dowding on social and political power, freedom, choice and luck. It is anchored by a substantial introductory essay that pulls together the different strands to demonstrate the coherence and connections between the different concepts discussed through the book. The book demonstrates the importance of the concept of power to political science and argues that comparative static definitions enable comparison of power structures in terms of agents’ resources. It shows the importance of systematic luck in understanding the power structure. However, static definitions are inherently unsatisfactory in dynamic settings. Here we need to apply game theory rather than game forms, and in dynamic settings luck is vital to our perception of freedom, responsibility and leadership. Later chapters reveal the problematic evaluation of choice and freedom and how these relate to responsibility. The book concludes by demonstrating that freedom and rights exist in different senses, which matter for our understanding of how much freedom exists in a society. It shows that Sen’s liberal paradox is ambiguous between rights as claims and rights as liberties; how fundamental his paradox is to our understanding of the conflict between rights and welfare depends on the manner in which we evaluate freedom.

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Annual Review of Political Science

Volume 24, 2021, review article, open access, nationalism: what we know and what we still need to know.

• Harris Mylonas 1 , and Maya Tudor 2
• View Affiliations Hide Affiliations Affiliations: 1 Elliott School of International Affairs and Department of Political Science, George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052, USA; email: [email protected] 2 Blavatnik School of Government, St. Hilda's College, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 6GG, United Kingdom; email: [email protected]
• Vol. 24:109-132 (Volume publication date May 2021) https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041719-101841
• Copyright © 2021 by Annual Reviews. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See credit lines of images or other third-party material in this article for license information

Amid the global resurgence of nationalist governments, what do we know about nationalism? This review takes stock of political science debates on nationalism to critically assess what we already know and what we still need to know. We begin by synthesizing classic debates and tracing the origins of the current consensus that nations are historically contingent and socially constructed. We then highlight three trends in contemporary nationalism scholarship: ( a ) comparative historical research that treats nationalism as a macropolitical force and excavates the relationships between nations, states, constitutive stories, and political conflict; ( b ) behavioral research that uses survey data and experiments to gauge the causes and effects of attachment to nations; and ( c ) ethnographic scholarship that illuminates the everyday processes and practices that perpetuate national belonging. The penultimate section briefly summarizes relevant insights from philosophy, history, and social psychology and identifies knowledge gaps that political scientists are well-positioned to address. A final section calls for more comparative, cross-disciplinary, cross-regional research on nationalism.

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Twelve Theses on Nationalism

Subscribe to governance weekly, william a. galston william a. galston ezra k. zilkha chair and senior fellow - governance studies.

August 12, 2019

• 16 min read

This piece was originally published by “ The American Interest. “

B y the end of World War Two, nationalism had been thoroughly discredited. Critics charged that national self-interest had prevented democratic governments from cooperating to end the Great Depression, and that nationalist passions had led not just to war, but also to some of the worst crimes groups of human beings had ever perpetrated on others. The construction of international institutions and norms—in economics, politics, and human rights—as antidotes to nationalist excesses dominated Western diplomacy for decades after 1945, and the global struggle between liberal democracy and communism muted the expression of nationalist sentiments on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The peace and economic growth that characterized this period built public support for this strategy.

As decades passed and new generations emerged, memories of the Great Depression and World War Two lost their hold on the Western imagination. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the postwar era began giving way to new forces. The European Union, its boosters convinced that their enlightened post-national project represented the future of politics for mankind, sought to move from economic integration to political integration. But public opposition swelled in many member-states. The “captive nations” of eastern and central Europe reemerged as independent actors, and long-submerged nationalist feelings resurfaced. But the feelings were not limited to the east: Growing regional inequalities within countries drove a wedge between left-behind populations and the international elites many citizens held responsible for their plight. The Great Recession of 2008 undermined public confidence in expert managers of the economy, and in the internationalist outlook that had long dominated their thinking. In Europe, concerns over immigration grew as people from lower-wage countries in the EU moved freely to wealthy member-states. These concerns exploded in 2015 after German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to admit more than 1 million refugees from Syria and other countries wracked by conflict and economic stagnation.

All these trends, and others, were at work in the United States. The consequences of China’s entry into the WTO, especially for U.S. manufacturing, stoked concerns about international trade. Five decades of robust immigration transformed America’s demography, a shift celebrated by some but deplored by others. In the wake of the Great Recession and the Iraq war, the costs of America’s global leadership became increasingly controversial, and the belief that other nations were taking advantage of the United States intensified. Postwar internationalism became a new front in the decades-old culture war. In retrospect, it was only a matter of time until someone mounted a frontal challenge to the consensus of elites in both major political parties. When it did, “America First” hit the established order with the force and subtlety of a wrecking-ball.

“Nationalism rightly understood means that no nation is an island, and that in the long run the wellbeing of one’s nation cannot be decoupled from the fate of others.”

The growth of nationalism as a political phenomenon encouraged the emergence of nationalist theoreticians and ideologues. In the United States, a July 2019 conference on “National Conservatism” brought together thinkers who argued—in direct opposition to the leaders of the postwar era—that nationalism offers a more secure and morally preferable basis for both domestic and international policy. Similar convenings have occurred in Europe. Critics of the new nationalism have been quick to weigh in.

As the battle has been joined, the ratio of heat to light has been high. And yet so are the stakes. Our democratic future depends on whether publics come to see nationalism as the solution, the problem, or something in-between. As a contribution to clarifying the debate, I offer twelve theses on nationalism.

Thesis One:   Nationalism and patriotism are not the same.  Patriotism is love of country—as George Orwell puts it, “devotion to a particular place and way of life.” Nationalism means giving pride of place, culturally and politically, to a distinctive ensemble of individuals—the nation.

Thesis Two:   A nation is a community, united by sentiments of loyalty and mutual concern, that shares a cultural heritage and belief in a common destiny.  Some nations additionally invoke common descent, which in nearly all cases is mythical, as it was when John Jay posited it for the nascent United States in Federalist 2. As political theorist Bernard Yack observes in  Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community , not all nationalist claims are based on ethnicity. Ethno-nations are distinct, he observes, in that they make descent from previous members “a necessary, rather than merely sufficient, condition of membership.”

Thesis Three:   An individual need not be born into a cultural heritage to (come to) share it.  Entrants into the national community commit themselves not only to learn their nation’s history and customs but also to take on their benefits and burdens as their own, as Ruth did when she pledged to Naomi that “Your people shall be my people, and your God my God.”

Thesis Four:   Nationalism and patriotism can yield conflicting imperatives.  Many Zionists felt patriotic connections to the states in which they lived, even as they labored to create a nation-state of their own. Although many of today’s Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey harbor patriotic sentiments, their primary loyalty is to the Kurdish nation, and their ultimate aim is national self-determination in their own state.

Thesis Five:   Nationalism poses a challenge to the modern state system.  The familiar term “nation-state” implicitly assumes that the geographical locations of distinct nations coincide with state boundaries. Occasionally this is true (Japan comes close), but mostly it isn’t. Nations can be spread across multiple states (as the Kurds are), and states can contain multiple nations (as Spain does). What some regard as the ideal arrangement—a sovereign state for each nation and only this nation—is still exceedingly rare despite the convulsions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and still could not be realized without further massive, bloody disruptions of existing arrangements. Hitler’s determination to unify all ethno-cultural Germans into a single nation would have been a disaster, even if he had harbored no further ambitions. Today’s Hungarians have grounds for objecting to the Treaty of Trianon, which left millions of their co-nationals outside the borders of their shrunken state. Nevertheless, any effort to reunite them under a single flag would mean war in the heart of Europe.

Today’s state system includes international organizations, which many nationalists oppose as abrogating their states’ sovereignty. This stance rests on a failure to distinguish between revocable agreements, which are compatible with maintaining sovereignty, and irrevocable agreements, which are not. In leaving the European Union, Britain is exercising its sovereign rights, which it did not surrender when it entered the EU. By contrast, the states that banded together into the United States of America agreed to replace their several sovereignties into a single sovereign power, with no legal right under the Constitution to reverse this decision. When the southern states tried to secede, a civil war ensued, and its outcome ratified the permanent nature of the Union.

Thesis Six:   It is possible to be a nationalist without believing that every nation has a right to political independence, but it isn’t easy.  The U.S. Declaration of Independence speaks of “the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them.” Similarly, Israel’s Declaration of Independence invokes the “self-evident right of the Jewish people to be a nation, as all other nations, in its own sovereign state.”

There are often practical reasons to deny some nations political self-determination (see Thesis Five). But doing so in principle rests on the belief that some nations are superior to others and deserve to rule over them. The claimed superiority can be cultural, hence mutable and temporary, or ethno-racial, essentialist, and immutable. The former often includes the responsibility of dominant nations to prepare subordinated nations for independence, as John Stuart Mill’s defense of tutelary colonialism did. The latter implies that subordinate nations are at best means to the well-being of dominant nations; at worst, lesser forms of humanity who exist at the sufferance of superior nations.

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There is no logical connection between the undeniable premise that each nation is distinctive and the conclusion that mine is better than yours. But the psychology of pride in one’s nation can lead even decent, well-meaning people from the former to the latter.

Some contemporary defenders of nationalism claim that it is inherently opposed to imperialism. Nation-states want only to be left alone, they say, to govern themselves in accordance with their own traditions. As Rebecca West once put it, there is not “the smallest reason for confounding nationalism, which is the desire of a people to be itself, with imperialism, which is the desire of a people to prevent other peoples from being themselves.”

She would be right if all nationalism were inwardly focused and guided by the maxim of live and let live. But the history of the 20th century shows that some forms of nationalism are compatible with imperialism and worse. It depends on what a nation thinks that “being itself” entails. The proposition that nationalism and imperialism always stand opposed rests not on historical evidence, but rather on a definition of nationalism at odds with its real-world manifestations.

Thesis Seven:   It is possible to be a nationalist without believing that the interests of one’s nation always trump competing considerations.  Writing in the shadow of World War Two, George Orwell declared that nationalism was “the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation, placing it beyond good and evil and recognizing no other duty than that of advancing its interests.” Although this is an unmatched description of Nazism, it conflates an extreme instance of nationalism with the totality.

In fact, nationalism is compatible with a wide range of ideologies and political programs. It motivated not only Nazi Germany but also Britain’s heroic resistance to fascism. (Churchill’s wartime speeches rallied his countrymen with stirring invocations of British nationalism against its foe.) And because the nation need not be understood as the supreme good, “liberal nationalism” is not an oxymoron.

Giving priority to the interests of one’s nation does not mean ignoring the interests of others, any more than caring most about one’s own children implies indifference to the fate of others’ children. Nations are sometimes called upon to risk their blood and treasure to respond to or prevent harm in other nations. At some point, the imbalance between modest costs to one’s nation and grievous damage to others should compel action. Even though some Americans would have risked their lives to prevent the Rwandan genocide, America’s failure to intervene was a mistake, a proposition that nationalists can accept without contradicting their beliefs.

Thesis Eight:   It is a mistake to finger nationalism as the principal source of oppression and aggression in modern politics.  As we have seen repeatedly, creedal and religion-based states and movements can be just as brutal, and they can pose, in their own way, equally fundamental challenges to the state system. The Reformation triggered a full century of astonishingly bloody strife. More recently, for those who took class identity to be more fundamental than civic identity, “socialist internationalism” became the organizing principle of politics, and similarly if membership in the Muslim  umma  is thought to erase the significance of state boundaries. Those outside the favored class or creed became enemies with whom no permanent peace is possible, and the consequences are as negative for decent politics as any of the evils perpetrated in the name of nationalism.

Thesis Nine:   As a key source of social solidarity, nationalism can support higher-order political goods such as democracy and the welfare state.  Democracy rests on mutual trust, without which the peaceful transfer of power comes to be regarded as risky. The welfare state rests on sympathy and concern for others who are vulnerable, whether or not the more fortunate members of the community see themselves as equally vulnerable. Shared nationality promotes these sentiments, while in the short-to-medium term (at least), increasing national diversity within states weakens them.

This helps explain why many nationalists who are not driven by racial or ethnic bias nonetheless are ambivalent about high numbers of immigrants and refugees. It also points to the most important domestic challenge contemporary nationalists face—reconciling their attachment to their co-nationals with fair treatment for other groups with whom they share a common civic space.

Thesis Ten:   Although we typically think of nations as driving the creation of nation-states, the reverse is also possible.  A generation ago, Eugen Weber showed how, over the decades before World War One, the French state deployed a program of linguistic, cultural, and educational unification to turn “peasants into Frenchmen.” During the past half-century, post-colonial governments have sought, with varying degrees of success, to weaken tribal and sectarian ties in favor of overarching national attachments.

Many historians have discerned similar processes at work in the United States. Prior to the Civil War, lexicographers such as Noah Webster crystallized a non-regional American English, distinct from British English, while historians such as George Bancroft told the story of America’s creation and growth as a narrative that all could share. After the Civil War, as flows of immigrants from Central and Southern Europe accelerated, programs of civic education proliferated—with the aim, one might say, of turning peasants into Americans. Because it was no longer possible to say, as John Jay did in 1787, that Americans were “descended from the same ancestors,” let alone “professing the same religion,” it became all the more important to create a common cultural heritage into which millions of new immigrants could be initiated. The process may have been rough and ready, even coercive, but in the main it succeeded. And today, after a half century of cultural strife and large flows of immigrants from an unprecedented diversity of countries, it may be necessary to recommit ourselves to this task, albeit in less favorable circumstances.

Thesis Eleven:   Although scholars distinguish between creedal nationalism and ethnic or cultural nationalism as ideal types, there are no examples of purely creedal nations.  In the United States, abstract principles and concrete identities have been braided together since the Founding. Our greatest President, who famously described the United States as a nation dedicated to a proposition, also invoked (unsuccessfully) the “mystic chords of memory” and our “bonds of affection” as antidotes for civil strife and advocated transmuting our Constitution and laws into objects of reverence—a “political religion.”

Thesis Twelve:   Although nationalism is a distinctively modern ideology, national identity has pervaded much of human history and is unlikely to disappear as a prominent feature of politics.  As Bernard Yack has persuasively argued, nationalism is unthinkable without the emergence of the principle of popular sovereignty as the source of legitimate political power. Because this theory characterizes the “people” who constitute the sovereign in abstract terms, it does not answer the key practical question: Who or what is the people?

The U.S. Declaration of Independence exemplifies this hiatus. Before we reach its much-quoted second paragraph on the rights of individuals, we encounter the assertion that Americans constitute “one people” asserting its right to “dissolve the political bands that have connected them with another.” Americans are one people, the British another. The governing class of Great Britain had a different view: Americans were subjects of the king, just as residents of the British Isles were, distinguished from them only by location. Even to assert their Lockean right of revolution, of which George III was no great fan, Americans had to make the case that they were a separate and distinct people. It turns out that in the case of the United States and many that followed, national identity offered the most plausible way to meet this challenge, which is why John Jay resorted to it. 19th century nationalists had richer intellectual resources on which to draw, including Herder’s account of distinct cultures, but their strategy was much the same.

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In short, national identity is transmuted into nationalism through its encounter with the doctrine of popular sovereignty. When the people are understood as the nation, popular sovereignty becomes national sovereignty.

Because pre-modern politics lacked the theory of popular sovereignty, it could not develop a doctrine of nationalism. Nonetheless, national identity has pervaded human history, for the simple reason that we are finite beings shaped by unchosen contingencies. Although we are social, cultural, and political beings, we are born helpless and unformed. We are formed first by the ministration of parents and kin or their equivalents, then by the experiences of neighborhood and local community, and eventually by the wider circle of those with whom we share a cultural heritage. To be sure, the encounter with those whose formative influences were different will not leave us untouched. No matter how much our horizons are broadened, we never set aside our origin. We may leave home, but home never quite leaves us, a reality reflected in our language. “Mother tongue,” “fatherland”—the age-old metaphor of our place of origin as nurturing, shaping parent will never lose its power.

N ational identity is an aspect of human experience that no measure of education should seek to expunge—nor could it if it tried. But as we have seen, the modern political expression of national identity is multi-valent. Nationalism can be a force for great evil or great good. It can motivate collective nobility and collective brutality. It can bring us together and drive us apart.

In the face of these realities, the way forward is clear, at least in principle. Acknowledging the permanence of nationalism and its capacity for good, we must do our best to mitigate its negative effects. Nationalism need not mean that a country’s cultural majority oppresses others with whom it shares a state; putting one’s country first need not mean ignoring the interests and concerns of others. On the contrary: To adapt a Tocquevillian locution, nationalism rightly understood means that no nation is an island, that in the long run the wellbeing of one’s nation cannot be decoupled from the fate of others. The American leaders who rebuilt Europe understood that theirs was not an act of charity but rather a means to the long-time best interest of their country. The leaders of the civil rights movement knew that they promoted not only the cause of justice, but also the strength of their country, at home and abroad.

The details may have changed since the days of George Marshall and Martin Luther King, Jr., but the essentials remain the same.

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• Published: 17 November 2022

Revisiting key debates in the study of nationalism

• Abdul Maajid Dar 1  

Humanities and Social Sciences Communications volume  9 , Article number:  411 ( 2022 ) Cite this article

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The purpose of this article is to lay out the debates and arguments around three key broader issues that dominate nationalism studies: (a) the meaning of a nation and nationalism and the relationship between political and cultural nationalism; (b) the origins and character of nations and nationalism; and (c) the civic-ethnic dichotomy and the relationship between nationalism and liberalism. It does not aim to provide definitive answers to the complex problems associated with nations and nationalism but rather to provide an overview of these debates by examining the existing literature on nations and nationalism. The final section discusses the position of new approaches to nations and nationalism and how they have problematised the key assumptions of the mainstream understanding of nationalism. The article, in light of an overview of the literature, draws four important conclusions. First, the academic journey of nationalism has reached a stage where the current consensus is that nations are socially constructed and historically contingent phenomena, and the current focus of the scholarship is on looking at the intersection between the cultural and political aspects of nationalism. Second, nations and nationalism possess a multifaceted character with particularity, subjectivity, and relativity as their defining features, representing that a single, universal explanation of nationalism is neither feasible nor morally desirable. Third, to understand the multiplicity and diversity of nations and nationalism and the ways in which elements of this multidimensionality intersect, it is necessary to treat them as open-ended, unstable, dispersed, protean, particular, and contingent phenomena. Finally, deep contestation constitutes a source of power and strength for nations and nationalism.

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The phenomena of nation and nationalism are the forces that shape the modern world, among others. They are global phenomena occurring worldwide, despite the scepticism articulated by many scholars about their continuing survival and relevance. They, as modern concepts, first originated in Europe in the late eighteenth century. Within the study of nationalism, though scholars are deeply divided on the origins of nations and nationalism, there is a general consensus that they bloomed and acquired their modern political meanings and significance in the context of the French Revolution of 1789. The French Revolution defined the nation as a democratic, sovereign, secular republic of equal citizens, a definition that dominated nationalist studies and movements throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. By asserting the principles of democracy, constitutionalism, equality, national self-determination, the sovereignty of the people, and republicanism as the basis for the new political order in Europe, the revolution significantly contributed to the spread of the phenomena of nation and nationalism from France to other countries in Europe, particularly Italy, Germany, Russia, and Spain. The Napoleonic wars, the 1848 revolutions, and post-1848 national unification-oriented movements made the nation and nationalism fashionable throughout Europe and North America in the 19th century. As milestones in the development of nation and nationalism in the 20th century, anticolonial movements widely extended them to three non-western continents: Asia, Africa, and Latin America. As a result, nation and nationalism have acquired a global presence, taking various forms in different socio-economic and political contexts.

While there is a general consensus that nations and nationalism are happening everywhere, scholarship on nationalism is deeply engrossed in intense debates about the meaning of nation and nationalism, their origins, and their nature and scope. This article provides a theoretical review of these debates and is based on an examination of existing literature on nations and nationalism. Accordingly, the article is divided into four broad sections. The first section examines the debates and disputes about the meaning of a nation and nationalism and the relationship between political and cultural nationalism. The second section discusses the competing arguments of primordialism, modernism, and ethnosymbolism about the origins of nations and nationalism. The following section analyses the intense debates about the civic-ethnic dichotomy and the relationship between nationalism and liberalism. The fourth section discusses the position of new approaches to nations and nationalism and the ways they have problematised the key assumptions of the mainstream understanding of nationalism. The main findings are summarised in the conclusion.

Defining nation and nationalism

The nation and nationalism, like other concepts in the social sciences, are deeply contested. Scholars across the social sciences—history, sociology, political science, anthropology, philosophy, and psychology—have provided a number of competing and diverse definitions of nation and nationalism, connoting different meanings in different contexts. Much of the ambiguity stems from scholars’ approach to defining a nation and nationalism exclusively on the basis of objective or subjective factors or viewing them as purely political or cultural phenomena. Objective–subjective debate, revolving around what makes a nation a nation and how membership in a nation is determined, is conceptually significant since all other debates, such as debates about cultural and political nationalism, origins of nations and nationalism, and civic–ethnic dichotomy, cannot be understood without reference to and independent of the objective and subjective markers that occupy a central place in these debates. First, cultural nations are associated with objective definitions, and cultural nationalism is conceptualised on the basis of objective elements, while political nations are related to subjective definitions, and political nationalism is defined on the basis of subjective factors. Second, the theories about the origins of nations and nationalism, such as primordialism and ethno-symbolism, place greater emphasis on the importance of objective factors in constituting a nation and see nationalism as a cultural phenomenon, while the special focus of modernism is on the subjective sense of belonging to a nation and considers nationalism as a political phenomenon. Third, the distinction between civic or political and ethnic or cultural nationalism is deeply embedded in subjective and objective factors respectively and broader debates about the origins of nations and nationalism and the relationship between political and cultural nationalism. Finally, objective and subjective elements also constitute an important part of analysis for new feminist, postcolonial and poststructuralist approaches to nationalism, but in a reflexive and non-essentialist sense, when they insist that objective elements and subjective sense of belonging to a nation are discursively constructed through discourses and argue for studying a nation and nationalism as contextual, contingent and particular categories. Thus, conceptually, all the debates about nations and nationalism are interrelated and mutually constitutive, and no one can be understood in isolation, as we will see in this paper.

Objective and subjective definitions

Objective definitions.

The objective elements in defining nations include a common language, religion, history, customs, territory, and ethnicity. The proponents of objective definitions argue for these objective markers as the fixed criteria for determining membership in a nation. While defining a nation on the basis of objective elements, Joseph Stalin stated that “a nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture” (as cited in Franklin, 1973 , p. 57). For Yoram Hazony ( 2018 ), nation refers to “a number of tribes with a common language or religion and a past history of acting as a body for the common defense and other large-scale enterprises” (p. 19). This means that a nation comes into existence only when a particular group of people has bonds of cohesion and mutual loyalty. The feeling of mutual loyalty is produced by a common language or religion and the “history of collaboration against common enemies” (p. 126). Objective definitions’ focus on fixed objective criteria for the constitution of a nation is ridden with problems and is strongly challenged both on pragmatic and conceptual grounds. The main problem, among others, with objective definitions, is that no one is certain about which attributes a group of people must have to become a nation and what number of them. This problem is highlighted by Ernest Renan (1882/ 1996 ) by arguing: “how is it that Switzerland, which has three languages, two religions, and three or four races, is a nation, when Tuscany, which is so homogenous, is not one?” (p. 46). For Renan, it is the will of the group of people, not necessarily the objective factors, on the basis of which they form a nation. As he puts it: “the United States and England, Latin America and Spain speak the same language yet do not form a single nation. Conversely, Switzerland, so well made, since she was made with the consent of her different parts, numbers three or four languages” (p. 50). Following Renan, Bernard Yack ( 2012 ) argues: “there are a sufficient number of examples of multilingual nations—as well as nations divided by a common language—to bring into doubt the association of nations with linguistic communities” (p. 74). Similarly, Michael Hechter ( 2000 ) and Florian Bieber ( 2020 ) point out that none of the objective elements necessarily generates national solidarity. What Renan points out and the majority of scholars embrace is that no nation satisfies all the objective criteria and, therefore, an attempt to define nations absolutely on the basis of objective markers lacks reliability and is “fundamentally misguided” (Ozkirimli, 2005 , p. 17).

Subjective definitions

The subjective factors employed in the definition of nations consist of self-consciousness, attitudes, sentiments, solidarity, fidelity, and willpower. According to Renan (1882/ 1996 ), “a nation is… a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future” (p. 53). For Max Weber ( 1994 ), “a nation is a community of sentiment which could adequately manifest itself in a state of its own” (p. 25). Seton-Watson ( 1977 ) holds that “a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one” (p. 5). The subjective definitions emphasise that a nation comes into existence only when the members of a group become conscious of their identity and recognise each other as fellow citizens. As David Miller ( 1995 ) writes: “national communities are constituted by belief: nations exist when their members recognise one another as compatriots, and believe that they share characteristics of the relevant kind” (p. 22). Bieber ( 2020 ), too, argues that the choice of individuals to join or identify themselves with a nation and the acceptance of the same by the larger community are essential prerequisites for the constitution of a nation. For proponents of subjective definitions, objective elements are neither adequate nor absolute categories for the constitution of a nation, though they may play a role in generating the feeling of commonality. As Renan (1882/ 1996 ) states: “language invites people to unite, but it does not force them to do so…. Religion cannot supply an adequate basis for the constitution of a modern nationality either” (p. 50). Bieber ( 2020 ) reinforces this point of view and argues that objective markers “facilitate the subjective sense of belonging to a nation, but they are not necessary” (p. 8).

Although subjective definitions are widely embraced, they are neither final nor free from problems. They remain silent on what motivates the feeling of commonality and nationality (Ozkirimli, 2005 ). The second problem is what distinguishes a nation from other groupings possessing subjective elements too. This problem is highlighted by Craig Calhoun ( 1997 ) by arguing that “social solidarity and collective identity can exist in many sorts of groupings, from families to employees of business corporations to imperial armies. They are minimal conditions for calling a population a nation, but far from a definition” (p. 4). Thirdly, by regarding the creation and dissolution of nations as a product of individual or collective consciousness or choice, subjective criteria, argues Eric Hobsbawm ( 1992 ), “can lead the incautions into extremes of voluntarism” (p. 8).

To avoid the problems associated with objective and subjective definitions, some scholars define a nation as a combination of objective and subjective factors (Kellas, 1998 ; Tamir, 1993 , 2019 ; Yack, 2012 ). According to Kellas ( 1998 ), “nations have ‘objective’ characteristics which may include a territory, a language, or common descent (though not all of these are always present), and ‘subjective’ characteristics, essentially a people’s awareness of its nationality and affection for it” (p. 3). For Yael Tamir ( 1993 ), “a group is defined as a nation if it exhibits both a sufficient number of shared, objective characteristics- such as language, history, or territory- and self-awareness of its distinctiveness” (p. 66). For these scholars, only those who share certain objective characteristics recognise each other as compatriots; they feel commonality and nationality. The scholars’ approach of defining a nation as a combination of objective and subjective factors fails to establish and fix a balance between the two and therefore causes the same problems associated with objective or subjective definitions.

Political and cultural definitions

Political definitions.

Political definitions hold that nationalism is essentially a political phenomenon linked to the idea of self-determination or political autonomy (Anderson, 1983/ 2006 ; Breuilly, 1993 ; Gellner, 1983 ; Hobsbawm, 1992 ; Hechter, 2000 ; Moore, 2001 ). As Ernest Gellner ( 1983 ) states:

Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent…. there is a very large number of potential nations on earth. Our planet only contains room for a certain number of independent or autonomous political units (pp. 1–2).

Gellner further states that “nation/culture… cannot normally survive without its own political shell, the state” (p. 143). Benedict Anderson (1983/ 2006 ) makes a similar claim by defining a nation as “an imagined political community-- and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (p. 6). Eric Hobsbawm ( 1992 ) also claims that “it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except insofar as both relate to it [state]” (p. 10). For Margaret Moore ( 2001 ), “national identities… are political identities, connected to the political community with which one identifies, and cultural difference is not a crucial or even necessary element” (p. 14). The political definitions place emphasis on the identification between state and nation and the homogenisation of social, cultural, and ethnic elements of the population by the state. This means that they see nations as political communities and nationalism as political phenomenon. Among classical thinkers, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of the general will, John Stuart Mill’s liberal-civic conception of nation and nationalism, and Georg W. Friedrich Hegel’s conceptualisation of the state as an ethical whole symbolise such a vision of the nation-state.

The political definitions are not satisfactory as they cause a number of problems. Firstly, by equating nationalism with the state, political definitions cause what Walker Connor ( 1978 ) describes as “terminological disease” (p. 378), making it difficult to distinguish between distinct terms like nation, nationalism, state, and nation-state. Secondly, nations sometimes exist without having their own states, nations and states are not absolutely identical, and the meaning of state is derived from the nature and purposes of nationhood (Canovan, 1996 ; Guibernau, 2013 ; Hazony, 2018 ; Lichtenberg, 1999 ; MacCormick ( 1999 ); Norman, 1999 ; Ozkirimli, 2005 ; Yack, 2012 ). As Bernard Yack ( 2012 ) states: “it is far from “pointless to talk about nations apart from the state”, that there is a distinctive form of intergenerational community associated with the nation, one that does not depend on the state for its existence” (p. 96). Further, while challenging the assumption of congruence between political and national units, he argues that the state draws its legitimacy from the national community or nation to which it remains a servant and subordinate. Judith Lichtenberg ( 1999 ) argues along somewhat similar lines that “the argument for political rights such as statehood or autonomy rests on the premise of nationhood: groups demand states by arguing that they constitute nations” (p. 169). Thirdly, Anthony Smith ( 1986 , 1998 , 2009 ), as we will see in a moment, has vociferously criticised the proponents of political definitions for downplaying the cultural aspects of nationalism. He contends that it is not possible to understand modern political nationalisms without reference to ethno-symbolic resources. Fourthly, by conceptualising a nation as an ethnically homogeneous community or a purely political community, the reliability and relevance of political definitions in multinational states or multi-ethnic nations come into question (Kymlicka, 1989 ; Miller, 1995 ; 2020 ; Parekh, 2000 ; Taylor, 1994 ; Tamir, 1993 , 2019a ). For these scholars, the process of creating a culturally homogeneous society from a multicultural society is not attractive and is bound to produce disastrous consequences as it is the cultural community to which individuals belong that defines their meanings and within which they make and reshape their goals and aims. What is evident is that political definitions are restrictive as they are not sensitive to cultural plurality and thus do not substantially take into consideration the cultural aspirations of such communities as national minorities, immigrants, indigenous peoples, and subnational groups.

Cultural definitions

Given the problems associated with political definitions, some scholars advocate cultural definitions of nation and nationalism, which define nations as ‘cultures’ and nationalism as the ‘right to culture’. Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte are the key figures among the classical thinkers who argued for cultural definitions. Both Herder, the father of cultural nationalism, and Fichte emphasised the distinctness of national cultures with their emphasis on language, which they characterised as the epitome of people’s unique historical memories and traditions and the central source of the national spirit. The cultural definitions conceptualise national identities as cultural identities rather than political identities and thus regard a nation as a cultural community, not necessarily a political community corresponding to a modern state. Yael Tamir ( 1993 ), a contemporary exponent of cultural definitions, has stated:

The right to national self-determination… stakes a cultural rather than a political claim, namely, it is the right to preserve the existence of a nation as a distinct cultural entity…. National claims are not synonymous with demands for political sovereignty (p. 57).

She believes that the right to national self-determination is only about the right to culture and cannot be reduced to a set of civil rights and liberties. As she (1993) has argued:

Members of national minorities who live in liberal democracies, like the Quebecois and the Indians in Canada, the Aborigines in Australia, or the Basques in France, are not deprived of their freedoms and civil liberties, yet feel marginalised and dispossessed because they are governed by a political culture and political institutions imprinted by a culture not their own (p. 72).

Walker Connor ( 1994 ), Will Kymlicka ( 1989 ), Bhikhu Parekh ( 2000 ), and Charles Taylor ( 1994 ) have made a similar claim by arguing that cultural groups, such as national minorities, immigrants, indigenous peoples and subnational groups, primarily aspire to fight for recognition and preservation of their cultural distinctiveness and essence, and thus are satisfied to settle for something less than an independent state. The cultural definitions advocate what Chaim Gans ( 2003 ) characterises as “non-state-seeking nationalism” (p. 25), a nationalism which he defines as that form of cultural nationalism “which at most regards state as desirable, but not as necessary” (p. 25). Tamir ( 1993 ) believes that the right to national self-determination, as the embodiment of the unique cultural essence of cultural groups and their right to develop their cultural distinctiveness, signifies that each national or cultural group, whether in majority or minority in a particular territory, is entitled to it, and national cultures are entitled to political protection, not in the form of having an independent state for each nation. Rather, the right to national self-determination is to be realised as a more limited right within a state through mechanisms such as federalism, autonomous communities, consociational democracy, or through some form of political organisation that is not a nation-state. For Yoram Hazony ( 2018 ), who also defines nations in terms of objective elements and so sees nationalism as a cultural phenomenon, the establishment of stable and prosperous states is entirely dependent on the nation; as he argues: “mutual loyalty, which is derived from genuine commonalities of language or religion, and from a past history of uniting in wartime, is the firm foundation on which everything else depends” (p. 107). Social cohesion, stability and prosperity, he argues, exist only in a state that is constituted as what he calls a national state, “a nation whose disparate tribes have come together under a single standing government, independent of all other governments” (p. 80). On the other hand, non-national states lack the key element of social cohesion and are therefore bound to experience instability, ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and, ultimately, dissolution.

The cultural definitions are also ridden with problems. Some scholars (Brass, 1979 ; Calhoun, 1997 ; Eley and Suny, 1996 ; Hobsbawm, 1983 , 1992 ) criticise them, particularly for playing down the role of the state vis-a-vis the formation of national identities and the role played by socio-political elites in constructing cultural identities. Calhoun ( 1997 ) holds that although long-existing cultural elements have made an influential contribution to materialising national identities, the process of state formation in the modern era has brought about a transformation in the meaning and form of cultural patterns and national identities. Eric Hobsbawm claims that it is the state which makes the nation and nationalism, not the other way round (1992), and the politics of what he calls the ‘invention of tradition’ occupies a central position in relation to understanding the nature of modern nations associated with and based on constructions and discourses (1983). Paul Brass ( 1979 ) makes a similar claim by arguing that ethnic and national identities are not given but rather the product of the politics of socio-political elites. As he (1979) puts it:

The study of ethnicity and nationality…. is the study of the process by which elites and counter-elites within ethnic groups select aspects of the group’s culture, attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilise the group, to defend its interests, and to compete with other groups (pp. 40–41).

Given the restrictive nature of political and cultural definitions, some scholars (Calhoun, 1997 ; Dieckhoff, 2005 ; Delanty and Mohony, 2002 ; Eley and Suny, 1996 ; Ozkirimli, 2005 ; Wodak et al., 2009 ) see nations and nationalism as both political and cultural entities. According to Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny ( 1996 ), “nationality is best conceived as a complex, uneven, and unpredictable process, forged from an interaction of cultural coalescence and specific political intervention, which cannot be reduced to static criteria of language, territory, ethnicity, or culture” (p. 8). Ozkirimli ( 2005 ) has made a similar claim, when he argues that “nationalism is not about culture or politics, it is about both. It involves the ‘culturalization’ of politics and the ‘politicisation’ of culture” (pp. 21–22).

Origins of nations and nationalism: the deep theoretical divisions

In the academic study of nationalism, three theories dominate the subject: primordialism, modernism, and ethnosymbolism. The primary focus of these theories is on the origins of nations and nationalism and the process of nation formation, about which they not only disagree but provide competing explanations.

Primordialism

Primordialism believes that nations and nationalism have been in existence since time immemorial. Primordialists regard nations as organic, immemorial, given, natural, eternal, ancestral, and historically situated entities. Smith ( 1986 ) has identified four versions of primordialism: organic, sociobiological, culturalist, and perennialism. The organic approach developed by such German romantics as Herder and Fichte focuses on the naturalness of nations. It regards a nation as an organic group and believes that a nation and nationalism are innate phenomena. The sociobiological approach, the main proponent of which is Pierre Van den Berghe, maintains that nations and ethnic groups are extensions of kinship groups and, thus, are of considerable antiquity. For Van den Berghe ( 1978 ), kinship sentiments make individuals maximise genetic reproduction within the group to achieve what he terms “inclusive fitness” through what he describes “nepotism or kin selection”, a genetically based propensity to favour kin over non-kin. This approach regards nationalism as not an ethical but rather a biological phenomenon. The culturalist approach focuses on the importance of cultural givens to understand and explain the perpetual power of ethnicity and nationalism. Its leading exponents are Edward Shils ( 1957 ) and Clifford Geertz ( 1973 ), who claim that it is the primordial ties of family, language, blood, religion, race, custom, ethnicity, territory, and other cultural givens that hold nations together. For Shils and Geertz, these primordial ties and identities are natural and given, based on emotions and sentiments, and are ineffable and coercive, meaning that they are prior to social interactions and practices. Perennialism refers to that form of primordialism which, like other forms of primordialism, believes that nations are immemorial and of historical antiquity, but questions the claim of organic, sociobiological, and culturalist approaches that nations are given and natural phenomena. Against this claim of these forms of primordialism, perennialists treat nations as social, cultural and historical phenomena present in all periods of history with different shapes and recognise the change caused by forces of modernisation in ethnic and national identities. However, perennialists, such as Hugh Seton-Watson, Joshua Fishman, Donald Horowitz, Walker Connor and Adrian Hastings, have traced the origins of a number of European nations to the Middle Ages and mainly focus on the continuous impacts of immemorial ethnicity, meaning what Anthony Smith Smith ( 1998 ) describes that “Perennialists tend to derive modern nations from fundamental ethnic ties, rather than from the processes of modernisation” (pp. 223–224), and the French and American revolutions. As Seton-Watson ( 1977 ) has claimed that “the doctrine of nationalism dates from the age of the French Revolution, but nations existed before the doctrine was formulated” (p. 6). Similarly, Hastings ( 1997 ) has associated the emergence of nations and nationalism with the spread of Christianity in Europe. The perennialists thus believe in the historical continuity between immemorial ethnic communities and the nations of modernity and the modernity of nationalism.

Modernism represents a theoretical critique of primordialist approaches to nations and nationalism. Modernists argue that, contrary to the primordialist position, nations and nationalism are by-products of the processes of modernisation like capitalism, bureaucratisation, democratisation, secularisation, centralisation, rationalisation, industrialisation, urbanisation, humanism, mobility, and modern state, and that they are modern, i.e., late 18th-century-Phenomena (Anderson, 1983/ 2006 ; Breuilly, 1993 ; Gellner, 1983 ; Hobsbawm, 1983 ; Hechter, 1975 ; Kedourie, 1961 ; Nairn, 1981 ). They situate the genesis of nationalism in some social change, resulting in a transition from the pre-modern world to the modern one, and hold that the nation and nationalism have been invented against the backdrop of such transformation. Ernest Gellner ( 1983 ), a prominent modernist theorist, for example, has identified three phases in human history, the hunter-gatherer, the agro-literate, and the industrial, and has situated the emergence of nationalism in the process of transformation from agro-literate to industrial society.

While differing on political, social, economic, and military aspects of modernity, modernists concur that nations are political communities, modern and deliberately created phenomena, and are based on social communication and citizenship. As Gellner ( 1983 ) has stated:

Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent… political destiny are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality… and in general an inescapable one (pp. 48–49).

Against the claim of primordialists that nations are extensions of and formed from historically rooted pre-modern ethnic communities, Eric Hobsbawm (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983 ) has argued that it is nationalism that makes and produces nations, and he has termed this state as an “invented tradition”. As he puts it:

Israeli and Palestinian nationalism or nations must be novel, whatever the historic continuities of Jews or Middle Eastern Muslims, since the very concept of territorial states of the current standard type in their region was barely thought of a century ago, and hardly became a serious prospect before the end of World War 1 (pp. 13–14).

Benedict Anderson (1983/ 2006 ) makes a similar claim by seeing nations as imagined political communities. For him a nation “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (p. 6). He claims that it is what he calls print-capitalism that has primarily contributed to developing and creating this imagined project. As he argues: “the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation” (p. 46). It is to be noted that for Anderson, a nation is imagined, not imaginary. John Breuilly ( 1993 ) has associated the origins of nations with the modern centralised bureaucratic state.

Karl Deutsch’s ( 1953 ) ‘communication theory’, Michael Hechter’s ( 1975 ) and Tom Nairn’s ( 1981 ) conceptions of nationalism as the product of ‘internal colonialism’ and ‘uneven expansion of capitalism’ respectively, Gellner’s ( 1983 ) theory of cultural homogeneity associated with the process of industrialisation, Hobsbawm’s ( 1983 , 1992 ) and Anderson’s (1983/ 2006 ) theorisation of nations and nationalism in terms of ‘invented traditions’ and ‘imagined communities’ respectively, Paul Brass’s ( 1979 ) ‘instrumental theory’, and John Breuilly’s ( 1993 ) conceptualisation of nationalism as a ‘form of politics’ constitute valuable contributions to the theory of modernism. The modernist theories developed by these thinkers lack homogeneous character because their focus is on distinct aspects of modernisation. As, for instance, the primary focus of Hechter and Nairn is on the economic aspects of modernisation, while that of Gellner and Anderson is on cultural aspects and that of Breuilly is on political aspects. However, all modernist theorists agree that both nations and nationalism are totally modern phenomena and that they are manufactured; as John Breuilly ( 2019 ) argues: “nationalism arises from modernity, not from prior nations, even if pre-modern nations have existed in some form” (p. 61).

Ethno-symbolism

Ethno-symbolism has evolved out of theoretical criticism against primordialist and modernist approaches. It is that theoretical approach that recognises the independent role and power of memories, myths, traditions, and symbols in the making, continuation and transformation of nations and nationalism (Smith, 1986 , 1998 , 2009 ). According to Anthony Smith ( 1998 ), the father of this approach, “ethno-symbolism aims to uncover the symbolic legacy of ethnic identities for particular nations, and to show how modern nationalisms and nations rediscover and reinterpret the symbols, myths, memories, values and traditions of their ethno-histories, as they face the problems of modernity” (p. 224). Its primary exponents are John Armstrong, John Hutchinson, and Smith. Against modernist theories, ethno-symbolism puts emphasis on analysing the phenomena of nations and nationalism over long historical time-spans beyond the specific period of modernity; the significance and independent role of what Smith terms “symbolic resources” and “ethnies” in the formation of modern nations; the reliance of elites on ethno-symbolic resources in relation to their project of mobilising the masses and fashioning national identities and ideologies; the interrelationship between national past, present and future in the form of recurrence, re-appropriation and continuity of ethnic elements which are cultural and symbolic in character; and the transformation of ethnicity into modern nationalism (Smith, 1986 , 2009 ). Equally, ethno-symbolists reject the claim of organic, sociobiological, and culturalist forms of primordialism that nations are ‘natural’ and ‘given’ by arguing, in agreement with perennialists and modernists, that nations are cultural, social and historical phenomena situated in unique cultural and geo-historical settings (Smith, 1986 , 2009 ). They also argue that, contrary to the perennialist position, pre-existing ethnic elements and cultures influence and fashion modernisation as much as they are fashioned by modernisation. As Smith ( 1986 ) asserts that “in rejecting the claims of the perennialists, due weight is accorded to the transformations wrought by modernity and their effects on the basic units of human loyalty in which we operate and live” (p. 13). Thus, ethno-symbolists represent a middle position between primordialist and modernist explanations, believing that nations and nationalism are modern phenomena; however, they have developed out of and on the basis of pre-modern ethnies. For Smith, nations are formed from ethnies or ethnic communities, but he recognises that the latter, following modernity, have experienced an ideological transformation and modern instrumentalization and have been transformed into modern nationalism.

Civic-ethnic dichotomy

One of the lively debates that occupy a central position in the study of nationalism is over the question of the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism (Brubaker, 2004 ; Larsen, 2017 ; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010 ; Shulman, 2002 ; Tamir, 2019a ), a distinction that is based on the twofold classification made first by Hans Kohn ( 1946 ) as Western and Eastern nationalism. Kohn has conceptualised the civic-ethnic dichotomy in terms of geographical areas by claiming that civic nationalism belongs to the West (Western Europe and the United States) while ethnic nationalism is to the East (Central and Eastern Europe and the whole third world). For Kohn ( 1946 ), Western nationalism, from a normative perspective, is “a rational and universal concept of political liberty and the rights of man, looking towards the city of the future” (p. 574), and Eastern nationalism is “founded on history, on monuments and graveyards, even harking back to the mysteries of ancient times and of tribal solidarity” (p. 574). Based on his conceptualisation, civic or political nationalism is defined as a rational, liberal, progressive, inclusive, individualistic, and voluntaristic-oriented nationalism that sees the principle of self-determination as the right of each legal-political community with a set of equal rights and freedoms for all its members. On the other hand, ethnic or cultural nationalism is conceptualised as irrational, backward, regressive, coercive, exclusivist, and ethnocentric-oriented nationalism, which celebrates the primacy of cultural identity and national community over individual choice, freedoms, and rights. In other words, civic nationalism, as the epitome of the Enlightenment project of rationalism and individualism, is portrayed as that form of nationalism that recognises and celebrates the choice and will of each individual in relation to the nation to which he or she belongs, while ethnic nationalism, which is characterised as anti-individualist, closed and oppressive, is presented as that version of nationalism in which the nation to which each individual belongs by birth defines and fixes his or her choice and identity. Kohn has articulated a preference for Western civic nationalism against Eastern ethnic nationalism. Elie Kedourie ( 1961 ), Gellner ( 1983 ), Raymond Breton ( 1988 ), Liah Greenfeld ( 1993 ), Peter Alter ( 1994 ), George Schopflin ( 1996 ) and Michael Ignatieff ( 2006 ), among others, follow the same line of argument, claiming that civic nationalism is inclusive, liberal, progressive and voluntarist, and ethnic nationalism is exclusive, illiberal, destructive and ascriptive. Jurgen Habermas ( 1995 ) also argues for civic nationalism in his conceptualisation of “constitutional patriotism”, signifying the necessity of developing a shared loyalty on the part of citizens of the state to the liberal democratic based-political and constitutional principles.

Such a conceptualisation of the civic-ethnic dichotomy is reductionist-oriented, misleading, ethnocentric in nature, theoretically weak and empirically problematic as it asserts that nations are purely non-cultural political communities; sees civic nationalism as the only good form of nationalism and the rest as bad forms of nationalism; considers the values of democracy and freedom as the inherent and sole property of civic nationalism; associates civic nationalism with the West and ethnic nationalism with the rest in a gross simple manner; and is biased towards universalistic claims of liberal ideology (Bieber, 2020 ; Brubaker, 2004 ; Calhoun, 1997 ; Dieckhoff, 2005 ; Gans, 2003 ; Gustavsson and Miller, 2020 ; Hutchinson, 2013 ; Hazony, 2018 ; Larsen, 2017 ; Miller, 2020 ; Nielsen, 1999 ; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010 ; Shulman, 2002 ; Tamir, 2019a , 2019b ; Yack, 2012 ). Against the civic–ethnic dichotomy, John Hutchinson ( 2013 ) has argued:

Both nationalisms encouraged the rise of a civil society, of an educated citizenry engaged in a diversified ‘public’ sphere in which all could participate…. All nationalists appeal to the nation as historically determined and as moulded by human will (p. 76).

Criticising civic-ethnic distinction as “conceptually ambiguous, empirically misleading, and normatively problematic” (p. 5), Rogers Brubaker ( 2004 ) insists that glossily identified characteristics of Eastern ethnic nationalism form a part of Western nationalist politics as well and hence it is problematic and “impossible to hold an uncritical view of the essentially “civic” quality of West European nationalism” (p. 134). Furthermore, the logic of civic–ethnic distinction, like an ideology, is “to distinguish one’s own good, legitimate civic nationalism from the illegitimate ethnic nationalism found elsewhere” (p. 134). This means that states or secessionist movements politically employ this distinction to legitimise their state nationalist policies or secessionist national projects by presenting them, as opposed to empirical realities, “to domestic and especially international audiences as paragons of civic inclusiveness and tolerance” (p. 134). Christian Albrekt Larsen ( 2017 ) argues, on the basis of data from 44 countries, that Kohn’s distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism ignores “the within-country variation in perceptions of nationhood” (p. 13) and “lacks predictive power” (p. 18) about the birth of nations. Yoram Hazony ( 2018 ) states that Britain, France and the United States are not civic societies but national states, and their strength and stability lie not in the assumed civic nature of these states but in the national state character they have. By claiming that all forms of nationalism, whether civic or ethnic, are grounded and formed on the basis of both civic and ethnic components, Bernard Yack ( 2012 ) has termed the civic-ethnic dichotomy as an ethnocentric, misleading and double-edged myth, encouraging “us to divvy up these two components of nationhood between two mutually exclusive models of association” (p. 44). Sharing the argument of Yack, Kai Nielsen ( 1999 ) has criticised civic nationalism as a “deceptive ideology” for regarding a nation as exclusively a political community independent of cultural components and orientation. According to Nielsen, “All nationalisms are cultural nationalisms of one kind or another. There is no purely political conception of the nation, liberal or otherwise” ( 1999 , p. 127). Alain Dieckhoff ( 2005 ) argues along somewhat similar lines that what he terms “culture as a genuine resource” (p. 75) plays a significant role in the formation of a nation and legitimisation of a state’s national political project, both in Eastern and Western regions of the world. Gina Gustavsson and David Miller ( 2020 ) also argue that “although it may be possible to encourage people to give … civic elements more prominence when thinking about their national identities, it seems unlikely that the cultural and ethnic elements will disappear, since it is precisely these features that most clearly distinguish one nation from another” (p. 13). Pointing out the empirical weakness in the civic–ethnic dichotomy, Stephen Shulman ( 2002 ), on the basis of using survey data from 15 countries, argues that civic components are present in Eastern European nationalism as well, and nationalisms in Western European societies are not entirely free from ethnic components:

Overall, the data suggest that imperial and communist rule have not pushed Eastern European nationhood in a strongly cultural direction while greatly weaking civicness. And whereas most of the West has a long tradition of democracy and relatively strong and stable political institutions, cultural conceptions of nationhood are alive and well, and support for multiculturalism is relatively weak (p. 583).

In the same vein, Florian Bieber ( 2020 ) states that nations are not “permanently locked into this trajectory of “ethnic” versus “civic” nationalism. Rather, all nations have the two ideal types and oscillate between them over time” (p. 13). Yale Tamir ( 2019a ) states that the civic-ethnic distinction is theoretically inaccurate and more normative than descriptive, aiming “to establish the moral supremacy of West” (p. 425). This makes present-day politics a victim of misguided expectations and dangerous policies tending to produce catastrophic consequences:

The distinction assumes that ethnic conflicts are endemic to the East, encouraging us to ignore the spread of racial and ethnic tensions within presumed civic Western democracies, which include ethnic racial conflicts, the marginalisation of indigenous peoples…, and phenomena such as anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia. By waving the civic flag, Western democracies pretend to be more peaceful and inclusive than they really are, fostering a self-image that allows them to exonerate themselves, leaving them unprepared to deal with internal conflicts (p. 431).

She (2019b) further argues that the present political and social unrest is rooted “not only in an economic crisis but also in a crisis of identity for which the civic version of nationalism offers an insufficient, too abstract and legalistic answer” (p. 165).

Regarding the civic-ethnic dichotomy, one of the crucial issues of disagreement in nationalism studies is the nature of the relationship between nationalism and liberalism. One group of scholars regards nationalism as an inherently destructive, repressive, aggressive and preposterous force (Arendt, 1945 ; Acton, 1862 ; Hayek, 1982 ; Kedourie, 1961 ; King, 2007 ; Popper, 1966 ; Tagore, 1950 ). For this group, the phenomenon of nationalism is inimical to the values of democracy, prosperity, and individual rights and freedoms, as the former sacrifices the latter for the sake of the larger project of forming a nation and is the major cause of wars, genocide, moral corruption, and marginalisation of minority communities. Accordingly, Lord Acton ( 1862 ) has claimed that nationality is absurd and “is a confutation of democracy” (p. 25); Rabindranath Tagore ( 1950 ) has called nationalism “a great menace” (p. 67) and the nation “the greatest evil” (p. 17); Albert Einstein has characterised nationalism as “an infantile disease, the measles of mankind” (as cited in Isaacson, 2007 , p. 386); Hannah Arendt ( 1945 ) has associated nationalism with “chauvinism” (p. 458); Martin Luther King, Jr. ( 2007 ) has denounced nationalism as a “false god” (p. 132); and Friedrich A. Hayek ( 1982 ) and Karl Popper ( 1966 ) have equated nationalism with tribalism and authoritarianism. Acton has asserted that “nationality does not aim either at liberty or prosperity…. It is a confutation of democracy, because it sets limits to the exercise of the popular will, and substitutes for it a higher principle” (p. 25). For Popper ( 1966 ), nationalism is against reason and free liberal society as it “appeals to our tribal instincts, to passion and to prejudice, and to our nostalgic desire to be relieved from the strain of individual responsibility which it attempts to replace by a collective or group responsibility” (p. 49). Kedourie ( 1961 ) also argues that “the essence of nationalism is that the will of the individual should merge in the will of the nation” (110). Some contemporary scholars, such as Arundhati Roy, follow the same line of argument, claiming that nationalism, as a destructive and dehumanising force, is highly inimical to the liberal democratic project and individual freedom all over the world. Roy ( 2003 ) thus argues that “flags are bits of coloured cloth that governments use first to shrink-wrap people’s minds and then as ceremonial shrouds to bury the dead” (p. 47).

Another group of scholars sees nationalism as a progressive and liberating force, believing that it is compatible with liberal values of democracy, equality, and individual rights and freedoms (Greenfeld, 1993 ; Miller, 1995 , 2020 ; Moore, 2001 ; MacCormick, 1982 ; Nielsen, 1999 ; Renan, 1882/ 1996 ; Tamir, 1993 , 2019b ). Moreover, this group argues that nationalism positively supports liberalism and the later needs the former to survive and provide public goods such as social justice, welfare, cultural identity, and peace in the contemporary world. As Tamir ( 2019b ), who sees nationalism as an essential positive resource in contemporary society, states:

It [nationalism] has given the twentieth century some of its finest hours and could become the saviour of the twenty-first century. The much-discussed crisis of modern democracies is inherently associated with the breakdown of this partnership [among nationalism, liberalism, and democracy]. Democracy cannot be restored as a purely utilitarian project, only as a national one—as a framework that provides meaning and reasons for mutual care and responsibility. Self-centred individualism must therefore be replaced with a more collectivist spirit that nationalism knows how to kindle (p. xvi).

Gustavsson and Miller ( 2020 ), like Tamir, also argue that nationalism (or ‘nationality’ as they call it), which they consider essential to the effective functioning of contemporary liberal democracies, “provides the ‘cement’ or ‘glue’ that holds modern, culturally diverse, societies together and supports both democracy and social justice” (p. 3). This means that the realisation of the goal of social justice, which is a central component of contemporary liberalism, is dependent on social trust and solidarity “that only a common national identity can create at society-wide level” (Miller, 2020 , p. 25). Andreas Wimmer ( 2018 ), too, contends that nation-building, conceptualised as the process of the formation of a political community, characterised by “political equality between ethnic groups” (p. 6), around a nation helps in preventing civil wars, bringing about peace and fostering economic development.

Beyond Meta-theorisation

From the late 1980s onwards, the study of nationalism has witnessed the germination of new approaches such as feminist, postcolonial, and poststructuralist approaches. All these approaches are deeply influenced by the philosophy of poststructuralism or postmodernism. Believing that everything in society is the product of social construction associated with power, poststructuralists argue that there is no scientific and neutral knowledge, no fixed and single meaning and explanation, and no universal and absolute truth. Instead, they see the world as unstable, contingent, indeterminate, diverse and ungrounded and therefore celebrate multiple realities, multiple experiences, multiple voices and multiple truths, relativism, and constructivism.

The new approaches question the central assumptions of conventional theories of nationalism—primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism—and insist on theorising the issues related to nations and nationalism beyond the methodology and epistemology of these mainstream theories. They, in particular, criticise them for focusing exclusively on the single issue of the origins of nations and nationalism at the cost of such related issues of nationalism as the question of women’s identity, the world’s cultural and political fragmentation, the plural nature of cultural identities, the nature of nationalism in colonial societies, the social engineering character of national identities, the discursive nature of nations and nationalism, and the worldwide violation of rights of national minorities, immigrants, indigenous peoples, and subnational groups, among others. By characterising mainstream theories as gender-blind, Eurocentric, reductionist-oriented, and anti-contextual, the new approaches focus on deconstructing these meta-theories to unearth the issues ignored by meta-theorisation.

Feminist scholars such as Kumar Jayawardena ( 1986 ), Cynthia Enloe ( 1989 ), Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis ( 1989 ), Sylvia Walby ( 1996 ), and Suruchi Thapar-Bjorkert ( 2013 ) have criticised the mainstream theorisation about nations and nationalism as gender-blind and hegemonic theorisation for ignoring the role of women in the creation of nations and the significance of gender relations in the understanding of the complex nature and functioning of nations and nationalism. Suruchi Thapar-Bjorkert ( 2013 ) states that “discussions on nationalism have been primarily by men about men” (p. 806). For her, this is primarily due to three reasons: (a) the practice of placing greater emphasis on nationalism as a collective process; (b) the marginalisation of the specific role played by women in nation formation; and (c) the practice of seeing women as naturally subordinate to men. From the late 1980s onward, feminist scholars working on gender and nation have strongly challenged this trend. As Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis ( 1989 ) have incisively pointed out that women play an instrumental role in the production, maintenance and reproduction of ethnic and national processes through the following five major activities:

(a) as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities;

(b) as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups;

(c) as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture;

(d) as signifiers of ethnic/national differences—as a focus and symbol in ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction and transformation of ethnic/national categories;

(e) as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles (p. 7).

Cynthia Enloe ( 1989 ), while analysing the relationship between gender and nationalism in colonised societies, argues that women have been used as instrumental categories both by colonialists to maintain their colonial rule and by nationalist movements to fight against colonialism and establish new nation-states on the basis of standards set by the male nationalists. She thus sees nationalism as a patriarchal institution whose values and structures are created and dominated by men at the cost of the lived experiences and personal identities of women. For Enloe, the end of colonialism has not led to the liberation of women from the meanings and identity created by nationalist movements about women since postcolonial nation-states, as patriarchal institutions are not interested in recognising and celebrating the lived experiences of women.

Following Enloe’s conception of nationalism as a masculine project, Lene Hansen ( 2000 ), Begona Echeverria ( 2001 ), Patrizia Albanese ( 2006 ), Sikata Banerjee ( 2012 ) and Suruchi Thapar-Bjorkert ( 2013 ) argue that national identities are constructed largely by men, and women are excluded, in a systemic way, from shaping the national projects or identities. This exclusionary and masculine character of nationalism causes the exclusion of women from formal politics and decision-making centres. Furthermore, it, through gendered national stereotypes and by according symbolic roles to women such as mothers of the nation, causes subordination of their individual interests or identities to the collective interest of the larger body of the nation. The sexual violence against women during conflicts and wars is also symbolically associated with the nation; as Thapar-Bjorkert ( 2013 ) contends that “rape constitutes an instrument of militarised, masculinised nationalism, and it is on women’s body that the politics of the nation are mapped” (p. 811). All the above feminist scholars call for examining the ways gender intersects with sexuality, violence, religion, race, class, emotions, and other markers of national identity.

Representing the postcolonial approach, Homi Bhabha ( 1990 ) and Partha Chatterjee ( 1993 ), argue that, contrary to the West’s conventional discourse of homogenous cultural identities or the West’s Enlightenment project of universalism, national identities are deeply plural, fragmented and hybridised. Analysing the nature of anticolonial nationalisms in Asia and Africa and criticising the mainstream theorisation of nationalism as Eurocentric, Chatterjee has incisively disputed Benedict Anderson’s notion of the modular influence of European nationalism. For Chatterjee ( 1993 ), Asian and African nationalisms, which according to him were based “on a difference with the “modular” forms of the national society propagated by the modern West” (p. 5), were not entirely derivative of and modelled on European nationalism. Although Asian and African nationalist elites, he asserted, were deeply influenced by Western discourses and practices on nation and nationalism, they adapted and indigenised them in accordance with their unique cultures, economies, intellectual traditions, political systems, geographies, and histories. He explains this by categorising the realm of social institutions and practices into two domains: the inner, ‘spiritual’ domain, a native domain over which Asian-African nationalist elites have dominance; and the ‘material’ outer domain, a domain over which the West and the colonial state have superiority. He argues that, contrary to the conventional theorisation that nationalism in colonial societies has begun with their anticolonial political movements, ‘spiritual’, cultural nationalism, with which postcolonial nationalism begins, “creates its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power” (1993, p. 6). The inner, ‘spiritual’ domain constituted a part of the originality of the anticolonial nationalisms in Asia and Africa. It was a vital centre of anticolonial resistance outside and independent of the ‘material’ outer domain, which consisted of colonial state apparatus and a derivative political nationalism. Thus, the nationalist elites in Asia and Africa, according to Chatterjee, have not simply imitated the nationalist ideas of European nationalism, but indigenised and adapted them within their distinct socio-economic contexts. This created a new domain for nationalist elites to develop, outside the confines of the colonial state, non-Western notions of religion, family, gender relations, literature, and other aspects of Afro-Asian societies that are modern and at the same time non-Western.

Postmodernist approaches see nations and nationalism as essentially narrative and discursive formations and argue that social identities are always constructed through a dialectical relationship with other identities, meaning that identities are mutually constitutive and internally unstable, indeterminate and incomplete. Contesting the narrative that ethnicity and nation are natural, given and independent phenomena, Etienne Balibar ( 1991 ), Immanuel Wallerstein ( 1991 ) and Stuart Hall ( 1991 ) argue that they are historically constructed categories whose meanings are based on power relations within particular situations and defined in relation to other forms of identity such as gender and class. They contend that because ethnicity and nation are socially situated, their meanings are malleable, mutable, changeable and contextual, and thus lack a stable centre or single, universal presence. For Balibar, ethnicity exists only in the form of a discourse of what he calls “fictive ethnicity” (1991, p. 96), a conceptual category that for him is not simply fiction but represents that an ethnic or national community is socially constructed, through the medium of language and race, in such a way that we assume it as a natural phenomenon. He has stated:

No nation possesses an ethnic base naturally, but as social formations are nationalised, the populations included within them, divided up among them or dominated by them are ethnicized—that is, represented in the past or in the future as if they formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, culture and interests which transcends individuals and social conditions (1991, p. 96).

Sharing the position of Balibar, Hall argues:

We have the notion of identity as contradictory, as composed of more than one discourse, as composed always across the silences of the other, as written in and through ambivalence and desire. These are extremely important ways of trying to think an identity which is not a sealed or closed totality (1991, p. 49).

Rogers Brubaker ( 1996 ), while examining the structural characteristics and modus operandi of nationalist politics in post-communist Europe and Eurasia, has differentiated the concept of a nation from the concepts of nationhood and nationness on the basis of his reasoning to understand the nature and dynamics of a nation from a practical perspective. He has criticised the mainstream theorisation on nationalism (primordialism, modernism, and ethno-symbolism) as “analytically dubious” (p. 21) for seeing nations as real, essentialist entities and for adopting what he calls a developmentalist approach to the nation, which implies that nations grow, develop, and exist in a consolidated and stabilised manner. He states that “nationalism can and should be understood without invoking “nations” as substantial entities” (p. 7), meaning that the nation should not be treated as a reified entity intrinsically manifested in nationalism. For Brubaker, the central problem in mainstream theorisation is that it sees nations as a category of analysis inherently incarnated in the practice of nationalisms. This approach precludes “alternative and more theoretically promising ways of conceiving nationhood and nationness” (p. 15). The nation, he argues, is to be seen as a category of practice, and only nationhood and nationness are the real categories of analysis, which constitute a variable property of individual and group actions and which are something that does not develop but something that happens. To understand the logic, heterogeneity and real strength of nationalism, the complex reality of nationhood, diverse nationalist discourses and practices, and the protean, unstable and contextual character of nationness, Brubaker states:

We should focus on nation as a category of practice, nationhood as an institutionalised cultural and political form, and nationness as a contingent event or happening, and refrain from using the analytically dubious notion of “nations” as substantial, enduring collectivities… the analytical task at hand… is to think about nationalism without nations (1996, p. 21).

Similarly, Brubaker and Cooper ( 2000 ) and Brubaker ( 2004 ) question the mainstream’s theoretical approach of seeing the concepts of ethnicity, nation, race and other identity-related concepts as essential, substantial entities. For Brubaker, these categories are fluid, polymorphous and contingent and, therefore, should not be treated as reified entities with stable, essentialising character. Instead, these categories should be conceptualised “in terms of practical categories, situated actions, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organisational routines, institutional forms, political projects, and contingent events” (2004, p. 11).

Katherine Verdery ( 1996 ), contrary to the essentialist, stable and fixed conception of a nation, sees a nation as a symbol whose meanings, as defined by the symbolic, social, economic and political context, vary from context to context. For her, the modern state, through its totalising nationalist discourses and practices, produces and reproduces symbol nation and assigns meanings to it representing homogeneity and differentiation associated with ethnicity, class, race, locality, or gender. The state-created homogeneity and differences, which represent a process of exclusion, constitute a source of strength for the modern state and legitimise its existence and necessity in modern life. However, the states’ homogenisation processes, she argues, do not have a uniform character but are deeply shaped by the contexts in which the states make homogenising efforts. Thus, nationalism, “as a political utilisation of the symbol nation” (p. 227), has multiple meanings and a nation is not a substantial entity but a political fiction.

Craig Calhoun ( 1997 , 2007 ), against the conventional theories’ approach of defining nations as essential and reified entities, conceptualises nationalism as a discursive formation. For Calhoun, a nation comes into existence when its members consider themselves a nation. It is the discourse of nationalism, he argues, that plays a significant role in the production of collective identity, social solidarity and nationalist self-understandings among the people, but in an indeterminate and non-essentialist way. He criticises what he calls a reductionist approach to explain the diverse nationalisms that exist at the level of practical activity in terms of a single “master variable” (p. 21), be it ethnic identities, industrialisation, bureaucratisation, unequal economic development, state, or ressentiment. These forces help to explain the contents of specific nationalisms, but owing to multiple sources of nations, “they do not explain the form of nation or nationalist discourse itself” (p. 21), and a single explanatory variable is unable to capture the commonalities of many diverse nationalisms. It is the discourse of nationalism that connects different collectives, ideologies, movements, cultural patterns and policies and shapes all of them. “What is general”, he states, “is the discourse of nationalism. It does not completely explain any specific… activity or event, but it helps to constitute each through cultural framing” (p. 22). This suggests that a single, universal theory of nationalism is not possible:

Nationalism is too diverse to allow a single general theory to explain it all. Much of the content and specific orientation of various nationalisms is determined by historically distinct cultural traditions, the creative actions of leaders, and contingent situations within the international order. What can be addressed in more general, theoretical terms are the factors that lead to the continual production and reproduction of nationalism as a central discursive formation in the modern world (p. 123).

Calhoun’s scepticism towards a general theory of nationalism does not mean that a theory is not necessary but represents that multiple theories are needed to understand diverse forms of nationalism.

Alan Finlayson and Ronald Grigor Suny argue along somewhat similar lines that discourses are central to the formation of nations and understanding the complexity of nationalism. Finlayson ( 1998 ) argues for conceptualising nations and nationalism as specific phenomena through a discourse analysis approach to uncover the specific content of individual nationalisms obscured by totalising or universal explanations of nationalism. Considering that “no two nationalisms can be same” (p. 100), he insists that each national community is the by-product of a political-ideological discourse constructed and articulated in a specific context with a specific meaning and deployed to legitimise the totalising political projects of specific ideologies by associating them “with the apparently ‘natural’ nation” (p. 100). This means that “nationalism is not a matter of history, sociology or philosophy but always a matter of politics” (p. 117) and that nations and nationalism are not given, fixed, stable, and unitary phenomena but are variegated phenomena with particularity as their defining feature. Suny ( 2001 ), while examining the pattern of the formation of national identities in the post-Soviet republics, argues that nations are created through narratives, associated in particular with the construction of histories, which present nations as essential and reified entities. The national narratives or discourses, through teaching, reproduction and repetition, make people embrace nation and national identities as immemorial, singular, given, fixed and internally harmonious when, in fact, narratives do so by concealing “the fractures, divisions, and relations of power within the nation” (p. 871).

Ruth Wodak, et al. ( 2009 ), while arguing in favour of the discursive construction of national identities, also state that nations and national identities are produced and reproduced through discourses and that there is no singular and fixed national identity or a single vision of nation. Rather, there are multiple national identities that “are discursively constructed according to context, that is according to the degree of public exposure of a given utterance, the setting, the topic addressed, the audience to which it is addressed, and so on” (pp. 186–187). By this, they mean that, contrary to the essentialist position of nations, discursive national identities are dynamic, contradictory, ambivalent, unstable, and fragile. Similarly, Filiz Coban Oran ( 2022 ), while examining the nature of national identity in Turkey and the pattern of nationalist politics in post-Kemalist Turkey, contends that there has not been a specific Turkish nationalism. Rather, there are many diverse and competing Turkish nationalisms “which imagine different Turkeys” (p. 5), such as a secular Turkey and a Muslim Turkey, by discursively producing, dismantling and reproducing Turkey’s national identity associated with power.

Amanda Machin ( 2015 ), who conceptualises nation and nationalism in terms of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of language games, argues that, contrary to the claims of primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism, the meanings of nation and nationalism, as socially and historically constructed categories, are malleable, flimsy and protean with no essential meanings and stable centre at all. As a result, a single, universal explanation of nation and nationalism is not possible because it diminishes their power and obscures their “lack”, which “contains what we are missing and endlessly seeking” (p. 3), by silencing their multiplicity and diversity of meanings. For him, the power and strength of nation and nationalism lie in the contestation over their meanings and nature, and this contestation has the capacity to strengthen the roots of democracy. As he puts it:

It is actually in the lack of any final definition that the power of the nation resides. But it is also this that fills it with democratic potential. For it allows for the ongoing possibility for questioning the nation’s dominant meanings. Reviving the contestation over the question of ‘who are we?’ could, possibly, reinvigorate democracy (p. 3).

Machin thus argues for the encouragement and celebration of the contestation of nation and nationalism.

The new approaches to nationalism share that nations and nationalism are not absolute categories but historically and socially constructed categories and contingent events. second, they are less interested in the origins of nationalism and its historical evolution and more interested in its everyday existence or, to put it another way, they are more interested in the process of nation-building and in how national identities are constructed, articulated, represented, narrated and performed in everyday life. Finally, new approaches focus on dismantling the totalising and essentialising claims of meta-theories of nationalism associated with the Enlightenment project of universalism.

The paper has provided an overview of existing literature on nation and nationalism relating to debates and disputes about the meaning of nation and nationalism, their origins, and their nature and scope. Central to these debates, as an overview of literature, has suggested, lie a number of key questions: Whether nations are to be defined objectively or subjectively; whether nations make states and nationalism or the case is the other way around; whether nation and nationalism are political or cultural phenomena; whether they are modern phenomena or the extension of pre-modern ethnic communities; whether they are progressive or destructive forces; whether they are compatible with or diametrically opposed to the multiple values of democracy, equality, liberty, justice, and prosperity; whether non-western regions adopted them in the same form in which they emerged in the western world or adapted them in agreement with their unique contexts; and is nationalism about creating homogeneity in society and thereby devaluing differences, or about recognising and celebrating those differences? In this article, an overview of these debates has suggested a series of important things. First, the academic journey of nationalism has reached a stage where the current consensus is that nations are socially constructed and historically contingent phenomena, and the current focus of the scholarship is on looking at the intersection between the cultural and political aspects of nationalism. Second, nations and nationalism are not absolute, singular, fixed, and unitary phenomena but possess a multifaceted character with particularity, subjectivity, and relativity as their defining features. They carry multiple and diverse meanings depending on who is using them in what context and with what orientation. Therefore, a single, universal explanation of nationalism is neither feasible nor morally desirable. Third, to understand the multiplicity and diversity of nations and nationalism and the ways in which elements of this multidimensionality intersect, it is necessary to treat them as open-ended, unstable, dispersed, protean, particular, and contingent phenomena. Finally, deep contestation constitutes a source of power and strength for nations and nationalism as it can broaden and expand their sphere and scope by offering opportunities for exploring and analysing their multifaceted character and changing realities in the contemporary world.

Data availability

The author declares that the data supporting the findings of this study are available within the article and have been properly cited. However, no separate datasets were generated or analysed for this article.

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Nationalism.

• Renaud-Philippe Garner Renaud-Philippe Garner Department of Political Science, Aarhus University
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.2039
• Published online: 18 May 2022

Nationalism is a set of beliefs about the nation: its origins, nature, and value. For nationalists, we are particular social animals. On the one hand, our lives are structured by a profound sense of togetherness and similarity: We share languages and memories. On the other hand, our lives are characterized by deep divisions and differences: We draw borders and contest historical narratives. For nationalism, humanity is neither a single species-wide community nor an aggregation of individuals but divided into distinct and unique nations. At the heart of nationalism are claims about our identity and needs as social animals that form the basis of a series of normative claims. To answer the question “what should I do” or “how should I live,” one must first answer the questions “who am I” and “where do I belong.” Nationalism says that our membership in a nation takes precedence and ultimately must guide our choices and actions. In terms of guiding choice and action, nationalist thought proposes a specific form of partiality. Rather than treat the interests or claims of persons and groups impartially, the nationalist demands that one favors one’s own, either as a group or as individual persons. While nationalism does not claim to be the only form of partiality, it does claim to outrank all others: Loyalty or obligations to other groups or identities are subordinated to national loyalty. Together, these claims function as a political ideology. Nationalism identifies the nation as the central form of community and elevates it to the object of supreme loyalty. This fundamental concern for the nation and its flourishing can be fragmented into narrower aims or objectives: national autonomy, national identity, and national unity. Debate on nationalism tends to divide into two clusters, one descriptive and one normative, that only make partial contact. For historians and sociologists, the questions are explanatory: What is nationalism, what is a nation, how are they related, and when and how did they emerge? Philosophers and political theorists focus on the justification of nationalism or nationalist claims: Is national loyalty defensible, what are the limits of this loyalty, how do we rank our loyalties, and does nationalism conflict with human rights?

• nationalism
• perennialism
• civic nation
• ethnic nation
• liberal nationalism
• globalization

Introduction: A Contested Concept

Nationalism is not a consensual idea: We might say that it is doubly contested. On the one hand, there is little consensus on what it is . Primarily, historians and sociologists have conducted descriptive research: They argue for a definition of nationalism as well as an account of its emergence, and they advance typologies of nationalism or stages of its transformation. Arguably, the central debate concerns the origins of nationalism and nations: When did they emerge and why did they do so? Modernists claim that nationalism emerged in the past few centuries and created nations: The ideology invents a new and artificial form of community. Their critics, often experts on premodern eras, either respond that nations are far older than the modernist paradigm allows or that they are transformations of older communities rather than ex nihilo creations.

These debates are not merely about dates. Behind the answer to the question “when did nationalism first emerge?” we find questions like “what is nationalism?” “what is its function?” and “which conditions made it possible or inevitable?” Even among those who agree on an approximate timeline or place for its emergence, we find a range of competing explanations on what produced nationalism: new economic conditions, political transformations, or the power of new ideas.

Nor is there any consensus on the precise relationship between nationalism and nations. For some, nations predate nationalism but are transformed by it, while for others, nationalism creates nations, and for others yet, nations are the modern transformation of prenational communities.

On the other hand, we find intense disagreement about the morality or justification of nationalism. While some scholars seem ambivalent, noting both achievements and failures, and others defend some version of it, there is no gainsaying that nationalism is the object of sustained criticism. The normative debate is further complicated by the fact that what philosophers call “nationalism” only partially overlaps with what historians and sociologists mean by it. Many philosophers and political theorists seem interested in national partiality— the idea that one can, should, or must be partial to fellow nationals—rather than an ideology that orders domestic life and the international order.

Generally, the seminal works on nationalism are explanatory accounts. In addition, to this difference in age and output, there is a question of reliance. Normative debates depend on descriptive ones. Those making normative arguments tend to draw on the descriptive research—from their conception of nationalism to the extent to which they think the nation is artificial. Consequently, this entry focuses on central descriptive and normative questions, with a longer examination of the former. It begins with a clarificatory section (“ Nationalism or Patriotism? ”) that distinguishes the two eponymous concepts and provides a “core” definition of nationalism. The section “ The Origins and Nature of Nationalism ” provides a critical survey of the central descriptive debate: How and when did nationalism emerge? This section divides into subsections: “ Modernism and Its Proponents ” as well as “ Antimodernism .” The section “ Conceptions of the Nation ” addresses the question of what kind of community the nation is through a critical discussion of the ethnic–civic distinction. Normative questions are considered in the section “ The Justification of Nationalism .” The subsection “ Liberal Nationalism and Its Defense ” distinguishes liberal nationalism from core nationalism before turning to prominent arguments made in favor of and against the former.

Nationalism or Patriotism?

While nationalism and patriotism are sometimes treated as synonymous, there are good reasons to differentiate them. First, patriotism is far older than nationalism. While modernists all believe that nationalism is recent, none contest Greek patriotism during the Medic Wars ( Kohn, 1944 ). This chronological difference depends upon a more basic one: Nationalism and patriotism belong to different categories. Typically, patriotism is viewed as a love for or loyalty to one’s community, whether an emotion or character trait ( Kedourie, 1960 ; Kleinig et al., 2015 ; MacIntyre, 1984 ; Oldenquist, 1982 ). 1 Either way, patriotism is neither an ideology nor a form of politics. Understood as an emotion or a character trait, we can grasp the futility of asking when it first appeared: We do not ask when courage was invented or which society discovered love. 2

This distinction also helps explain why the two phenomena are related and sometimes conflated. If patriotism is older and more basic, it makes sense that nationalism draws on this emotion or character trait that arises naturally within human communities. Conversely, it is unsurprising that those who cultivate love and loyalty for their community are drawn to an ideology centered on it.

Nationalism, however, cannot be reduced to sentiment or a character trait. The standard view is that it is an ideology, whatever else it might be ( Billig, 1995 ; Eriksen, 2002 ; Kedourie, 1960 ; Smith, 1991 , 1998 , 2010 ). 3 Despite a wide variety of nationalisms and nationalist thinkers, we can still identify a few core propositions that were shared by seminal thinkers as well as by nationalist movements. We can refer to this as “core” or “classical nationalism.”

Nationalism begins with a claim about the nature and order of the world: It is divided into distinct and unique nations (i). 4 Then it adds a claim about the human good: Human freedom (or flourishing) is dependent upon membership in a nation (ii). Upon these claims about the world and our nature, they add normative claims. The nation, and only the nation, is the source of political legitimacy (iii). Nations must be autonomous and express their characters (iv). Finally, national loyalty outranks all other loyalties (v) ( Kedourie, 1960 ; Smith, 1991 , 1998 , 2010 ). 5

Together, these propositions can explain a great deal of what we call nationalism. 6 For instance, the quest for authenticity depends upon (i) and (iv). If nations are not unique, then it is hard to understand why authenticity should matter. Nor does it make much sense to stress the value of self-expression is what is being expressed is banal or common. Similarly, the nationalist aim of achieving statehood largely follows from (iii) and (iv). On the one hand, if all alien rule is illegitimate, then why should a nation accept it? On the other hand, it seems plausible that the best guarantee of autonomy and self-expression is state sovereignty. Or consider how nationalism is associated with mass mobilization and self-sacrifice. This is in part a function of (v). These projects are justified by an appeal to rank-ordering; if national loyalty reigns supreme, then all other loyalties must be subordinate.

In sum, while nationalist thinkers and nationalist movements present us with additions or iterations, these five beliefs capture much of what is shared. When one speaks about the age of nationalism or its spread, one is invariably speaking about some or all of these propositions. 7

The Origins and Nature of Nationalism

Since the mid- 20th century , the origins and nature of nationalism have been fiercely debated between modernists and their critics. While the former view has emerged as the dominant paradigm, steady criticism has produced notable rival views.

Modernism developed as a rejection of previous scholarship. Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries , school manuals and scholarship presented nations as ancient, even immemorial. History was taught as a multimillennia narrative of nations and their great members. For example, Germans were taught that their nation long predated unification under Otto von Bismarck. The Hermannsdenkmal— a 19th-century monument celebrating the victory of Arminius, a 1st-century warlord, over the Romans at Teutoburger Forest—embodies this belief in continuity between contemporary Germans and their alleged ancestors ( Grosby, 2005 ).

Modernism and Its Proponents

Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist—but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, even if, as indicated, these are purely negative. ( Gellner, 1964 , p. 168)

For modernists, nationalism and nations are products of modernity, even necessary features of it. They emerge, together, sometime between the English Revolution ( Greenfeld, 1992 ; Kohn, 1940 ) or Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation ( Kedourie, 1960 ). Central to modernism is the relationship between nationalism and nations: Nationalism invents nations. The latter are not organic communities. Unlike families or religious communities, they have not and cannot emerge anywhere, any time. The nation is created by nationalism, which in turn is the product of a particular set of sociohistorical circumstances.

This shared belief is also the point of departure for deep disagreement. Which features of modernity best explain the emergence of nationalism and the invention of nations? There are roughly five kinds of answers to this question: cultural, economic, political, ideological, and radical constructivism.

Modern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture. ( Gellner, 1983 , p. 36)

Primarily associated with Ernest Gellner, the cultural view claims that modernization created nationalism, which in turn created nations, out of necessity ( Gellner, 1964 , 1973 , 1983 ). The disruption of premodern life caused by industrialization made it necessary to produce a homogeneous culture that would allow workers to communicate independently of context. To overcome fragmented local premodern cultures, one needs an overarching culture: a national culture. For this reason, a high culture is constructed and later a mass education system is devised to ensure its uniform transmission. Nationalism is a product of necessity: It constructs a new form of identity and community as a response to urban uprooting and industrialization. The dislocating effects of modernity require a refashioning of culture and identity.

People is all they have got: this is the essence of the underdevelopment dilemma itself. ( Nairn, 1977 , p. 100)

A rival view explains the origins of nationalism by appealing to another modern phenomenon: capitalism. For theorists like Tom Nairn, nationalism is a strategic response to the uneven spread of capitalism and the power that it provides ( Nairn, 1977 ). The unequal development and spread of capitalism distribute resources and power unequally: There are centers that benefited from the development of capitalism and there are poorer peripheries. Peripheral elites design an ideology that takes advantage of their only abundant resource: people. And to effectively mobilize and motivate those who do not share their class or interests, these peripheral elites must create a powerful sense of belonging. The solution is to draw on popular beliefs and practices to create a new interclass community: the nation. Thus, economic variants of modernism explain the advent of nationalism in terms of recent economic change, namely, capitalism.

On these views, nationalism is both a form of elite manipulation and transformation. The elites must construct a new sense of community to persuade the masses to endorse their priorities and projects. Yet, they must also change; they must become conversant in a language that draws on popular culture, its myths, and symbols, to mobilize this sense of interclass community.

But the clarity of focus on the nation as coterminous with the state cries out for a predominantly political explanation. ( Mann, 1995 , p. 48)

Yet another variant considers the territorial state to be the best explanation for the advent of nationalist ideology. Bluntly put, political changes are what call for a new political ideology. Nationalism emerges within the past few centuries because it is intimately linked to the modern state. The latter is not a collection of fiefdoms or local power structures but a stable administrative structure, centered in a capital, ruling over well-defined territories ( Giddens, 1985 ).

Here too modernity is cast as a disruptive force and nationalism is part and parcel of a response to it. Whatever else it disrupts, modernity destroys premodern polities and political frameworks. Instead of drawing on religious symbols or myths of descent, nationalism is the attachment to those symbols or representations of the modern state such as citizenship.

Other political variants of modernism emphasize interstate competition and the role that militarization plays ( Mann, 1986 ; Tilly, 1975 ). Still, the argument is essentially the same: Nationalism is created by modern states to help them function competitively and effectively in domestic or international affairs. Either way, it is a largely psychological phenomenon, a special esprit de corps tailor-made for the inhabitants of these new large administrative states.

Again, since a nation, ipso facto, must speak an original language, its speech must be cleansed of foreign accretions and borrowings, since the purer the language, the more natural it is, and the easier it becomes for the nation to realise itself, and to increase its freedom. ( Kedourie, 1960 , p. 67)

A fourth variant considers nationalism to be the response to the discontentment brought by modernity. Powerfully articulated by Elie Kedourie, this view presents nationalism as a civic religion, complete with a narrative of the fall, a path to redemption, and exhortations to sacrifice and purification. This creed was birthed by disillusioned marginal German intellectuals and then exported worldwide ( Kedourie, 1960 , 1971 ).

Collective humiliation and powerlessness are to be explained by national disunity, loss of identity, and autonomy. Like ancient Hebrews explaining their political subjugation in terms of their sinful ways, the nationalist blames contemporary discontentment on a failure to honor and safeguard one’s unique and distinct nation. The solution is national revival: The nation must be reunited, autonomy restored, and national identity restored to its authentic self.

Unlike other variants of modernism that see nationalism as the creation of elites seeking to secure the rising power structures or to provide the necessary social identity for the changing times, this view of nationalism as civic religion is invented by powerless members of society.

No surprise then that the search was on, so to speak, for a new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together. Nothing perhaps more precipitated this search, nor made it more fruitful, than print-capitalism, which made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to other, in profoundly new ways. ( Anderson, 1983/2006 , p. 36)

Finally, there are radical constructivist accounts that emphasize the artificiality of the nation: Nationalism is a narrative and the nation is a cultural artifact. For instance, Benedict Anderson has famously argued that changes in terms of how we conceptualize time, the combination of the printing press and capitalism, as well as political change meant that we could imagine new forms of community in which large groups of people can simultaneously imagine themselves as equal members ( Anderson, 1983/2006 ).

The convergence of factors explains what is needed for the narrative to take form and succeed. Print capitalism provides both the material means and an economic incentive to help construct and sustain reading publics, united by a vernacular language. Yet, the impetus to tell this story, to imagine such communities, comes from disaffected civil servants. Here we find echoes of the ideological account: Disaffected functionaries in Latin America came to resent their careers stunted by imperial metropoles. In short, the construction of nations through the nationalist narrative is made possible by several factors: new technology, changing ideas, and a class of people motivated to reimagine their sense of belonging.

Modernism is an attractive paradigm. Undeniably, nationalism spread and came to prominence in the past few centuries. Moreover, the nation-state and the notion of popular sovereignty certainly do not appear at home in the premodern world of multinational empires and dynastic power. And its advocates are right to show that much of what has been called ancient or authentic by nationalists was, in fact, neither. 8 Yet, for all its strengths, the modernist paradigm faces important hurdles.

The proliferation of variants reveals deep disagreement; irreconcilable modernisms cast doubt on the promise of modernism. For example, while modernists agree that the nation is a recent creation, they cannot agree on who created it. If nationalism invented nations, who invented nationalism?

For authors who defend economic modernism, it is the invention of peripheral elites who need a new form of mobilization to outcompete richer and more powerful elites ( Hechter, 1975 ; Nairn, 1977 ). Similarly, for those who consider nationalism as a form of political messianism, it is the invention of the marginal and frustrated among the educated and the skilled ( Kedourie, 1960 , 1971 ). Yet, conceiving nationalism as a rational strategy for weaker parties cannot be reconciled with the claim that nationalism emerges as the state’s official ideology to reinforce militarization or with the view that it is devised by elites for the sake of modernization and industrialization ( Gellner, 1964 , 1983 ; Tilly, 1975 ). One is left wondering whether nationalism is the ideology of the downtrodden who seek liberation or the ideology of the ruling class who seek consolidation.

There are deeper problems for modernist accounts. All of them purport to offer a unitary explanation and yet none do. Each variant draws its strength from its ability to compellingly explain certain cases, but none can explain all the central let alone the plausible cases. While economic theories rightly show how nationalism can be a strategy in an unequal contest, this hardly proves that nationalism is the consequence of such conditions: Underdevelopment often fails to produce nationalism, and nationalism regularly emerges among the (over)developed ( Connor, 1994 ). Similarly, explaining nationalism as a response to industrialization fails to account for those cases where the former precedes the latter ( Smith, 1983 ). And political accounts of nationalism fail to explain why nationalist energies can focus on something besides the state or sovereignty. If nationalism is only about the pursuit or consolidation of state power, what are we to make of cultural nationalism: artistic renaissances, campaigns for moral regeneration, and attempts to transform through education? And given that cultural and political nationalism feed off each other, why focus solely on the latter ( Hutchinson, 1987 , 1994 )?

Finally, the modernist paradigm struggles to persuasively answer important questions. Even if modern societies require new forms of community, this does not explain why the nation arouses such powerful and awe-inspiring passions. Put otherwise, how can instrumental accounts, which consider the nation an artificial community invented to serve some further end, explain its motivational power? Some modernists try to explain the power of nationalism by pointing to its self-referential quality: It is a form of self-worship ( Breuilly, 1993 ). But such replies must inevitably fail. Even if group worship provides great motivational power, this fails to answer a comparative question: Why is the national identity so much more powerful than other available identities? Why should an artificial and recent form of self-worship prove so effective?

Antimodernism

The appearance of the nation and its continuation over time is not a historically uniform process that can be attributed to one cause, such as the requirements of industrial capitalism, or confined to one period of time, such as the last several centuries. ( Grosby, 2005 , p. 58)

The primary fault line between modernists and their critics concerns not the origins of nationalism as an ideology but the nature of nations and their antiquity. Rather than conceive of nations as artificial and recent, the critics of modernism consider them to be either ancient forms of community or transformations of premodern forms of community.

Either way, critics of modernism tend to stress the extent to which nations must build upon dimensions of human identity that are far from modern, such as ethnicity or religion ( Armstrong, 1982 ; Gat, 2012 ; Grosby, 1991 , 2005 ; Hastings, 1997 ; Reynolds, 1983 , 1984 ; Smith, 1986 , 1991 , 1998 , 2000 ).

The argument tends to center on an existential claim: Is it or is it not the case that a nation has existed before modernity? For modernists, the answer must be negative. Indeed, if a single nation precedes nationalism, then the former can exist independently of the latter. And this demonstrates that nationalism neither invents the nation as a type of community nor all tokens of it. For this reason, considerable time and energy are expended to show that some nations, or at the very least one nation, existed before modernity.

We should distinguish between two antimodernist strands. Primordialism is the belief that nations are natural: They have always existed, or their origins are lost in time. While such views were more common in the 19th century , there are late- 20th-century attempts to defend primordialism. Sociobiological primordialism considers the nation as an extension of kin selection; our national ties are the product of our evolutionary inheritance and our tendency to favor those who are genetically similar ( van den Berghe, 1978 ). However, such views quickly break down. If the nation is primarily about kin selection, then it makes little sense to cooperate with and sacrifice oneself for those who are genetically unrelated. Even ethnic nations are bound by myths of common descent rather than actual genetic proximity.

Alternatively, we can speak of “cultural primordialism” when (national) culture is treated as a social given, something inherited that arouses powerful and nearly irresistible passions, even if this is only how we feel or perceive these ties ( Geertz, 1973 ). However, this view quickly falters. While “given” or “primordial” ties can be powerful, they are also subject to change, revision, and rejection. Moreover, the theory does not explain the power of these ties so much as rename them. Why should the given be stronger than the chosen?

Far more influential, perennialism accepts that nationalism is a modern ideology, that nations are historical objects—they appear at a point in time—but rejects that they were invented by nationalism in the modern era. 9 We can distinguish between perennialists who believe that the nation is persistent and those who argue that it is best understood as a recurrent phenomenon. The former is the idea that nations, or at least some of them, are continuous intergenerational communities that have existed without interruption while the latter is the view of nations as recurring, going in and out of existence throughout the ages ( Smith, 1998 ).

Because the critics of modernity do not claim that all or most nations are ancient, they readily concede that Tanzania is quite modern. Instead, the debate focuses on the antiquity of specific nations that serve as litmus tests. Thus, Adrian Hastings argued that England had already emerged as a functional national community during the Middle Ages. For him, there is an English national identity, modeled on the biblical model of Israel: a united people keenly aware of their identity, possessing a language and territory, a government, and a shared religion ( Hastings, 1997 ). Later developments, like the Reformation and the spread of a vernacular-language Bible, might reinforce and transform English identity, but what is being changed must be older than these transformations.

Naturally, if the English nation is modeled on something older, then the antiquity of the nation can be pressed further. Perhaps the hardest case for the modernist paradigm is that of ancient Israel. Here we are faced with what appears to be the uninterrupted intergenerational community that was conscious of its distinct identity, as well as possessed a unique language and religion and a homeland. In addition, they shared memories of an independent political community and rebellions against foreign occupation ( Grosby, 1991 ).

Again, cases such as medieval England or ancient Israel are designed to show that while premodern nations might be exceptional, modernism is wrong to assert that nationalism invents the concept of the nation and all instances of it. In a way, we might say that critics of modernity imagine nations like democracy: Most democracies are quite young, and the success of the idea is recent, but that does not show that democracy is a modern invention.

While radical critics of modernism argue that some nations have existed long before modernity, others present a moderate critique. Nations might be recent, but they are continuous with premodern communities. It is reasonable to understand these critics as rejecting the radical modernism of Eric Hobsbawm, who denies any serious continuity between older forms of community, ethnic or religious, for instance, and the nations invented by nationalism ( Hobsbawm, 1990 ; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983 ).

These moderate critics argue that nationalism does not create ex nihilo a novel form of community. Instead, nationalism transforms preexisting identities (cultural, ethnic, religious, etc.) to produce the modern nation. For medievalists like Susan Reynolds, it is a mistake to overlook the existence of communities that identified themselves through myths of ethnic descent, customs and laws, and the use of proper nouns. Nations might appear later, but many are rooted in the regnal kingdoms that possessed popular consciousness and a sense of identity ( Reynolds, 1983 , 1984 ).

Yet, the most sophisticated attempt to show continuity between the premodern and modern identity is probably the work of Anthony D. Smith’s. Through several decades of scholarship, Smith has stressed the importance of the longue durée , long-term analysis. To appreciate the emergence of nationalism and nations, we need to look at very long periods in part to avoid becoming narrowly focused on a particular era or set of cases that would lead to hasty generalizations. Where studies of short periods see invention, long-term analysis reveals that “invention” is often reinterpretation or reconstruction of older materials. Attention to the longue durée also helps explain why nationalism resonates. While many of its claims are inaccurate or false, the continuity between ethnic communities and modern nations shows that behind myths of antiquity and rootedness lie real shared memories and practices, an intergenerational sense of belonging that is not the invention of political elites ( Smith, 1986 , 1991 , 1998 , 2000 , 2009 ).

However insightful these rival views are, they are not without their weaknesses. To begin, none of them quite propose a rival grand narrative or general theory that explains the emergence of nationalism or nations. Again, many arguments center on the most convincing cases that can falsify modernism’s claims. Consequently, these case-study arguments often leave us with important questions about patterns and widespread change. Why do some nations like Israel emerge so early while others like Germany emerge much later? Why does the age of nationalism arrive so late if the nation is so old? What explains the appearance of major changes to collective identity if modernity does not invent nations?

Modernists also raise important methodological objections for their critics. For one, they accuse them of assuming that there is more continuity than the evidence supports ( Breuilly, 1996 ). A leitmotiv is that we have little idea what ordinary or plain persons believed in the premodern world given that they have left behind few writings. The writings of literate elites cannot be presumed to represent widespread beliefs or sentiments. 10 Furthermore, even when we do have some insight into what plain persons thought thanks to partial or fragmentary testimony, we must be careful to avoid reading the past through contemporary lenses.

In turn, this focus on written sources has itself been criticized. Azar Gat (2012) has argued that too much has been made of the written word or the lack of it. Not only is very little of human history covered by written documentation, but it is far from the only available evidence. For instance, while we have few texts documenting the sentiments of ordinary people, we have accounts of events that depended upon ordinary people. Gat repeatedly returns to the case of mobilization and war in the premodern world to argue that it is unrealistic to maintain that ordinary sentiments or identities are unknown or unknowable. Small and weak states did not simply coerce thousands if not tens of thousands of men to fight who barely recognized themselves in their elites. A fortiori , this is true of popular uprisings. 11 Simply put, Gat rejects the idea that we are begging the question of national identity or consciousness if they are part of the best explanation of phenomena ( Gat, 2012 ).

Still, this question of national consciousness is not solely methodological. It is one thing to ask on what grounds we attribute such beliefs or sentiments, and it is quite another to ask why this must be demonstrated. Here we shift from a discussion about whether nationalism invents nations to the very nature of the nation. Even if modernists and their critics could agree on how to conduct their inquiry, they might still disagree on its object. If a nation is defined as a group in which mass national consciousness must exist , then demonstrating that nations existed in the premodern world is far harder than if nations only require moderate consciousness. 12 Fundamentally, the question of how to prove the existence of premodern nations is a function of what the nation is.

Conceptions of the Nation

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things that, in truth, are but one constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form. ( Renan, 2018 , p. 261)

Despite its centrality, the question “what is a nation?” has been debated since Ernest Renan’s eponymous lecture at La Sorbonne in 1882 . Disagreement over what the nation is—what kind of community is it, how does it differ from other forms?—has produced some striking responses.

Faced with this question, Hugh Seton-Watson admits that there is nothing else to say save that a nation exists when enough people within a community believe that they belong to a nation or act as if they do ( Seton-Watson, 1977 ). Others like Rogers Brubaker deny that the nation is a particular kind of object. Instead, we should consider the “nation” as a category of practice rather than a form of community with set properties. Hence his proposal to “think about nationalism without nations” ( Brubaker, 1996 , p. 21).

Nevertheless, we can identify some broadly consensual beliefs about the nation. To begin, nations are territorial communities: They claim land as rightfully theirs. The homeland is sacred territory. It is imbued with meaning because it is the site of past events that define the group: where battles were fought, the dead are buried, and past generations flourished.

Moreover, nations are always understood as bounded and limited communities. No nation, however ambitious, understands itself as universal. Unlike certain religious communities, the nation does not aspire to or imagine itself as encompassing humankind. Finally, the nation is primarily a group in which membership is inherited, even when it is open to outsiders. Newborns are not without nationality until they reach the age of reason; one receives a nationality at birth even if one later opts to renounce it or to try to obtain another.

Beyond these shared and widely accepted features, we remain confronted by a central question: What is the nature of the community? What unites conationals?

Civic and Ethnic Views of the Nations

Two main concepts of nation and fatherland emerged in the intertwining of influence and conditions; conflicting and fusing, they became embodied in currents of thought in all nations and, to a varying degree, in entire nations. The one was basically a rational and universal concept of political liberty and the rights of man, looking towards the city of the future. In it the secularized Stoic-Christian tradition lived on: in England, it is Protestant form, in France, in its Catholic form. It found its chief support in the political and economic strength of the educated middle classes and, with a shift of emphasis, in the social-democratically organized labor movements. The other was basically founded on history, on monuments and graveyards, even harking back to the mysteries of ancient times and of tribal solidarity. ( Kohn, 1944 , p. 574)

Nations, and nationalisms, are often sorted according to two ideal types: French and German, Western and Eastern, or civic and ethnic. 13 This typology refers to the nature of the community or the identity that defines the nation. The Western or civic nation is primarily a political association and therefore more of a voluntary community. On this view, the nation is a pact or covenant, a social contract. The nation qua political community occupies a territory that is governed by laws and institutions. This is the view of the nation most associated with Western nations, particularly France, where republicanism played an important part in defining membership in the nation.

The Eastern or ethnic nation is defined by descent, or rather the presumed shared descent of its members. Here members understand themselves as ancestrally related, possessing an identity that is inherited and unchosen on the model of the family. The idea of the ethnic nation is often compared to the family as in Walker Connor’s well-known claim that it is perceived as “the family fully extended” ( Connor, 1994 , p. 202).

We might summarize these two views of the nations in terms of competing conceptions of nationality and its attribution— jus soli and jus sanguinis . How one acquires membership is a function of the nature of the community. The former attributes nationality to those born within the national territory while the latter attributes nationality based on the identity of one’s parents. 14

Of course, one’s conception of the nation is linked to other crucial concepts, namely, national identity. How one understands the nature of the community called the nation affects one’s conception of national identity. What it means to be an X—American or Turkish—will depend on the nature of the community in question. If one considers that the United States of America is a civic nation, a social contract in which members of the republic share political ideals and obey the same laws, then being or becoming an American is a function of becoming a member of a political union. On the civic view, who one’s parents are or which religion one practices will often be orthogonal to determining one’s national identity. Yet, if one holds an ethnic view of the nation, then the identity of one’s parents is no longer irrelevant but essential. On this view, to be Turkish is to be ancestrally related to other Turks and thus filiation is central.

However, these are ideal types. They allow us to make analytical distinctions, to explain patterns of thought and behavior, but they do not correspond to social reality. No actual nation is purely civic or purely ethnic but contains both civic and elements. For example, during the Third French Republic, while students learned about la Répulique, une et indivisible , they also learned that their country used to be called Gaul and their ancestors were Gauls. We find both the civic view embodied by the Republic and the ethnic view embodied in shared ancestry. While it is useful to speak of civic or ethnic to pick out what is emphasized, real nations only approximate these models ( Smith, 1991 ; Yack, 1996 , 2012 ). It is perhaps most useful to think of nations as ranging from more civic (e.g., the United States of America) to more ethnic (e.g., Japan).

The division of nations into civic and ethnic communities is not merely a descriptive question. Behind this categorization loom normative issues: We consider the civic nation to be more open and compatible with consent while the ethnic nation is bound through unchosen features—hence the reason why the civic nation is referred to as voluntarist conception while the ethnic nation is an organic conception. While ethnic nationalism might like to describe itself with the language of the family— fatherland, motherland, brotherhood, and so on —a less controversial unchosen association, it remains the case that the ethnic conception of the nationality makes it harder for newcomers to join. One can profess one’s faith in the republic, one can consent to the social contract, but one cannot so easily choose to change one’s (presumed) descent.

Here again, we must not lose sight that if we consider civic nations to be voluntary and ethnic nations to be organic, and that all actual nations combine elements of both models, then no nation is purely voluntarist or organic. This mixed view, which combines consent and inheritance, was already present in Ernest Renan’s seminal lecture. As it is often highlighted, he insists on the importance of consent, famously calling the nation an “everyday plebiscite” ( Renan, 2018 , pp. 262–263). Nevertheless, he also speaks about the importance of an indivisible past, an inheritance of “glory and regrets” ( Renan, 2018 , p. 261).

The Justification of Nationalism

Despite its unrivaled appeal and motivational power, nationalism has seduced few scholars. Several of its most prominent scholars could hardly disguise their contempt like Elie Kedourie or Eric Hobsbawm. Among philosophers and political theorists, it is often met with skepticism or hostility. Ethnic nationalism, the most ubiquitous form, past and present, is largely thought to be indefensible. Civic nationalism, while judged less harshly, is not universally embraced. In the words of an eminent political theorist, nationalism is “the starkest political shame of the twentieth century , most intractable and yet most unanticipated blot on the political history of the world since the year 1900 ” ( Dunn, 1979 , p. 55). Normatively, nationalism is on the back foot.

And yet, there is also considerable misunderstanding. To a large extent, the descriptive and the normative work fail to make contact. Consider what is arguably the most prominent anthology of high-profile philosophical papers on the justification of nationalism, The Morality of Nationalism ( McKim & McMahan, 1997 ). The endnotes reveal that many chapters contain few or no references to major or minor studies of nationalism. Several philosophers base their arguments on a commonsense understanding or on one or two works. Something similar holds the other way around. In Nations and Nationalism: A Reader ( Spencer & Wollman, 2010 ), 3 out of 19 of the authors from the above anthology appear very cursorily in the references. None of those contributing to the first anthology are the authors of any essential texts in the reader.

There are likely many reasons for this situation, but two should retain our attention. First, many normative works on nationalism either fail to distinguish it from patriotism or conflate them. In his defense of “nationalism,” Hurka defines it as “people being partial to their conationals” ( Hurka, 1997 , p. 140). However, so defined, it is indistinguishable from a widespread understanding of patriotism. Similarly, Judith Lichtenberg seems to think that the only difference between nationalism and patriotism is that the former applies before the establishment of the state while the latter applies after it ( Lichtenberg, 1997 ). This is an astonishing claim as it would make patriotism more recent than nationalism.

Second, and more fundamentally, many normative theorists use “nationalism” to mean something very different from the core ideology of nationalism or some variant. Typically, they mean national partiality , which amounts to the idea that one may, should, or must favor the claims or interests of one’s conationals over those of foreigners. For instance, when Thomas Hurka defends a moderate form of national partiality, he is very far from justifying the claim that national loyalty outranks all others, which was proposition (v). It is perfectly possible to favor one’s conationals over foreigners and yet believe that friends and family command a greater loyalty still.

We can add that nationalists, with few notable exceptions, do not have a purely instrumental view of loyalty and sacrifice: They do not love the nation to better serve humankind. 15 Rather, the nation itself is the ultimate end. In other words, the instrumental defenses of national partiality that we find in the philosophical literature share little with the classical view of nationalism. 16

In short, many philosophers are using “nationalism” in a very narrow sense compared to the scholars of nationalism. While we can find important contributions in these piecemeal or partial discussions of the morality of nationalism, we can also find defenses of something that goes beyond some measure of partiality or an isolated defense of self-determination. 17 However, we do not find much of a defense of classical or core nationalism. Commonly, we find a defense of liberal nationalism .

Liberal Nationalism and Its Defense

Liberals then need to ask themselves whether national convictions matter to their way of thinking, to their values, norms, and modes of behaviour, to their notions of social justice, and to the range of practical policies they support. In other words, they must rethink their beliefs and policies and seek to adapt them to the world in which they live. ( Tamir, 1993 , pp. 3–4)

Liberal nationalism is not part of an explanatory theory of nationalism. 18 Instead, it is an attempt to revise nationalism so that it can be reconciled with the dominant post-Enlightenment political framework, liberalism. Recall that the core ideology of nationalism involves certain claims about morality and human flourishing. On the one hand, we find claims about the value of community and membership. For instance, we saw that proposition (ii) of core nationalism was that individual freedom or flourishing required membership in a nation. Either way, the point is the connection between membership in a nation and human well-being. On the other hand, we find claims that are action-guiding: Proposition (v) is that national loyalty always comes first.

To be schematic, the classical view of the nation can be summarized as an ideology with a demanding view of partiality, which rests upon very strong claims about the value of nations. This demandingness is captured by the insistence that one sacrifice everything on the national altar. We find it in a Swiss “political catechism,” exhorting citizens to “sacrifice willingly and joyfully” their property and lives to the fatherland ( Kohn, 1944 , p. 385). Or in the poetry of Thomas Babington Macauley famously taught to British schoolchildren:

Then out spake brave Horatius, The Captain of the Gate; “To every man upon this earth Death cometh soon or late. And how can man die better Than facing fearful odds, For the ashes of his fathers, And the temples of his Gods.”

In sum, the morality view put forward by classical nationalism emphasizes the utmost importance of national membership in human flourishing and consequently affirms a rigid hierarchy of duties that places national loyalty above all else. These features—its demandingness, its absolute claims about communal life and flourishing—help explain why many have been so critical.

On the one hand, internal critiques seek to show that the classical view of nationalism is incapable of defending its strong claims. Prominently, we find objections concerning the relative value of the nation and nationality. A popular form of this objection lists the various communities to which one belongs and asks for a clear explanation as to why membership in the nation is so important. To be clear, the argument is not that the nation does not matter but that even if one can establish that it plays a very important role in human flourishing, perhaps even that it is the most valuable form of communal life, this does not yet show that national loyalty must always trump other loyalties ( Lichtenberg, 1997 ).

Here it is worth pointing out how descriptive research is mobilized to make normative arguments. If modernism is true, then the defenders of nationalism must explain why human flourishing depends so much upon a recent invention. Were premodern lives all deeply marred? If nations were invented, why can we not invent more inclusive communities to replace them? Conversely, if the critics of modernity are right, then it is easier to argue that national membership like family membership is a deep feature of human life and flourishing.

On a similar line of thought, one can admit that national autonomy is valuable or defensible and accept that national identity should be expressed and yet challenge precisely what is required to achieve either. If neither national autonomy nor national self-expression requires a nation-state, at least not in all cases, then it becomes much harder to justify nationalist demands for one.

On the other hand, we find external critiques that point to the conflict between nationalism and other normative beliefs or commitments we might have. First, it is difficult to reconcile the core ideology of nationalism with any demanding form of cosmopolitanism. Indeed, given the rigid rank-ordering of loyalties in core nationalism, one’s loyalty to humankind is at best something to be attended to once one’s duties to the nation are discharged. If cosmopolitanism is a commitment to impartial benevolence and the belief that our common humanity is our overriding identity and the object of our strongest loyalty, then they are flatly incompatible.

A similar point can be made about human rights. Understood as bedrock normative claims, human rights would represent (nearly) absolute side constraints. Here too there is a very real possibility that human rights and nationalism conflict. If national loyalty dominates all other loyalties, then it is difficult to understand how a nationalist can coherently choose to honor human rights when these conflict with the demands of the nation. Indeed, when scholars and plain persons evoke how nationalism can be belligerent or fanatical, this is largely what they mean. If loyalty always takes precedence, then there is little or nothing nationalists will not do. And this, its critics say, is precisely why the 20th century was so bloody. 19

Finally, classical nationalism can seem hard to reconcile with a strong commitment to autonomy or political consent. One is obligated to one’s nation and fellow nationals, and yet one’s nationality is often unchosen. This worry is at its strongest when applied to ethnic nationalism as on this view, membership is doubly unchosen: One cannot choose one’s ancestors at birth, nor can one easily later choose to be ancestrally related to members of a new group. Yet, ethnic nationalism is not unique in imposing obligations based on unchosen identities ( Scheffler, 1994 ). Even membership in civic nations is largely unchosen and can be demanding.

Liberal nationalism seeks to reconcile nationalism and liberalism, even showing them to be mutually reinforcing. Proposed initially by Yael Tamir in her seminal Liberal Nationalism , variants of this moderate form of nationalism have also been prominently defended by David Miller and Chaim Gans ( Gans, 2003 ; Miller, 1995 , 1999 , 2007 , 2016 ; Tamir, 1993 , 2019 ). Before addressing arguments for liberal nationalism, we should consider how it generally differs from classical or core nationalism.

First, liberal nationalists abandon the rigid acontextual hierarchy of duties of core nationalism. National loyalty may still outrank other loyalties, but it does not always do so. Most notably, when the human rights of foreigners are at stake, our duties to fellow nationals or to the nation itself must come second. This is the spirit of the “weak cosmopolitanism” we find endorsed by liberal nationalists ( Miller, 2016 ). We might also say that while we have stronger positive duties to fellow nationals than to foreigners, our negative duties to not violate human rights apply equally to all and take precedence over positive duties to fellow members ( Miller, 2005 ).

Second, liberal nationalism is essentially a nonethnic form of nationalism. This does not make it a pure civic nationalism because it focuses on the preservation and transmission of a national identity and a public culture that are not exhausted by constitutionalism. 20 However, it does essentially abandon myths of ethnic descent or ancestral relatedness as a part of national identity ( Smith, 2010 ). While nationality might still be attributed at birth, it becomes considerably easier to join and become accepted within another nation once ethnic descent is jettisoned.

Third, liberal nationalists are more concerned with the relationship between the nation and liberal democracy ( Tamir, 1993 , 2019 ). While many classical nationalists were strong advocates of democratic or republican regimes, it was by no means universal. Indeed, core nationalism is compatible with an authoritarian government so long as it is authentic or expressive of the national character. Indeed, some very prominent nationalists were antidemocratic, like Charles Maurras and l’Action française as well as Russian nationalists, who summed up their view as “Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality” ( Riasanovsky, 2005 ).

To justify their views, liberal nationalists essentially offer two kinds of arguments. Recall, their project is not to revise or rehabilitate democracy or liberalism as it is to revise and rehabilitate nationalism; this explains why their arguments presume the value of democracy and liberalism and focus on establishing the ethical credentials of (a reformed) nationalism.

The first kind of argument put forward by nationalists might be called communitarian . These arguments are all noninstrumental in the sense that they do not derive the value of national community or loyalty from its contribution to either liberal democracy or liberal conceptions of justice. The arguments focus on the value of community independently of its contribution to democracy or social justice. We might further divide this argument into arguments over the intrinsic worth of national communities and the constitutive role of national communities in human flourishing.

The former strives to demonstrate that nations are valuable communities; they are the site of shared meaning and values. Cultures or cultural communities are good things, and they should continue to exist. Moreover, if we add that these cultures are distinct and unique—proposition (i) from core nationalism—then we ought to appreciate that preserving and sustaining nations provides the world with a diversity of cultures ( Berlin, 1976 ). If culture is good, then nations are valuable as incarnations of culture, and if we value a diversity of cultures, we ought to value the irreducible plurality of nations.

The latter kind of argument seeks to show how nations are constitutive of human flourishing. In their strongest form, they claim that one cannot flourish outside of the nation while weaker versions simply highlight how dispensing with the nation or national makes human flourishing harder or less complete than it otherwise might be. Here, we find various iterations. Some focus on the relationship between national identity and self-esteem ( Berlin, 1979 ; MacCormick, 1982 , 1991 , 1996 ; Margalit & Raz, 1990 ; Nielsen, 1999 ; Tamir, 1993 ; Taylor,1992 ), others on how our understanding of morality is conditioned by our membership in a nation and our participation in its moral traditions, its interpretation of principles or values ( MacIntyre, 1981 , 1984 , 1988 ; Taylor, 1989 ; Walzer, 1983 , 1987 , 1994 ). Others still insist on how choice and personal development require communal membership ( Kymlicka, 1995 ; Tamir, 1993 ).

The key point is that all these arguments seek to show that without the nation, human life would be greatly impoverished. Our national identities and our national loyalty constitute, at least for many of us, part and parcel of what it is to live a meaningful or good life.

The second kind of argument is instrumental: The value of the nation is derived from its role in sustaining either liberal democracy or liberal conceptions of justice. National identity and loyalty are either presented as necessary or uniquely valuable means of achieving our political aims of popular rule or social justice. Put otherwise, these arguments all work back from our commitments to democracy or justice and argue that once we properly appreciate how nations can help us achieve our aims, we will value them.

The most famous, the trust argument , has many variations. Essentially, we begin with the need for trust: To cooperate, to sacrifice for others, we must trust that others will reciprocate. For instance, in a democracy, the minority must believe that the majority will not abuse its power and will relinquish it when it loses. All must believe that others are equally committed to the common good. Yet, within large groups, trust cannot rest on personal knowledge of individual track records. To establish trust and motivate people to cooperate and make sacrifices, people need to feel committed to something above and beyond the partisan factions. The nation is presented as an engine of social trust because national identity will bind together and motivate nationals to work as a team. Liberal nationalists present the nation as (uniquely) capable of providing the identification and trust necessary to overcome the various forces, like disagreement or egoism, that threaten social cooperation, sacrifice, and trust ( Canovan, 1996 ; Kymlicka, 2001 ; Miller, 1995 ; Moore, 2001 ; Schnapper, 1998 ).

Of course, not only democracy requires social trust. Redistributive policies and social justice also require cooperation and sacrifice from people who are personally unacquainted. Here too, the argument goes, national identity provides the necessary identification and motivation.

In short, liberal nationalism is defended on two grounds. Noninstrumental arguments are fundamentally arguments about the value of community tout court or its constitutive role in human flourishing. Either way, they need to defend a certain conception of human nature or one about intrinsic value. The instrumental arguments are less ambitious as they begin from the commitments held by many critics of nationalism, such as democracy and social justice, and seek to show the cost of eliminating national identities and loyalties.

While more moderate than classical nationalism, liberal nationalism has not been spared criticism. On the one hand, it faces internal critiques. For instance, the trust argument has been the target of a fair amount of skepticism. Does national identity bind and motivate as its advocates claim? Critics have argued that it is far from clear that national identity can or does create the kind of affective bond and trust that its proponents claim. For instance, there appear to be plenty of cases in which fellow nationals distrust each other and would prefer to deal with foreigners if they had the choice ( Abizadeh, 2002 ). Moreover, given that a central claim can be empirically verified, we are entitled to ask what quantitative evidence can be produced in addition to sociohistorical narratives about the relationship between nation-states and welfare states. Here, even defenders of liberal nationalism concede that testing the claim has only provided partial support ( Miller & Ali, 2014 ).

Multiple external criticisms have been formulated, but two are particularly noteworthy against the backdrop of globalization. 21 An older and quite prominent critique is egalitarian. Essentially, these critics begin by identifying our commitment to equality and then show how nation-states contribute to inequality: They favor nationals at the expense of foreigners. While this might be tolerable in a world where everyone had access to a decent life, it is intolerable when so many lack so much and others live in abundance. In sum, the argument seeks to show that liberal nationalism, or any variation that does not significantly depart from the status quo, is deeply incompatible with a commitment to human equality ( Caney, 2005 ; Pogge, 2002 ; Singer, 1972 ; Steiner, 1994 ).

The second critique focuses on how liberal nationalism remains at odds with certain conceptions of human rights. Here, research is undeniably influenced by the political reality of the early 21st century ; migration and refugee crises have stimulated debate on the morality of borders. Behind talk of borders, we find the deeper conflict between, on the one hand, the notion of collective autonomy or the self-determination of peoples and, on the other hand, a human right to free movement or to immigrate. If liberal nationalism allows that one can exclude people from one’s group or territory, then we must ask whether self-determination comes at the expense of a basic right. For those who endorse a human right to immigrate, liberal nationalism’s support for borders and exclusion is objectionable ( Carens, 2013 ; Oberman, 2016 ).

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1. Classically, patriotism was classified as a virtue (i.e., an admirable character trait). Yet, its ethical credentials have been increasingly questioned in the wake of World War I. Still, proponents and opponents of patriotism tend to agree that it is a character trait.

2. One view is that patriotism is loyalty to political institutions, specifically republican, rather than to an ethnocultural community ( Connor, 1994 ; Dietz, 1989 ; Taylor, 1997 ; Viroli, 1995 ). However, this definition is questionable. Even if “patriots” has often been used to name advocates of republicanism, it is certainly not the only recorded use. Nor does this view match the common uses of “patriot” or “patriotism” to speak of the intense loyalty of those who have no institutions or do not necessarily believe in republicanism (e.g., patriotic Kurds). Worse, if patriotism is loyalty to institutions and nationalism is loyalty to an ethnocultural group, then those who defend this distinction seem committed to the claim that nationalism is ancient. How else can they describe loyalty to the Jewish people and Kingdom during the Jewish-Roman wars?

3. A prominent dissenter in the literature is Benedict Anderson. He claimed that nationalism was more like kinship or religion, no doubt in part due to what he considered to be its philosophical poverty and even incoherence ( Anderson, 2006 , pp. 4–5).

4. We might say that nations are numerically distinct and qualitatively distinct as opposed to manufactured objects that are numerically distinct but qualitatively indistinct.

5. The point is not that there existed a clear doctrine called “core nationalism” that people simply adopted or not. There are and have been nationalists of all ideological stripes—conservative, liberal, socialist, and so on. The point of putting forward core nationalism is to identify those beliefs most shared between them that allow us to recognize that despite their differences and nuances, there are common threads.

6. This view is open to the challenge that it primarily summarizes Western nationalism. For those interested in an influential non-Western perspective, see Chatterjee (1986 , 1993 ).

7. An example is the way in which proposition (iii) has become so central to nationalist movements in the wake of the French Revolution. The age of nationalism and later decolonization delegitimized the millennia-old institution of empire by spreading the proposition that all alien rule is illegitimate.

8. From Thanksgiving that commemorates events in the early 17th century but only becomes a national institution in the late 19th century, to the 19th-century invention of distinct clan tartans in Scotland, more than one practice or symbol is far more recent than commonly believed ( Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983 ).

9. Authors like Azar Gat would be unhappy with this label. Nevertheless, his overall argument is far more critical of modernism than anything else. Indeed, insisting on the antiquity of the national state seems like a form of perennialism ( Gat, 2012 ).

10. Modernists are skeptical of identity unsupported by institutions. Identity that is not affirmed and transmitted through institutions is “fragmentary, discontinuous and elusive” ( Breuilly, 1996 , p. 156).

11. The battle of Raphia and the subsequent popular Egyptian revolt against Hellenistic rule is a textbook case drawn from the premodern world ( Gat, 2012 , pp. 118–119). Similar examples abound in Gat’s account.

12. For instance, Walker Connor insists that nations begin at the end of the 19th or early 20th century because they require mass consciousness, which in turn depends upon mass communication and standardized education. Adrian Hastings believed that so long as national consciousness extends to many people beyond government circles and the ruling class, then one can speak of a nation ( Connor, 1994 ; Hastings, 1997 ).

13. These are the most prominent, but they are not the only classification of nations and nationalism. For instance, one may draw the line between secular and religious forms of nationalism ( Juergensmeyer, 1993 ).

14. While many accept that there are different kinds of nations, some reject this pluralism in favor of a monolithic view. Walker Connor insists that all nationalism is ethnic nationalism ( Connor, 1994 ).

15. Perhaps the most notable exception is Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who often defends nationalism as essential for the progress of humanity ( Fichte, 2008 ). Notwithstanding these passages, Fichte certainly sounds like an ardent nationalist.

16. Authors who defend loyalty to the nation or national partiality purely as a means of achieving the greatest happiness or to ensure the maximal discharging of moral duties, such as R. M. Hare and Robert Goodin respectively argue, are hardly endorsing “nationalism” ( Goodin, 1988 ; Hare, 1981 ). Few nationalists think of their nation as a mere tool let alone believe that humanity is the ultimate object of loyalty.

17. An excellent example of the way that debate has proceeded is the way that Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) is cited or discussed. MacIntyre does not discuss let alone defend nationalism but patriotism. His focus is clearly on a character trait and not an ideology: Nowhere does he claim that all political legitimacy comes from the nation or that nations must be as autonomous as possible. Of course, this does not mean that MacIntyre’s defense of patriotism is irrelevant—he does after all make strong claims about communal life and human flourishing. The point is that many philosophers and political theorists treat nationalism and national partiality as interchangeable. Consequently, what is discussed on the heading of “nationalism” in the normative debate is often an anemic understanding of what historians and sociologists are discussing.

18. Authors like David Miller might reply that liberal nationalism is not a contemporary reconstruction of nationalism but a view inspired by historical nationalists such as Giuseppe Manzini and John Stuart Mill ( Gustavsson & Miller, 2019 ). While one might convincingly argue that Manzini advocated something sufficiently like contemporary liberal nationalism, things are less clear for Mill. While he did believe that national sentiment was crucial to representative government, he also advocated colonialism on the grounds that it made the colonized better off—a point hard to square with core nationalism ( Bell, 2010 ).

19. The accusation that nationalism is particularly responsible for brutal and total wars in the 20th century is widespread ( Smith, 1998 , 2010 ). Even if the accusation is correct, nationalism was also a driving force, if not the driving force, behind decolonization. Whatever historical debates are to be had about what causes what, the cost-benefit analysis of nationalism is likely more complex than François Mitterand’s “ Le nationalisme, c’est la guerre .”

20. If by “constitutional patriotism” we mean that people are primarily loyal not to a cultural community but the norms and values of a liberal democratic constitution, then liberal nationalism remains a form of nationalism ( Habermas, 1994 ).

21. There is no shortage of external critiques. Feminist authors have pointed out the extent to which nationalism can be understood as a gendered ideology: one that rarely grants women an equal role in the nation or addresses their concerns ( Elshtain, 1993 ; Enloe, 1989 ; Walby, 1992 ). Similarly, those whose argue that we inhabit an increasingly postnational or globalized world argue that the nation and nationalism are obsolete ( Falk, 2002 ; Horsman & Marshall, 1994 ; McNeill, 1986 ).

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Nationalism

The term “nationalism” is generally used to describe two phenomena:

• the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity, and
• the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) self-determination.

(1) raises questions about the concept of a nation (or national identity), which is often defined in terms of common origin, ethnicity, or cultural ties, and specifically about whether an individual’s membership in a nation should be regarded as non-voluntary or voluntary. (2) raises questions about whether self-determination must be understood as involving having full statehood with complete authority over domestic and international affairs, or whether something less is required.

Nationalism came into the focus of philosophical debate three decades ago, in the nineties, partly in consequence of rather spectacular and troubling nationalist clashes. Surges of nationalism tend to present a morally ambiguous, and for this reason often fascinating, picture. “National awakening” and struggles for political independence are often both heroic and cruel; the formation of a recognizably national state often responds to deep popular sentiment but sometimes yields inhuman consequences, from violent expulsion and “cleansing” of non-nationals to organized mass murder. The moral debate on nationalism reflects a deep moral tension between solidarity with oppressed national groups on the one hand and repulsion in the face of crimes perpetrated in the name of nationalism on the other. Moreover, the issue of nationalism points to a wider domain of problems related to the treatment of ethnic and cultural differences within democratic polity, arguably among the most pressing problems of contemporary political theory.

In the last two decades, migration crisis and the populist reactions to migration and domestic economic issues have been the defining traits of a new political constellation. The traditional issue of the contrast between nationalism and cosmopolitanism has changed its profile: the current drastic contrast is between populist aversion to the foreigners-migrants and a more generous, or simply just, attitude of acceptance and Samaritan help. The populist aversion inherits some features traditionally associated with patriotism and nationalism, and the opposite attitude the main features of traditional cosmopolitanism. One could expect that the work on nationalism will be moving further on this new and challenging playground, addressing the new contrast and trying to locate nationalism in relation to it.

In this entry, we shall first present conceptual issues of definition and classification (Sections 1 and 2) and then the arguments put forward in the debate (Section 3), dedicating more space to the arguments in favor of nationalism than to those against it in order to give the philosophical nationalist a proper hearing. In the last part we shall turn to the new constellation and sketch the new issues raised by nationalist and trans-nationalist populisms and the migration crisis.

1.1 The Basic Concept of Nationalism

1.2 the concept of a nation, 2.1 concepts of nationalism: classical and liberal, 2.2 moral claims, classical vs. liberal: the centrality of nation, 3.1 classical and liberal nationalisms, 3.2 arguments in favor of nationalism, classical vs. liberal: the deep need for community, 3.3 arguments in favor of nationalism: issues of justice, 3.4 populism and a new face of nationalism, 3.5 nation-state in global context, 4. conclusion, introduction, other internet resources, related entries, 1. what is a nation.

Although the term “nationalism” has a variety of meanings, it centrally encompasses two phenomena: (1) the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their identity as members of that nation and (2) the actions that the members of a nation take in seeking to achieve (or sustain) some form of political sovereignty (see for example, Nielsen 1998–9: 9). Each of these aspects requires elaboration.

• raises questions about the concept of a nation or national identity, about what it is to belong to a nation, and about how much one ought to care about one’s nation. Nations and national identity may be defined in terms of common origin, ethnicity, or cultural ties, and while an individual’s membership in the nation is often regarded as involuntary, it is sometimes regarded as voluntary. The degree of care for one’s nation that nationalists require is often, but not always, taken to be very high: according to such views, the claims of one’s nation take precedence over rival contenders for authority and loyalty. [ 1 ]
• raises questions about whether sovereignty requires the acquisition of full statehood with complete authority over domestic and international affairs, or whether something less than statehood suffices. Although sovereignty is often taken to mean full statehood (Gellner 1983: ch. 1), [ 2 ] possible exceptions have been recognized (Miller 1992: 87; Miller 2000). Some authors even defend an anarchist version of patriotism-moderate nationalism foreshadowed by Bakunin (see Sparrow 2007).

There is a terminological and conceptual question of distinguishing nationalism from patriotism. A popular proposal is the contrast between attachment to one’s country as defining patriotism and attachment to one’s people and its traditions as defining nationalism (Kleinig 2014: 228, and Primoratz 2017: Section 1.2). One problem with this proposal is that love for a country is not really just love of a piece of land but normally involves attachment to the community of its inhabitants, and this introduces “nation” into the conception of patriotism. Another contrast is the one between strong, and somewhat aggressive attachment (nationalism) and a mild one (patriotism), dating back at least to George Orwell (see his 1945 essay). [ 3 ]

Despite these definitional worries, there is a fair amount of agreement about the classical, historically paradigmatic form of nationalism. It typically features the supremacy of the nation’s claims over other claims to individual allegiance and full sovereignty as the persistent aim of its political program. Territorial sovereignty has traditionally been seen as a defining element of state power and essential for nationhood. It was extolled in classic modern works by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau and is returning to center stage in the debate, though philosophers are now more skeptical (see below). Issues surrounding the control of the movement of money and people (in particular immigration) and the resource rights implied in territorial sovereignty make the topic politically central in the age of globalization and philosophically interesting for nationalists and anti-nationalists alike.

In recent times, the philosophical focus has moved more in the direction of “liberal nationalism”, the view that mitigates the classical claims and tries to bring together the pro-national attitude and the respect for traditional liberal values. For instance, the territorial state as political unit is seen by classical nationalists as centrally “belonging” to one ethnic-cultural group and as actively charged with protecting and promulgating its traditions. The liberal variety allows for “sharing” of the territorial state with non-dominant ethnic groups. Consequences are varied and quite interested (for more see below, especially section 2.1 ).

In its general form, the issue of nationalism concerns the mapping between the ethno-cultural domain (featuring ethno-cultural groups or “nations”) and the domain of political organization. In breaking down the issue, we have mentioned the importance of the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity. This point raises two sorts of questions. First, the descriptive ones:

Second, the normative ones:

This section discusses the descriptive questions, starting with (1a) and (1b) ;the normative questions are addressed in Section 3 on the moral debate. If one wants to enjoin people to struggle for their national interests, one must have some idea about what a nation is and what it is to belong to a nation. So, in order to formulate and ground their evaluations, claims, and directives for action, pro-nationalist thinkers have expounded theories of ethnicity, culture, nation, and state. Their opponents have in turn challenged these elaborations. Now, some presuppositions about ethnic groups and nations are essential for the nationalist, while others are theoretical elaborations designed to support the essential ones. The definition and status of the social group that benefits from the nationalist program, variously called the “nation”, “ethno-nation”, or “ethnic group”, is essential. Since nationalism is particularly prominent with groups that do not yet have a state, a definition of nation and nationalism purely in terms of belonging to a state is a non-starter.

Indeed, purely “civic” loyalties are often categorized separately under the title “patriotism”, which we already mentioned, or “constitutional patriotism”. [ 4 ] This leaves two extreme options and a number of intermediates. The first extreme option has been put forward by a small but distinguished band of theorists. [ 5 ] According to their purely voluntaristic definition, a nation is any group of people aspiring to a common political state-like organization. If such a group of people succeeds in forming a state, the loyalties of the group members become “civic” (as opposed to “ethnic”) in nature. At the other extreme, and more typically, nationalist claims are focused upon the non-voluntary community of common origin, language, tradition, and culture: the classic ethno-nation is a community of origin and culture, including prominently a language and customs. The distinction is related (although not identical) to that drawn by older schools of social and political science between “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism, the former being allegedly Western European and the latter more Central and Eastern European, originating in Germany. [ 6 ] Philosophical discussions centered on nationalism tend to concern the ethnic-cultural variants only, and this habit will be followed here. A group aspiring to nationhood on this basis will be called an “ethno-nation” to underscore its ethno-cultural rather than purely civic underpinnings. For the ethno-(cultural) nationalist it is one’s ethnic-cultural background that determines one’s membership in the community. One cannot choose to be a member; instead, membership depends on the accident of origin and early socialization. However, commonality of origin has become mythical for most contemporary candidate groups: ethnic groups have been mixing for millennia.

Sophisticated, liberal pro-nationalists therefore tend to stress cultural membership only and speak of “nationality”, omitting the “ethno-” part (Miller 1992, 2000; Tamir 1993,2013; Gans 2003). Michel Seymour’s proposal of a “socio-cultural definition” adds a political dimension to the purely cultural one: a nation is a cultural group, possibly but not necessarily united by a common descent, endowed with civic ties (Seymour 2000). This is the kind of definition that would be accepted by most parties in the debate today. So defined, the nation is a somewhat mixed category, both ethno-cultural and civic, but still closer to the purely ethno-cultural than to the purely civic extreme.

Let us now turn to the issue of the origin and “authenticity” of ethno-cultural groups or ethno-nations. In social and political science one usually distinguishes two kinds of views, but there is a third group, combining element from both. The first are modernist views that see nationalism as born in modern times, together with nation-states. [ 7 ] In our times the view was pioneered by Ernst Gellner (see his 1983). [ 8 ] Other modernist choose similar starting points with century or two of variation. [ 9 ] The opposite view can be called, following Edward Shils (1957) “primordialist”. According to it, actual ethno-cultural nations have either existed “since time immemorial”.

The third, quite plausible kind of view, distinct from both primordialism-ethno-symbolism and modernism, has been initiated by W. Connor (1994). [ 10 ] A nation is a politicized and mobilized ethnic group rather than a state. So, the origins of nationalism predate the modern state, and its emotional content remains up to our times (Conversi 2002: 270), but the actual statist organization is, indeed, modern. However, nation-state is a nationalist dream and fiction, never really implemented, due to the inescapable plurality of social groups. So much for the three dominant perspectives on the origin of nationalism.

Indeed, the older authors—from great thinkers like Herder and Otto Bauer to the propagandists who followed their footsteps—took great pains to ground normative claims upon firm ontological realism about nations: nations are real, bona fide entities. However, the contemporary moral debate has tried to diminish the importance of the imagined/real divide. Prominent contemporary philosophers have claimed that normative-evaluative nationalist claims are compatible with the “imagined” nature of a nation. [ 11 ] They point out that common imaginings can tie people together, and that actual interaction resulting from togetherness can engender important moral obligations.

Let us now turn to question (1c) about the nature of pro-national attitudes. The explanatory issue that has interested political and social scientists concerns ethno-nationalist sentiment, the paradigm case of a pro-national attitude. Is it as irrational, romantic, and indifferent to self-interest as it might seem on the surface? The issue has divided authors who see nationalism as basically irrational and those who try to explain it as being in some sense rational. Authors who see it as irrational propose various explanations of why people assent to irrational views. Some say, critically, that nationalism is based on “false consciousness”. But where does such false consciousness come from? The most simplistic view is that it is a result of direct manipulation of “masses” by “elites”. On the opposite side, the famous critic of nationalism Elie Kedourie (1960) thinks this irrationality is spontaneous. A decade and a half ago Liah Greenfeld went as far as linking nationalism to mental illness in her provocative 2005 article (see also her 2006 book). On the opposite side, Michael Walzer has offered a sympathetic account of nationalist passion in his 2002. Authors relying upon the Marxist tradition offer various deeper explanations. To mention one, the French structuralist Étienne Balibar sees it as a result of the “production” of ideology effectuated by mechanisms which have nothing to do with spontaneous credulity of individuals, but with impersonal, structural social factors (Balibar & Wallerstein 1988 [1991]). [ 12 ]

Some authors claim that it is often rational for individuals to become nationalists (Hardin 1985). Can one rationally explain the extremes of ethno-national conflict? Authors like Russell Hardin propose to do so in terms of a general view of when hostile behavior is rational: most typically, if an individual has no reason to trust someone, it is reasonable for that individual to take precautions against the other. If both sides take precautions, however, each will tend to see the other as increasingly inimical. It then becomes rational to start treating the other as an enemy. Mere suspicion can thus lead by small, individually rational steps to a situation of conflict. (Such negative development is often presented as a variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma; see the entry on prisoner’s dilemma ). It is relatively easy to spot the circumstances in which this general pattern applies to national solidarities and conflicts (see also Wimmer 2013).

Finally, as for question (1d) , the nation is typically seen as an essentially non-voluntary community to which one belongs by birth and early nurture and such that the belonging is enhanced and made more complete by one’s additional conscious endorsement. Not everyone agrees: liberal nationalists accept the idea of choice of one’s national belonging and of possibility for immigrants to become nationals by choice and intentional acculturation.

2. Varieties of Nationalism

We pointed out at the very beginning of the entry that nationalism focuses upon (1) the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity, and (2) the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) some form of political sovereignty. The politically central point is (2): the actions enjoined by the nationalist. To these we now turn, beginning with sovereignty and territory, the usual foci of a national struggle for independence. They raise an important issue:

The classical answer is that a state is required. A more liberal answer is that some form of political autonomy suffices. Once this has been discussed, we can turn to the related normative issues:

Consider first the classical nationalist answer to (2a) . Political sovereignty requires a state “rightfully owned” by the ethno-nation (Oldenquist 1997). Developments of this line of thought often state or imply specific answers to (2b) , and (2c) , i.e., that in a national independence struggle the use of force against the threatening central power is almost always a legitimate means for bringing about sovereignty. However, classical nationalism is not only concerned with the creation of a state but also with its maintenance and strengthening.

Classical nationalism is the political program that sees the creation and maintenance of a fully sovereign state owned by a given ethno-national group (“people” or “nation”) as a primary duty of each member of the group. Starting from the assumption that the appropriate (or “natural”) unit of culture is an ethno-nation, it claims that a primary duty of each member is to abide by one’s recognizably ethno-national culture in all cultural matters.

Classical nationalists are usually vigilant about the kind of culture they protect and promote and about the kind of attitude people have to their nation-state. This watchful attitude carries some potential dangers: many elements of a given culture that are universal or simply not recognizably national may fall prey to such nationalist enthusiasms. Classical nationalism in everyday life puts various additional demands on individuals, from buying more expensive home-produced goods in preference to cheaper imported ones to procreating as many future members of the nation as one can manage (see Yuval-Davies 1997, and Yack 2012).

Besides classical nationalism (and its more radical extremist cousins), various moderate views are also now classified as nationalist. Indeed, the philosophical discussion has shifted to these moderate or even ultra-moderate forms, and most philosophers who describe themselves as nationalists propose very moderate nationalist programs.

Nationalism in this wider sense is any complex of attitudes, claims, and directives for action ascribing a fundamental political, moral, and cultural value to nation and nationality and deriving obligations (for individual members of the nation, and for any involved third parties, individual or collective) from this ascribed value. The main representative of this group of views is liberal nationalism , proposed by authors like Miller, Tamir, and Gans (see below).

Nationalisms in this wider sense can vary somewhat in their conceptions of the nation (which are often left implicit in their discourse), in the grounds for and degree of its value, and in the scope of their prescribed obligations. Moderate nationalism is less demanding than classical nationalism and sometimes goes under the name of “patriotism.” (A different usage, again, reserves “patriotism” for valuing civic community and loyalty to state, in contrast to nationalism, centered on ethnic-cultural communities).

Let us now turn to liberal nationalism, the most discussed kind of moderate nationalism.

Liberal nationalists see liberal-democratic principles and pro-national attitudes as belonging together. One of the main proponents of the view, Yael Tamir, started the debate in her 1993 book and in her recent book talks about the nation-state as “an ideal meeting point between the two” (2019: 6). Of course, some things have to be sacrificed: we must acknowledge that either the meaningfulness of a community or its openness must be sacrificed to some extent as we cannot have them both. (2019: 57). How much of each is to give way is left open, and of course, various liberal nationalists take different views of what precisely the right answer is.

Tamir’s version of liberal nationalism is a kind of social liberalism, in this respect similar to the views of David Miller who talks about “solidaristic communities” in his 1999 book Principles of Social Justice and also takes stance in his 1995 and 2008 books. They both see the feeling of national identity as a feeling that promotes solidarity, and solidarity as means for increased social justice (Tamir 2019, in particular ch.20; compare Walzer 1983, Kymlicka 1995a, 2001, and Gans 2003, 2008).

Liberal nationalists diverge about the value of multiculturalism. Kymlicka takes it as basic for his picture of liberalism while Tamir dismisses it without much ado: multicultural, multiethnic democracies have a very poor track record, she claims (2019: 62). Tamir’s diagnosis of the present day political crisis, with politicians like Trump and Le Pen coming to the forefront, is that “liberal democrats were paralyzed by their assumed victory” whereas “nationalists felt defeated and obsolete” (2019: 7).

Tamir lists two kinds of reasons that guarantee special political status to nations. First kind, that no other political entity “is more able than the state to promote ideas in the public sphere” (2019: 52), and the second kind that nation needs continuous creative effort to make it functional and attractive.

The historical development of liberalism turned it into a universalistic, anti-communitarian principle; this has been a fatal mistake that can be and should be corrected by the liberal nationalist synthesis. Can we revive the unifying narratives of our nationality without sacrificing the liberal inheritance of freedom and rights? Liberal nationalism answers in the affirmative. From its standpoint, national particularism has primacy: “The love of humanity is a noble ideal, but real love is always particular…” (2019: 68).

Interestingly, Tamir combines this high regard of nation with an extreme constructivist view of its nature: nations are mental structures that exist in the minds of their members (2019: 58).

Is liberal nationalism implemented anywhere in the present world, or is it more of an ideal, probably end-state theory, that proposes a picture of a desirable society? Judging by the writings of liberal nationalists, it is the latter, although presented as a relatively easily reachable ideal, combining two traditions that are already well implemented in political reality.

The variations of nationalism most relevant for philosophy are those that influence the moral standing of claims and of recommended nationalist practices. The elaborate philosophical views put forward in favor of nationalism will be referred to as “theoretical nationalism”, the adjective serving to distinguish such views from less sophisticated and more practical nationalist discourse. The central theoretical nationalist evaluative claims can be charted on the map of possible positions within political theory in the following useful but somewhat simplified and schematic way.

Nationalist claims featuring the nation as central to political action must answer two crucial general questions. First, is there one kind of large social group that is of special moral importance? The nationalist answer is that there certainly is one, namely, the nation. Moreover, when an ultimate choice is to be made, say between ties of family, or friendship, and the nation, the latter has priority. Liberal nationalists prefer a more moderate stance, which ascribes value to national belonging, but don’t make it central in this way. Second, what are the grounds for an individual’s obligations to the morally central group? Are they based on voluntary or involuntary membership in the group? The typical contemporary nationalist thinker opts for the latter, while admitting that voluntary endorsement of one’s national identity is a morally important achievement. On the philosophical map, pro-nationalist normative tastes fit nicely with the communitarian stance in general: most pro-nationalist philosophers are communitarians who choose the nation as the preferred community (in contrast to those of their fellow communitarians who prefer more far-ranging communities, such as those defined by global religious traditions). [ 13 ]

Before proceeding to moral claims, let us briefly sketch the issues and viewpoints connected to territory and territorial rights that are essential for nationalist political programs. [ 14 ] Why is territory important for ethno-national groups, and what are the extent and grounds of territorial rights? Its primary importance resides in sovereignty and all the associated possibilities for internal control and external exclusion. Add to this the Rousseauian view that political attachments are essentially bounded and that love —or, to put it more mildly, republican civil friendship—for one’s group requires exclusion of some “other”, and the importance becomes quite obvious. What about the grounds for the demand for territorial rights? Nationalist and pro-nationalist views mostly rely on the attachment that members of a nation have to national territory and to the formative value of territory for a nation to justify territorial claims (see Miller 2000 and Meisels 2009). This is similar in some respects to the rationale given by proponents of indigenous peoples’ rights (Tully 2004, but see also Hendrix 2008) and in other respects to Kolers’ 2009 ethno-geographical non-nationalist theory, but differs in preferring ethno-national groups as the sole carriers of the right. These attachment views stand in stark contrast to more pragmatic views about territorial rights as means for conflict resolution (e.g., Levy 2000). Another quite popular alternative is the family of individualistic views grounding territorial rights in rights and interests of individuals. [ 15 ] On the extreme end of anti-nationalist views stands the idea of Pogge) that there are no specific territorial problems for political philosophy—the “dissolution approach”, as Kolers calls it.

We now pass to the normative dimension of nationalism. We shall first describe the very heart of the nationalist program, i.e., sketch and classify the typical normative and evaluative nationalist claims. These claims can be seen as answers to the normative subset of our initial questions about (1) pro-national attitudes and (2) actions.

We will see that these claims recommend various courses of action: centrally, those meant to secure and sustain a political organization for the given ethno-cultural national community (thereby making more specific the answers to our normative questions (1e) , (1f) , (2b) , and (2c) ). Further, they enjoin the community’s members to promulgate recognizable ethno-cultural contents as central features of the cultural life within such a state. Finally, we shall discuss various lines of pro-nationalist thought that have been put forward in defense of these claims. To begin, let us return to the claims concerning the furthering of the national state and culture. These are proposed by the nationalist as norms of conduct. The philosophically most important variations concern three aspects of such normative claims:

• The normative nature and strength of the claim: does it promote merely a right (say, to have and maintain a form of political self-government, preferably and typically a state, or have cultural life centered upon a recognizably ethno-national culture), or a moral obligation (to get and maintain one), or a moral, legal, and political obligation? The strongest claim is typical of classical nationalism; its typical norms are both moral and, once the nation-state is in place, legally enforceable obligations for all parties concerned, including for the individual members of the ethno-nation. A weaker but still quite demanding version speaks only of moral obligation (“sacred duty”).
• The strength of the nationalist claim in relation to various external interests and rights: to give a real example, is the use of the domestic language so important that even international conferences should be held in it, at the cost of losing the most interesting participants from abroad? The force of the nationalist claim is here being weighed against the force of other claims, including those of individual or group interests or rights. Variations in comparative strength of nationalist claims take place on a continuum between two extremes. At one rather unpalatable extreme, nation-focused claims take precedence over any other claims, including over human rights. Further towards the center is the classical nationalism that gives nation-centered claims precedence over individual interests and many needs, but not necessarily over general human rights (see, for example, MacIntyre 1994, Oldenquist 1997). On the opposite end, which is mild, humane, and liberal, the central classical nationalist claims are accorded prima facie status only (see Tamir 1993, Gans 2003, and Miller 2013; and for applications to Central Europe Stefan Auer 2004).

Universalizing nationalism is the political program that claims that every ethno-nation should have a state that it should rightfully own and the interests of which it should promote.

Alternatively, a claim may be particularistic, such as the claim “Group X ought to have a state”, where this implies nothing about any other group:

Particularistic nationalism is the political program claiming that some ethno-nation should have its state, without extending the claim to all ethno-nations. It claims thus either by omission (unreflective particularistic nationalism), or by explicitly specifying who is excluded: “Group X ought to have a state, but group Y should not” (invidious nationalism).

The most difficult and indeed chauvinistic sub-case of particularism, i.e., (B), has been called “invidious” since it explicitly denies the privilege of having a state to some peoples. Serious theoretical nationalists usually defend only the universalist variety, whereas the nationalist-in-the-street most often defends the egoistic indeterminate one.

The nationalist picture of morality traditionally has been quite close to the dominant view in the theory of international relations called “realism”. Put starkly, the view is that morality ends at the boundaries of the nation-state; beyond there is nothing but anarchy. [ 16 ] It nicely complements the main classical nationalist claim about the nation-state, i.e., that each ethno-nation or people should have a state of its own, and suggests what happens next: nation-states enter into competition in the name of their constitutive peoples.

3. The Moral Debate

Recall the initial normative question centered around (1) attitudes and (2) actions. Is national partiality justified, and to what extent? What actions are appropriate to bring about sovereignty? In particular, are ethno-national states and institutionally protected (ethno-) national cultures goods independent from the individual will of their members, and how far may one go in protecting them? The philosophical debate for and against nationalism is a debate about the moral validity of its central claims. In particular, the ultimate moral issue is the following: is any form of nationalism morally permissible or justified, and, if not, how bad are particular forms of it? [ 17 ] Why do nationalist claims require a defense? In some situations they seem plausible: for instance, the plight of some stateless national groups—the history of Jews and Armenians, the historical and contemporary misfortunes of Kurds—lends credence to the idea that having their own state would have solved the worst problems. Still, there are good reasons to examine nationalist claims more carefully. The most general reason is that it should first be shown that the political form of the nation-state has some value as such, that a national community has a particular, or even central, moral and political value, and that claims in its favor have normative validity. Once this is established, a further defense is needed. Some classical nationalist claims appear to clash—at least under normal circumstances of contemporary life—with various values that people tend to accept. Some of these values are considered essential to liberal-democratic societies, while others are important specifically for the flourishing of creativity and culture. The main values in the first set are individual autonomy and benevolent impartiality (most prominently towards members of groups culturally different from one’s own). The alleged special duties towards one’s ethno-national culture can and often do interfere with individuals’ right to autonomy.

Liberal nationalists are aware of the difficulties of the classical approach, and soften the classical claims, giving them only a prima facie status. They usually speak of “various accretions that have given nationalism a bad name”, and they are eager to “separate the idea of nationality itself from these excesses” (Miller 1992, 2000). Such thoughtful pro-nationalist writers have participated in an ongoing philosophical dialogue between proponents and opponents of the claim. [ 18 ] In order to help the reader find their through this involved debate, we shall briefly summarize the considerations which are open to the ethno-nationalist to defend their case (compare the useful overview in Lichtenberg 1997). Further lines of thought built upon these considerations can be used to defend very different varieties of nationalism, from radical to very moderate ones.

For brevity, each line of thought will be reduced to a brief argument; the actual debate is more involved than one can represent in a sketch. Some prominent lines of criticism that have been put forward in the debate will be indicated in brackets (see Miscevic 2001). The main arguments in favor of nationalism will be divided into two sets. The first set of arguments defends the claim that national communities have a high value, sometime seen as coming from the interests of their individual member (e.g., by Kymlicka, Miller, and Raz) and sometimes as non-instrumental and independent of the wishes and choices of their individual members, and argues that they should therefore be protected by means of state and official statist policies. The second set is less deeply “comprehensive”, and encompasses arguments from the requirements of justice, independent from substantial assumptions about culture and cultural values.

The first set will be presented in more detail since it has formed the core of the debate. It depicts the community as the source of value or as the transmission device connecting its members to some important values. For the classical nationalist, the arguments from this set are communitarian in a particularly “deep” sense since they are grounded in basic features of the human condition.

The general form of deep communitarian arguments is as follows. First, the communitarian premise: there is some uncontroversial good (e.g., a person’s identity), and some kind of community is essential for acquisition and preservation of it. Then comes the claim that the ethno-cultural nation is the kind of community ideally suited for this task. Then follows the statist conclusion: in order for such a community to preserve its own identity and support the identity of its members, it has to assume (always or at least normally) the political form of a state. The conclusion of this type of argument is that the ethno-national community has the right to an ethno-national state and the citizens of the state have the right and obligation to favor their own ethnic culture in relation to any other.

Although the deeper philosophical assumptions in the arguments stem from the communitarian tradition, weakened forms have also been proposed by more liberal philosophers. The original communitarian lines of thought in favor of nationalism suggest that there is some value in preserving ethno-national cultural traditions, in feelings of belonging to a common nation, and in solidarity between a nation’s members. A liberal nationalist might claim that these are not the central values of political life but are values nevertheless. Moreover, the diametrically opposing views, pure individualism and cosmopolitanism, do seem arid, abstract, and unmotivated by comparison. By cosmopolitanism we refer to moral and political doctrines claiming that

• one’s primary moral obligations are directed to all human beings (regardless of geographical or cultural distance), and
• political arrangements should faithfully reflect this universal moral obligation (in the form of supra-statist arrangements that take precedence over nation-states).

Confronted with opposing forces of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, many philosophers opt for a mixture of liberalism-cosmopolitanism and patriotism-nationalism. In his writings, B. Barber glorifies “a remarkable mixture of cosmopolitanism and parochialism” that in his view characterizes American national identity (Barber 1996: 31). Charles Taylor claims that “we have no choice but to be cosmopolitan and patriots” (Taylor 1996: 121). Hilary Putnam proposes loyalty to what is best in the multiple traditions in which each of us participates, apparently a middle way between a narrow-minded patriotism and an overly abstract cosmopolitanism (Putnam 1996: 114). The compromise has been foreshadowed by Berlin (1979) and Taylor (1989, 1993), [ 19 ] and in the last two decades it has occupied center stage in the debate and even provoked re-readings of historical nationalism in its light. [ 20 ] Most liberal nationalist authors accept various weakened versions of the arguments we list below, taking them to support moderate or ultra-moderate nationalist claims.

Here are then the main weakenings of classical ethno-nationalism that liberal, limited-liberal, and cosmopolitan nationalists propose. First, ethno-national claims have only prima facie strength and cannot trump individual rights. Second, legitimate ethno-national claims do not in themselves automatically amount to the right to a state, but rather to the right to a certain level of cultural autonomy. The main models of autonomy are either territorial or non-territorial: the first involves territorial devolution; the second, cultural autonomy granted to individuals regardless of their domicile within the state. [ 21 ] Third, ethno-nationalism is subordinate to civic patriotism, which has little or nothing to do with ethnic criteria. Fourth, ethno-national mythologies and similar “important falsehoods” are to be tolerated only if benign and inoffensive, in which case they are morally permissible despite their falsity. Finally, any legitimacy that ethno-national claims may have is to be derived from choices the concerned individuals are free to make.

Consider now the particular pro-nationalist arguments from the first set. The first argument depends on assumptions that also appear in the subsequent ones, but it further ascribes to the community an intrinsic value. The later arguments point more towards an instrumental value of nation, derived from the value of individual flourishing, moral understanding, firm identity and the like.

• The Argument From Intrinsic Value . Each ethno-national community is valuable in and of itself since it is only within the natural encompassing framework of various cultural traditions that important meanings and values are produced and transmitted. The members of such communities share a special cultural proximity to each other. By speaking the same language and sharing customs and traditions, the members of these communities are typically closer to one another in various ways than they are to the outsiders.
• The Argument from Flourishing . The ethno-national community is essential for each of its members to flourish. In particular, it is only within such a community that an individual can acquire concepts and values crucial for understanding the community’s cultural life in general and the individual’s own life in particular. There has been much debate on the pro-nationalist side about whether divergence of values is essential for separateness of national groups.

The Canadian liberal nationalists Seymour (1999), Taylor, and Kymlicka pointed out that “divergences of value between different regions of Canada” that aspire to separate nationhood are “minimal”. Taylor (1993: 155) concluded that it is not separateness of value that matters.

• The Argument from Identity . Communitarian philosophers emphasize nurture over nature as the principal force determining our identity as people—we come to be who we are because of the social settings and contexts in which we mature. This claim certainly has some plausibility. The very identity of each person depends upon his/her participation in communal life (see MacIntyre 1994, Nielsen, 1998, and Lagerspetz 2000). Given that an individual’s morality depends upon their having a mature and stable personal identity, the communal conditions that foster the development of personal identity must be preserved and encouraged. Therefore, communal life should be organized around particular national cultures.
• The Argument from Moral Understanding . A particularly important variety of value is moral value. Some values are universal, e.g., freedom and equality, but these are too abstract and “thin”. The rich, “thick” moral values are discernible only within particular traditions; as Charles Taylor puts it, “the language we have come to accept articulates the issues of the good for us” (1989: 35). The nation offers a natural framework for moral traditions, and thereby for moral understanding; it is the primary school of morals.

The ‘physiognomies’ of cultures are unique: each presents a wonderful exfoliation of human potentialities in its own time and place and environment. We are forbidden to make judgments of comparative value, for that is measuring the incommensurable. (1976: 206)

Assuming that the (ethno-)nation is the natural unit of culture, the preservation of cultural diversity amounts to institutionally protecting the purity of (ethno-)national culture. The plurality of cultural styles can be preserved and enhanced by tying them to ethno-national “forms of life”.

David Miller has developed an interesting and sophisticated liberal pro-national stance over the course of decades from his work in 1990 to the most recent work in 2013. He accepts multicultural diversity within a society but stresses an overarching national identity, taking as his prime example British national identity, which encompasses the English, Scottish, and other ethnic identities. He demands an “inclusive identity, accessible to members of all cultural groups” (2013: 91). miller claims such identity is necessary for basic social solidarity, and it goes far beyond simple constitutional patriotism. A skeptic could note the following. The problem with multicultural society is that national identity has historically been a matter of ethno-national ties and has required sameness in the weighted majority of cultural traits (common language, common “history-as-remembered”, customs, religion and so on). However, multi-cultural states typically bring together groups with very different histories, languages, religions, and even quite contrasting appearances. Now, how is the overarching “national identity” to be achieved starting from the very thin identity of common belonging to a state? One seems to have a dilemma. Grounding social solidarity in national identity requires the latter to be rather thin and seems likely to end up as full-on, unitary cultural identity. Thick constitutional patriotism may be one interesting possible attitude that can ground such solidarity while preserving the original cultural diversity.

The arguments in the second set concern political justice and do not rely on metaphysical claims about identity, flourishing, and cultural values. They appeal to (actual or alleged) circumstances that would make nationalist policies reasonable (or permissible or even mandatory), such as (a) the fact that a large part of the world is organized into nation-states (so that each new group aspiring to create a nation-state just follows an established pattern), or (b) the circumstances of group self-defense or of redressing past injustice that might justify nationalist policies (to take a special case). Some of the arguments also present nationhood as conducive to important political goods, such as equality.

• The Argument from the Right to Collective Self-determination . A group of people of a sufficient size has a prima facie right to govern itself and decide its future membership, if the members of the group so wish. It is fundamentally the democratic will of the members themselves that grounds the right to an ethno-national state and to ethno-centric cultural institutions and practices. This argument presents the justification of (ethno-)national claims as deriving from the will of the members of the nation. It is therefore highly suitable for liberal nationalism but not appealing to a deep communitarian who sees the demands of the nation as independent from, and prior to, the choices of particular individuals. [ 22 ]
• The Argument from the Right to Self-defense and to Redress Past Injustices . Oppression and injustice give the victimized group a just cause and the right to secede. If a minority group is oppressed by the majority to the extent that almost every minority member is worse off than most members of the majority simply in virtue of belonging to the minority, then nationalist claims on behalf of the minority are morally plausible and potentially compelling. The argument establishes a typical remedial right, acceptable from a liberal standpoint (see the discussion in Kukathas and Poole 2000, also Buchanan 1991; for past injustices see Waldron 1992).
• The Argument from Equality . Members of a minority group are often disadvantaged in relation to the dominant culture because they have to rely on those with the same language and culture to conduct the affairs of daily life. Therefore, liberal neutrality itself requires that the majority provide certain basic cultural goods, i.e., granting differential rights (see Kymlicka 1995b, 2001, and 2003b). Institutional protections and the right to the minority group’s own institutional structure are remedies that restore equality and turn the resulting nation-state into a more moderate multicultural one.
• The Argument from Success . The nationstate has in the past succeeded in promoting equality and democracy. Ethno-national solidarity is a powerful motive for a more egalitarian distribution of goods (Miller 1995; Canovan 1996, 2000). The nation-state also seems to be essential to safeguard the moral life of communities in the future, since it is the only form of political institution capable of protecting communities from the threats of globalization and assimilationism (for a detailed critical discussion of this argument see Mason 1999).

Andreas Wimmer (2018) presents an interesting discussion of the historical success of nation-state (discussed in Knott, Tolz, Green, & Wimmer 2019).

These political arguments can be combined with deep communitarian ones. However, taken in isolation, their perspectives offer a “liberal culturalism” that is more suitable for ethno-culturally plural societies. More remote from classical nationalism than the liberal one of Tamir and Nielsen, it eschews any communitarian philosophical underpinning. [ 23 ] The idea of moderate nation-building points to an open multi-culturalism in which every group receives its share of remedial rights but, instead of walling itself off from others, participates in a common, overlapping civic culture in open communication with other sub-communities. Given the variety of pluralistic societies and intensity of trans-national interactions, such openness seems to many to be the only guarantee of stable social and political life (see the debate in Shapiro and Kymlicka 1997).

In general, the liberal nationalist stance is mild and civil, and there is much to be said in favor of it. It tries to reconcile our intuitions in favor of some sort of political protection of cultural communities with a liberal political morality. Of course, this raises issues of compatibility between liberal universal principles and the particular attachments to one’s ethno-cultural nation. Very liberal nationalists such as Tamir divorce ethno-cultural nationhood from statehood. Also, the kind of love for country they suggest is tempered by all kinds of universalist considerations, which in the last instance trump national interest (Tamir 1993: 115; 2019: passim, see also Moore 2001 and Gans 2003). There is an ongoing debate among philosophical nationalists about how much weakening and compromising is still compatible with a stance’s being nationalist at all. [ 24 ] There is also a streak of cosmopolitan interest present in the work of some liberal nationalists (Nielsen 1998–99). [ 25 ]

In the last two decades, the issues of nationalism have been increasingly integrated into the debate about the international order (see the entries on globalization and cosmopolitanism ). The main conceptual link is the claim that nation-states are natural, stable, and suitable units of the international order. A related debate concerns the role of minorities in the processes of globalization (see Kaldor 2004). Moreover, the two approaches might ultimately converge: a multiculturalist liberal nationalism and a moderate, difference-respecting cosmopolitanism have a lot in common. [ 26 ]

“Populism” is an umbrella term, covering both right-wing and left-wing varieties. This section will pay attention to right-wing populist movements, very close to their traditional nationalist predecessors. This corresponds to the situation in the biggest part of Europe, and in the US, where nationalist topics are being put forward by the right-wing populist. [ 27 ]

However, it has become quite clear that nationalism is only one of the political “isms” attracting the right-wing populists. The migration crisis has brought to the forefront populist self-identification with linguistic-cultural communities (“we, French speaking people” for the former, “we Christians” for the later) that goes beyond nationalism.

Jan-Werner Müller (2016) and Cas Mudde (2007) note that the form common to all sorts of populism is quite simple and describe it as “thin”. Mudde explains: “Populism is understood as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the People” (2007: 23). Populism, so defined, has two opposites: elitism and pluralism. First, there is the elite vs. people (“underdog”) contrast. Second, it is possible to distinguish two ways of characterizing “the people”: either in terms of social status (class, income-level, etc.) or in terms of ethnic and/or cultural belonging (see also de Cleen 2017).

The second, horizontal dimension distinguishes the predominantly left-wing from the predominantly right-wing populisms and leaves a place for a centrist populist option. Take classical strong ethnic nationalism. The relation between right-wing populism and such a nationalism is very tight. This has led some theoreticians (Taguieff 2015) to present “nationalist populism” as the only kind of populism. The term captures exactly the synthesis of populism and the strong ethnic nationalism or nativism. From populism, it takes the general schema of anti-elitism: the leader is addressing directly the people and is allegedly following the people’s interest. From nationalism, it takes the characterization of the people: it is the ethnic community, in most cases the state-owing ethnic community, or the ethno-nation. In his work, Mudde documents the claim that purely right-wing populists claim to represent the true people who form the true nation and whose purity is being muddied by new entrants. In the United States, one can talk about populist and reactionary movements, like the Tea Party, that have emerged through the recent experience of immigration, terrorist attacks, and growing economic polarization. We have to set aside here, for reasons of space, the main populist alternative (or quasi-alternative) to national populism. In some countries, like Germany, some populist groups-parties (e.g., German AfD party (Alternative for Germany)), appeal to properties much wider in their reach than ethno-national belonging, typically to religious affiliations. Others combine this appeal with the ethno-national one. This yields what Riva Kastoryano (2006) calls “transnational nationalism”.

Interestingly, liberal nationalism is not very attractive to the populists. On the theoretical side one can note that Tamir (2019) sees her liberal nationalism as a good recipe against the threat of demagogues like Trump and Boris Johnson (she avoids the use of the label “populist”, e.g., 2019: 31).

The rise of populism is changing the political playfield one must work with. The tolerant (liberal nationalist or anti-nationalist) views are confronting new problems in the populist age marked by migration crisis, etc. The dangers traditionally associated with military presence are gone; the national populists have to invent and construct a presumed danger that comes into the country together with foreign families, including those with children. In short, if these conjectures hold, the politicians and theoreticians are faced with a change. The traditional issue of the contrast between patriotism/nationalism and cosmopolitanism has changed its profile: the current drastic contrast is between the populist aversion to the foreigners-migrants and a more generous attitude of acceptance and Samaritan help. Finally, the populist understanding of “our people” (“we-community”) encompasses not only nationalist options but also goes way beyond it. The important element is the promiscuous character of the populist choices. It is probable that the future scholarship on nationalism will mainly focus on this new and challenging playfield, with an aim to address the new contrast and locate kinds of nationalism in relation to it. [ 28 ]

The migration crisis has made the nation-state in global context the central political topic concerning nationality. Before moving on to current events, the state of art before the crisis should be summarized. First, consider the debates on territory and nation and issues of global justice.

Liberal nationalists try to preserve the traditional nationalist link between ethnic “ownership” of the state and sovereignty and territorial control, but in a much more flexible and sophisticated setting. Tamar Meisels thus argues in favor of “taking existing national settlements into account as a central factor in demarcating territorial boundaries” since this line “has both liberal foundations” (i.e., in the work of John Locke) and liberal-national appeal (2009: 159) grounded in its affinity with the liberal doctrine of national self-determination. She combines it with Chaim Gans’ (2003: Ch. 4) interpretation of “historical right” claims as “the right to formative territories”. She thus combines “historical arguments, understood as claims to formative territories”, with her argument from settlement and insists on their interplay and mutual reinforcement, presenting them as being “most closely related to, and based on, liberal nationalist assumptions and underlying ideas” (Meisels 2009: 160). She nevertheless stresses that more than one ethnic group can have formative ties to a given territory, and that there might be competing claims based on settlement. [ 29 ] But, given the ethno-national conflicts of the twentieth century, one can safely assume that culturally plural states divided into isolated and closed sub-communities glued together merely by arrangements of modus vivendi are inherently unstable. Stability might therefore require that the pluralist society envisioned by liberal culturalists promote quite intense intra-state interaction between cultural groups in order to forestall mistrust, reduce prejudice, and create a solid basis for cohabitation.

But where should one stop? The question arises since there are many geographically open, interacting territories of various sizes. Consider first the geographical openness of big continental planes, then add the modern ease of interaction (“No island is an island any more”, one could say), and, finally and dramatically, the substantial ecological interconnectedness of land and climate. Here, the tough nationalistic line is no longer proposed seriously in ethical debates, so the furthest pro-national extreme is in fact a relatively moderate stance, exemplified by Miller in the works listed. Here is a typical proposal of his concerning global justice based on nation-states: it might become a matter of national pride to have set aside a certain percentage of GDP for developmental goals—perhaps for projects in one particular country or group of countries (2013: 182).

This brings us to the topic of migrations, and the heated debate on the present scene. [ 30 ] In Europe immigration is probably the main topic of the present day populist uproar, and in the United States it is one of the main topics. So, immigration plus the nationalist-populist reactions to it are in the current decade the main testing ground for nationalist and cosmopolitan views.

Let’s look at the pro-national side in the debate. Liberal nationalists, in particular Miller, have put forward some thoughtful pro-nationalist proposal concerning immigration. Miller’s proposal allows refugees to seek asylum temporarily until the situation in their country of origin improves; it also limits economic migration. Miller argues against the defensibility of a global standard for equality, opportunity, welfare, etc., because measures of just equality are context-bound. People do have the right to a minimum standard of living, but the right to migrate only activates as a last resort after all other measures within a candidate-migrant’s country of origin have been tried. However, he also (particularly in his book on “Strangers in our midst”, 2016), claims that national responsibility to accept immigrant refugees is balanced by considerations of the interest of would-be immigrants and the interests that national communities have in maintaining control over their own composition and character.

If we agree with the liberal nationalists on the positive side, we can ask about the dynamics of the help required for the immigrants. Distinguish at least three stages, first, the immediate emergency (starvation, freezing, urgent medical problems) and catering to it, second, settlement and learning (on the host and the immigrant newcomer side), and third, the stage of (some kind of) citizenship, of relatively stable life in the host country.

In the first phase, the immediate help comes first, both normatively and causally: just accept the would-be refugees (indeed, the would-be refugees should be helped in leaving their countries and travelling to the host country). In longer term, staying should involve opportunity for work and training.

But there is more. The Samaritan obligation can and should function as a preparation for wider global activity. [ 31 ] So, we have two theoretical steps, first, accepting Samaritanism and second, agreeing with deeper trans-national measure of blocking distant causes, like poverty and wars in the Third world. Let us call this “Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model”. The model is geared to the dramatically changed playground in which the nationalism issues are played out in the context of populism and refugee crisis, raising issues that were not around two decades ago.

In presenting the claims that the pro-nationalists defend, we have proceeded from the more radical towards more liberal nationalist alternatives. In examining the arguments for these claims, we have presented metaphysically demanding communitarian arguments resting upon deep communitarian assumptions about culture, such as the premise that the ethno-cultural nation is the most important community for all individuals. This is an interesting and respectable claim, but its plausibility has not been established. The moral debate about nationalism has resulted in various weakenings of culture-based arguments, typically proposed by liberal nationalists, which render the arguments less ambitious but much more plausible. Having abandoned the old nationalist ideal of a state owned by a single dominant ethno-cultural group, liberal nationalists have become receptive to the idea that identification with a plurality of cultures and communities is important for a person’s social identity. They have equally become sensitive to trans-national issues and more willing to embrace a partly cosmopolitan perspective. Liberal nationalism has also brought to the fore more modest, less philosophically or metaphysically charged arguments grounded in concerns about justice. These stress the practical importance of ethno-cultural membership, ethno-cultural groups’ rights to have injustices redressed, democratic rights of political association, and the role that ethno-cultural ties and associations can play in promoting just social arrangements.

The events in the current decade, the refugee crisis and the rise of right-wing populism, have dramatically changed the relevant practical and theoretical playground. The traditional nationalism is still relevant, but populist nationalism attracts much more attention: new theories are being produced and debated, coming to occupy the center stage. On the other hand, migration crisis has replaced the typical cosmopolitan issue of solidarity-with-distant-strangers with burning issues of helping refugees present at our doors. Of course, the causes of the crisis are still the same ones that cosmopolitans have been worrying about much earlier: wars and dramatically unequal global distribution of goods, and of threats, like illnesses and climate disasters. The task of the theory is now to connect these deeper issues with the new problems occupying the center-stage of the new playground; it is a challenge now formulated in somewhat different vocabulary and within different political conceptual frameworks than before.

This is a short list of books on nationalism that are readable and useful introductions to the literature. First, two contemporary classics of social science with opposing views are:

• Gellner, Ernest, 1983, Nations and Nationalism , Oxford: Blackwell.
• Smith, Anthony D., 1991, National Identity , Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Three presentations of liberal nationalism, two of them by the same author, Yael Tamir, offer the best introduction to the approach:

• Miller, David, 1995, On Nationality , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0198293569.001.0001
• Tamir, Yael, 1993, Liberal Nationalism , Press, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• –––, 2019, Why Nationalism , Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Two short and readable introductions are:

• Özkirimli, Umut, 2010, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction , second edition, London: Palgrave Macmillan. First edition is 2000; third edition is 2017.
• Spencer, Philip and Howard Wollman, 2002, Nationalism, A Critical Introduction , London: Sage.

The two best anthologies of high-quality philosophical papers on the morality of nationalism are:

• McKim, Robert and Jeff McMahan (eds), 1997, The Morality of Nationalism , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Couture, Jocelyne, Kai Nielsen, and Michel Seymour (eds.), 1998, Rethinking Nationalism , Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Supplement Volume 22, Calgary, AB: University of Calgary Press.

The debate continues in:

• Miscevic, Nenad (ed), 2000, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Philosophical Perspectives , La Salle and Chicago: Open Court.
• Dieckoff, Alain (ed.), 2004, The Politics of Belonging: Nationalism, Liberalism, and Pluralism , Lanham: Lexington.
• Primoratz, Igor and Aleksandar Pavković (eds), 2007, Patriotism, Philosophical and Political Perspectives , London: Ashgate.
• Breen, Keith and Shane O’Neill (eds.), 2010, After the Nation? Critical Reflections on Nationalism and Postnationalism , London: Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1057/9780230293175

A good brief sociological introduction to nationalism in general is:

• Grosby, Steven, 2005, Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction , Oxford: Oxford University Press.

and to the gender-inspired criticism of nationalism is:

• Yuval-Davis, Nira, 1997, Gender & Nation , London: Sage Publications.
• Heuer, Jennifer, 2008, “Gender and Nationalism”, in Herb and Kaplan 2008: vol. 1, 43–58.
• Hogan, Jackie, 2009, Gender, Race and National Identity: Nations of Flesh and Blood , London: Routledge.

The best general introduction to the communitarian-individualist debate is still:

• Avineri, Shlomo and Avner de-Shalit (eds.), 1992, Communitarianism and Individualism , Oxford: Oxford University Press.

For a non-nationalist defense of culturalist claims see:

• Kymlicka, Will (ed.), 1995a, The Rights of Minority Cultures , Oxford: Oxford University Press.

A very readable philosophical defense of very moderate liberal nationalism is:

• Gans, Chaim, 2003, The Limits of Nationalism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511490231

And for application to Central Europe see:

• Auer, Stefan, 2004, Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe , London: Routledge.

A polemical, witty and thoughtful critique is offered in:

• Barry, Brian, 2001, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism , Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

And a more recent one in

• Kelly, Paul, 2015, “Liberalism and Nationalism”, in The Cambridge Companion to Liberalism , Steven Wall (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 329–352. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139942478.018

Interesting critical analyses of group solidarity in general and nationalism in particular, written in the traditions of rational choice theory and motivation analysis, are:

• Hardin, Russell, 1985, One for All, The Logic of Group Conflict , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Yack, Bernard, 2012, Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

There is a wide offering of interesting sociological and political science work on nationalism, which is beginning to be summarized in:

• Motyl, Alexander (ed.), 2001, Encyclopedia of Nationalism , Volumes I and II, New York: Academic Press.

A fine encyclopedic overview is:

• Herb, Guntram H. and David H. Kaplan, 2008, Nations and Nationalism: a Global Historical Overview , four volumes, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio.

A detailed sociological study of life under nationalist rule is:

• Billig, Michael, 1995, Banal Nationalism , London: Sage Publications.

The most readable short anthology of brief papers for and against cosmopolitanism (and nationalism) by leading authors in the field is:

• Cohen, Joshua (ed.), 1996, For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism , Martha Nussbaum and respondents, Boston, MA: Beacon Press
• Anderson, Benedict, 1983 [2006], Imagined Communities , London: Verso; revised edition, 2006.
• Aron, Raymond, 1962, Paix et guerre entre les nations , Paris: Calmann-Levy. Translated as Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations , Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (trans), Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965.
• Balibar, Etienne and Immanuel Wallerstein, 1988 [1991], Race, nation, classe: les identités ambiguës , Paris: Editiones La Découverte; translated as Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities , Chris Turner (trans.), London-New York: Verso.
• Barber, Benjamin R., 1996, “Constitutional Faith”, in J. Cohen (ed.) 1996: 30–37.
• –––, 1996, Jihad Vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World , New York: Ballantine Books.
• Barry, Brian, 1999, “Statism and Nationalism: a Cosmopolitan Critique”, in Shapiro and Brilmayer 1999: 12–66.
• –––, 2001, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism , Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
• Bauböck, Reiner, 2004, “Territorial or Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities?”, in Dieckoff 2004: 221–258.
• Bechhofer, Frank and David McCrone (eds.), 2009, National Identity, Nationalism and Constitutional Change , London: Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1057/9780230234147
• Bell, Duncan (ed.), 2008, Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Berlin, Isaiah, 1976, Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas , London: The Hogarth Press.
• –––, 1979, “Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power”, in Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas , London: Hogarth Press, 333–355.
• Betts, Alexander and Paul Collier, 2017, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System , London: Penguin.
• –––, 2017, “Banal Nationalism and the Imagining of Politics”, in Everyday Nationhood: Theorising Culture, Identity and Belonging after Banal Nationalism , Michael Skey and Marco Antonsich (eds.), London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 307–321. doi:10.1057/978-1-137-57098-7_15
• Blake, Michael, 2013, Justice and Foreign Policy , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552009.001.0001
• Breuilly, John, 2001, “The State”, in Motyl (ed.) 2001: Volume 1.
• –––, 2011, “On the Principle of Nationality”, in The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought , Gareth Stedman Jones and Gregory Claeys (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 77–109. doi:10.1017/CHOL9780521430562.005
• Breuilly, John, John Hutchinson, and Eric Kaufmann (eds), 2019, special issue on populism and nationalism in Nations and Nationalism , 25(1): 1–400.
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• –––, 2013, “Language, Religion and the Politics of Difference”, Nations and Nationalism , 19(1): 1–20. doi:10.1111/j.1469-8129.2012.00562.x
• –––, 2015, Grounds for Difference , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Buchanan, Allen, 1991, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec , Boulder: Westview Press.
• –––, 2004, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0198295359.001.0001
• Buchanan, Allen and Margaret Moore (eds.), 2003, States, Nations and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511613937
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• Canovan, Margaret, 1996, Nationhood and Political Theory , Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
• –––, 2000, “Patriotism Is Not Enough”, British Journal of Political Science , 30(3): 413–432. doi:10.1017/S000712340000017X
• –––, 2001, “Sleeping Dogs, Prowling Cats and Soaring Doves: Three Paradoxes in the Political Theory of Nationhood”, Political Studies , 49(2): 203–215. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.00309
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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Nussbaum, Martha C. 2002, “ Beyond the Social Contract: Toward Global Justice ”, Tanner Lecture, Australian National University.
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• Global Policy Forum , has papers on the future of nation-states.
• Academy of European Law , at the European University Institute.
• Territory and Justice network: repository of pre-publication papers .

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Inclusive and Exclusive Nationalism

Last updated 22 Jun 2020

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Another all-encompassing distinction derives from inclusive nationalism and exclusive nationalism (Dowds and Young, 1996).

In accordance with the inclusive strand of nationalism, members of a community are encouraged to accept and uphold those that symbolise a nation. Members may join a nation on a voluntary basis via the process of citizenship. Inclusive nationalism also celebrates liberal values of diversity and tolerance . Under the inclusive approach to nationalism, the individual needs a secure national identity to experience a life of liberty. Furthermore, inclusive nationalists adopt the prevalent values and parameters of a liberal democratic regime. Mainstream nationalist parties within a liberal democracy adopt a firmly inclusive tone.

In contrast, the more exclusive strand of nationalism is commonly associated with more authoritarian regimes in which the political culture does not embrace that of liberal democratic values. Such groups are racialist and – at times – overtly racist in their outlook. Evidence of this point is the renaissance in nationalist feeling within parts of Eastern Europe since the collapse of Communism. Exclusive nationalism is also a feature of ultra-nationalist parties and pressure groups that are commonly labelled as ‘fascist’ including Britain First, Jobbik, Alternative for Deutschland and Golden Dawn.

The distinction between inclusive and exclusive nationalism can also be understood via the political spectrum. Inclusive nationalism is located nearer to centre of the political spectrum, whereas exclusive nationalism is further to the right. The key dividing line between them is their attitude towards others .

Exclusive nationalism centres upon the need to scapegoat ‘others’ for that nation’s social ills. However, liberal nationalists are strongly opposed to the xenophobia, ignorance and prejudice that represents the very worst excesses of nationalism. For instance, the Italian theorist Giuseppe Garibaldi once argued that national self-determination is rooted in the popular will of the people to govern themselves. He argued in favour of the unification of Italy (or Risorgimento) on an inclusive basis. In contrast, exclusive nationalism has been expressed in the belligerent rhetoric of Donald Trump. The style in which he blamed Mexicans during the presidential campaign and his pledge to build a wall to keep them out of the United States are worth considering in this context.

Moreover, at its most extreme exclusive nationalism transforms into the ideology of fascism . There is a considerable overlap between fascist groups and nationalists on the far-right in regard to their anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, anti-globalisation and anti-establishment position. Indeed, fascism itself is an ideology built upon an ultra-nationalist standpoint - so whereas most nationalists could never be depicted a fascist, all fascists are (ultra)nationalists. In complete contrast, inclusive nationalism is consistent with the politics of compromise that lie at the very heart of any liberal democracy. To use a useful analogy, exclusive nationalism adopts a ‘drawbridge up’ approach. It is therefore more insular than the ‘drawbridge down’ attitude associated with inclusive nationalists such as the Italian liberal theorist Giuseppe Mazzini.

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